Operation EPIC FURY, the Israeli-American coordinated campaign executed from February to April 2026, was designed to dismantle the Iranian regime, decimate Iran’s nuclear capability and maintain freedom of navigation for commerce through the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). While the operation’s strategic objectives were clear it has also acted as one of modern days greatest examples of multi-domain operations and events for academia to draw lessons from for any future conflict. The decade’s first example with Russia’s campaign in Ukraine, identified lessons regarding the use of drone warfare and ground operations, while Operation EPIC FURY is a prime example for the use of conventional naval and air power. One of the most important lessons that can be taken from the last few months impacted both the United States Navy (USN) and United States Air Force (USAF), this being the criticality of what is known as Access, Basing and Overflight (ABO). While this concept is essential to surface based air power, either on land or sea, it shares a commonality between the West Asian theater and Eastern Asian theater. The lesson of ABO taken from Operation EPIC FURY can directly impact any military operations conducted in the Indo-Pacific theater.

During the few months of conflict ABO has fluctuated for the U.S. military as access has been impacted by Iranian efforts in the SoH, basing has been under daily assault by Iranian drones and ballistic missiles and overflight has shifted with the diplomatic relationships with Arabic nations around Iran. Access to the SoH and the Gulf of Oman (GoO) is essential for the USN, namely the USS Gerald R. Ford and USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Groups (CSG), so that sea-based aircraft can support land-based air packages from other basing locations in the area. Throughout the operation U.S. forces have used the same bases they have been for the last thirty years as many of them were previously used in combat during Operation DESERT STORM and following Global War on Terror. Thus, the Iranians could easily identify where to launch counter attacks to deal the most damage to the Israeli-American military forces. These bases included a total of 18 separate U.S. military sites, but the major hubs were Al Udeid Air Base (Qatar), Prince Sultan Air Base (Saudi Arabia), Ali Al Salem Air Base (Kuwait), Al Dhafra Air Base (UAE), Camp Victory (Iraq), and Muwaffaq Salti Air Base (Jordan). These six key bases were not only the locations where the USAF concentrated their air assets, but were the primary targets for Iranian retaliation.

          At the start of U.S. combat operations against Iran in late February, it was essential for U.S. CSGs to have access to the SoH and GoO, as sea-based aircraft like the F/A-18 Super Hornet, F-35C Lightning II, E-2 Hawkeye are some of the essential aircraft assisting with both kinetic strikes in Iran and command and control of strike packages. While the CSGs did have access to the SoH and GoO, permitting their aircraft to operate within 100 nautical miles from Iran, this state of operation is near impossible when translated to the East and South China Seas (ECS/SCS). Iran during Operation EPIC FURY could only threaten U.S. naval assets with long range drones and volleys of ballistic missiles, the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) in maintains an inventory of DF (land launched), JL (submarine launched) and PL (air launched) missiles that can threaten not only large naval vessels but high valued air assets as well. These capabilities significantly push back any naval asset hundreds of nautical miles to ensure survival against these advanced missile systems, degrading any ability by sea-based aircraft to participate in strike operations within the theater.

While access in the Indo-Pacific theater will be challenged, Operation EPIC FURY has also identified the lesson about dispersed land-based airpower. As mentioned, the U.S. massed aircraft between six primary bases in the theater. Each of which have experienced daily ballistic missile volleys from Iran and drone attacks from Iran proper or Iranian Aligned Militia Groups (IAMG) restricting aircraft from taking off safely and conducting strike packages to target launch locations within Iran. Just as it was clear where the U.S. was massing airpower in the West Asian theater, so too will it be evident in the Indo-Pacific theater. Notably some of the U.S. bases near China include naval and air bases in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, all of which would be seriously threatened by PLA close range missiles and military capabilities. This connection demands that any military force operating within the Indo-Pacific theater must learn from Operation EPIC FURY and prepare their force to counter the “glass cannon paradox”. By this it means that any force needs to be able to maximize offensive output while also sustaining the ability to defend itself from an adversary onslaught.

Regarding overflight, defined as “permission for military aircraft to pass over a specific country or territory” has been tenuous during Operation EPIC FURY. Each location that U.S. aircraft are based they also require overflight authorized by the host nation just to take off. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, UAE and Qatar have adjusted their stance with the U.S. as any acceptance of U.S. military aircraft taking off from within their borders to then strike Iran places significant diplomatic pressure on these nations. Additionally, it forces host nations to accept retaliatory strikes from drones and ballistic missiles increasing the risk to civilians and national infrastructure. While overflight has been fluid across the Arabic nations, in the Indo-Pacific, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) may also play a significant role in the theater. ASEAN stands resolute that the countries within this diplomatic organization do not choose sides between the U.S. and China nor seek warfare so to preserve the economic growth of the organization. This means that any nation seeking overflight of nations such as the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia or their territorial waters for combat operations against China may be diplomatically restricted. Thus, placing an additional burden for any operations in the theater as a direct lesson from the last few months of conflict against Iran.

Each of these areas of concern, military access to the battlespace, military basing around the operating area, and overflight for air transit, are significant lessons drawn from Operation EPIC FURY. The lesson that modern navies must adjust from a more permissive area allowing naval access, to a significant geographic distance for naval vessels is challenge never seen in modern conflict. The lesson that modern militaries must sustain a force that does not fall to the “glass cannon paradox” pressuring significant investment in military capabilities for both offense and defense simultaneously, and further pressuring modern military leadership to accept more risk than originally comfortable. The lesson that diplomacy is even more critical during the use of military force to maintain overflight is an aspect of military operations not previously thought of as a significant issue. Each of these lessons combined identifies how Operation EPIC FURY has taught lessons about ABO, and how ABO as a concept is a standing requirement. And it is imperative that any military forces observe how these challenges have impacted U.S. operations in their current theater, and how they can translate to other theaters around the globe.

The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of War, the Department of the Air Force, or the U.S. Government.