Muizzu’s Victory: Implications for India-China Rivalry
In an anarchical international system, smaller states often find
it challenging to exercise complete sovereignty over their territory amidst
unbridled strategic competition. Maldives, an archipelagic state in the Indian
Ocean, finds itself in such a situation in the light of great power competition
in its vicinity. The recent Presidential elections in Maldives concluded with
the victory of People’s National Congress (PNC) candidate Mohamed Muizzu. During
the campaign, widely considered pro-China, Muizzu consistently alleged a threat to the nation’s sovereignty
by the presence of the Indian military on the small archipelagic state as part
of PNC’s “India out” strategy. Central to the election campaign were hawkish
debates among contesting parties on whether India or China would have an
influential say in Male’s politics.
It’s clear that the 470-mile territory, with a
population of about half a million, does not have much to offer in terms of natural resources or markets.
However, being strategically located at the center of the Indian Ocean, the
26-atoll island nation provides vantage points for monitoring &
surveillance of vital shipping lanes in the region. Maldives is just 70
nautical miles from Minicoy, the Southernmost part of the Indian Union Territory
of Lakshadweep. Unlike China, India
has a rich history of engagement with the Maldives, dating back to ancient
times. But, over the last decade, the strategic competition has become sharper
in the Indian Ocean due to China’s diplomatic overtures and financial
assistance to states in what experts call ‘India’s Backyard.’ Therefore, the increasing
Chinese influence in Maldives carries potential security implications for New
Delhi.
China’s ‘String of Pearls’
design amplified Male’s emergence in Beijing’s geopolitical calculus. Its relations with the Maldives gained ground during the tenure of former Maldivian President Abdulla Yameen
(2013-2018), who, similar to Muizzu, had an anti-India stance since his rival
Mohamed Nasheed was supported by India. China, after President Xi Jinping’s
state visit to Maldives in 2014, invested heavily in infrastructural projects
while leasing some of its islands in the name of developing the island state’s
tourism industry, made possible with the promulgation of law in July 2015,
allowing the territories to be leased to foreign parties investing over $ 1
billion. Under President Yameen’s rule, Maldives also became one of the first
countries to sign the agreement, supporting China’s Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI).
In February 2018, former President Mohamed Nasheed accused China of
being “busy buying up the Maldives,” which was reprehensibly dismissed by
China. The accusation, however, turned out to be accurate as Chinese debt today
constitutes 30 percent of Maldives’ $6 billion economy. The country now under
the helm of former President Yameen’s protégé, Muizzu, should learn from its
neighbor, Sri Lanka’s experience: that Chinese monetary showers can be
nefarious, with strings attached. Unlike India, China’s long-term
strategy for the Indian Ocean region foresees control
over the strategic assets of countries in its bid to gain a predominant
foothold over the maritime commons. In acuminous contrast to the Chinese nature of engagement,
India has always been a first responder in times of distress, be it Operation
Cactus of 1998, the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, the water crisis in 2014, or
the Covid pandemic in the Maldives. This has generated significant goodwill
among Maldivians, which can also be attributed to India’s community-centric
projects involving a broad range of infrastructure, from law enforcement and
water supply to mosques and parks.
While many commentators
and news reports labeled the victory of supposedly pro-China Muizzu as a blowback for India’s strategic interests, the
reality tells a different story. The President-elect has given contradictory
signals, stating that he might review while not disturbing some ongoing Indian
projects. If he chooses to scrap India’s projects, he might incur discontent
from the Maldivians as most ongoing projects are community centric. The case of
pro-China Yameen is particularly striking. During his tenure as President, he declined India’s invitation to join the Milan
Exercise and the latter’s gift involving helicopters. At the same time, he
visited New Delhi thrice while signing a defense agreement with its neighbor in
2018. Similarly, during his term, the former and staunch pro-India President
Mohamed Nasheed presided over the country’s one of the largest projects
financed by China. Therefore, the classic political dynamic of the paradox
between talk and the walk could be repeated.
President-elect
Muizzu will face affinitive economic challenges like the previous
administration and is likely to opt for foreign-funded contracts that are viable
and aligned with national interests to ensure a way out of its developmental
challenges, including unemployment and connectivity gaps. This means that despite Muizzu’s reservations against India,
it needs to constructively engage with the newly elected President and offer rewarding alternatives. India might
have stepped up its game in the recent past, but it still languishes in the
pace of delivery. She
would need to up its game to walk the talk of “Neighborhood first” to reinforce
its strategic presence and match China’s precipitous delivery of
infrastructural projects. Considering increased commercial stakes, China would
want to preserve its strategic gains in the archipelagic state. Therefore, it
is incumbent upon India to protect its ‘pre-eminence’ and maintain stakes in
one of the most politically unstable nations in the region. The time for India
to act on “time-tested” ties is now.
Author’s Bio: Arudra
Singh is a researcher and writer at the Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers.
He is a Master’s student at the Jindal School of
International Affairs.