Russia and Ceasefire: Lessons from 125 Years

Now that settlement talks over the Russo-Ukraine War have broken down, many observers may be wondering what comes next. Some recent analysis predicts much heavy fighting ahead, while many analysts are discovering that the road to any peace runs through Moscow. Indeed, as the Russo-Ukraine War started with decisions in the Kremlin, it will likely end in a similar fashion. The key question is: what will make Russians stop fighting? (This article is based on remarks made by the author during a panel discussion on 21 October 2024 at the University of Wisconsin.)

History is a useful guide to answering that question. Since 1900, Russia and the Soviet Union have fought in quite a few major wars and a host of smaller conflicts. Of the major wars, in only two – the Russian Civil War in the early 1920s and World War II in 1945 – did Russia win an outright victory; the rest ended in defeat or settlement short of total victory. The list of those conflicts includes:

A. The Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905

B. World War I, 1914-1918

C. The Russo-Polish War, 1919-1921

D. The summer 1939 Nomonhan clash with Imperial Japan

E. The Winter War against Finland in 1939-40

F. The 1960s border clashes with China

G. The 1989 withdrawal from Afghanistan after the 1979 invasion

Most of these conflicts ended with a negotiated settlement. Several were regarded as defeats, as they were ended short of Russian/Soviet objectives being achieved.

Why did Russia stop fighting, and pursue a settlement? These case studies show four major reasons, acting either alone or in concert with each other. First, sometimes the decision to stop resulted from the national leader’s decision. Czar Nicholas II felt he was out of options in the summer of 1905 after a string of reverses on sea and land and sued for peace. Vladimir Lenin in 1918 made peace with Imperial Germany to focus on keeping his fledgling government alive.  In 1989 Nikita Gorbachev decided to pull out of Afghanistan and regroup at home.

Second, there was often an inability or unwillingness to expend further resources. Nicholas was uninterested in fighting more in 1905, and Russia was exhausted and in disorder in 1918. The Soviets broke off the Nomonhan, Winter War, and the China clashes because they had interests elsewhere and decided there had been enough fighting.

Third, the decision to stop was sometimes influenced by disorder at home. It is no coincidence that major social changes were underway, or happened soon after, the ending of the conflicts in 1905, 1918, and 1989. Defeat on the battlefield, plus economic stresses of the war, had called into question the legitimacy of the government, and the leaders needed to get the fighting ended to try and shore up the domestic situation.

Fourth, a decision may be forced by significant damage to Russian forces. Bloody and humiliating defeats crippled Russian forces in Manchuria and at sea in 1905, while the Russian Army’s combat record in World War I was dismal. The titanic Polish victory at Warsaw in 1920 smashed several Soviet armies. The outnumbered Finns severely damaged Soviet forces, surprising many observers, and the Afghan mujahedeen frustrated Soviet air and ground units alike.

Several of these factors are present in the current Russo-Ukraine War, which started in 2014 and has been raging in its present phase since 2022. Both sides have suffered severe losses and are nearing exhaustion of resources. However, Russian President Vladimir Putin has staked much personally and professionally on the war’s outcome, and it will be difficult for him to back out without risking his government’s collapse and possibly his life. Peace will remain elusive as long as Putin is in office, but changing governments is not a panacea; it is well to remember that Russia fought for nearly a year after Nicholas II abdicated in March 1917.

It is worth noting that even if peace happens, there is a good chance that borders will change. Every one of the conflicts prior to 1941 cited above resulted in some form of territorial exchange. The Winter War is especially analogous, as Finland was forced to cede 9% of its territory to end the fighting.  

The only thing predictable about the Russo-Ukraine War is its unpredictability. But if history is any guide, one or more of these factors may combine to create a resolution. In the meantime, fighting will continue.