America’s 21st Century Raiders:  Punitive Expeditions and Counter Terrorism Doctrine Reformed

By: Grant T. Willis, Capt., USAF | May 31st, 2026

 

“Let us admit it fairly, as a business people should,
We have had no end of a lesson: it will do us no end of good.”

—The Lesson, by Rudyard Kipling (1901) [1]

 

Defining the Threat

 

America’s enemies will always have a vote.  Whether we unilaterally declare a war finished or proclaim victory, the enemy will only accept defeat when THEY decide to.  Ceasefires, pull outs, or withdrawals do not serve as definitive ends to irregular wars while our enemies continue to pursue hostilities against us regardless of our timetables.  The nature of Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) is to play a longer game than our society has the attention span for, and they’re determined to harm our citizens at every opportunity.  Regardless of this determination amongst America’s enemies, our mentality as a nation tends to wish for a clear beginning, middle, and end of its wars.  In the counterinsurgency game, a clear ending, like the last page of a book is often elusive and leads to disillusionment and an exhausted national will to carry on an “endless” or “forever” war.  Indeed, the terrorist threat to America is an endless and forever state of being, and the capacity and necessity to meet that challenge is likewise never-ending.

 

Figure 1: The bombardment of the Tripolitan fleet and fortifications on 3 August 1804 by an American naval squadron

Although we continue to prepare our conventional forces for battle against Russia or China, there will be, for the foreseeable future, non-state entities which seek to harm our citizens at home and interests abroad.  From the birth of our nation, VEOs have sought to make war on the United States, starting with the Barbary States as early as 1785, when Berber corsairs under the Pasha of Algeria began a series of attacks upon American merchant vessels transiting the Mediterranean.[2]  As a result of multiple years of Islamic state sponsored pirates taking vessels, their cargo, and forcing American sailors into slavery, Congress authorized bribes to the Barbary despots.  The payoffs and their sums continued to rise.  The First Nation to officially declare war on the United States after 1783 was the barbary state of Tripoli in 1801, after a large bribe was requested by the Pirates and refused by the Jefferson administration.  The previous administrations of George Washington and John Adams had acquiesced to the Berber demands, but by 1801 Jefferson would not.[3]  Punitive military action against the states of Algeria, Tunis, and Tripoli required the establishment of the U.S. Navy in 1794 to project power abroad against the first enemy of the new Republic, Islamic fundamentalists.  The 1794 Naval Act begins by stating,

 

“WHEREAS the depredations committed by the Algerine corsairs on the commerce of the United States render it necessary that a naval force should be provided for its protection…”[4] 

 

After years of paying handsome bribes, the sword acted as a corrective instrument against state sponsored piracy by Islamic radicals who used their interpretation of the Quran as an excuse to attack “non-believers”.  Jefferson also sought to rescue American citizens held as slaves, and secure freedom of maritime navigation.  Navy squadrons brought themselves under the guns of the great fortifications of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, braved the Berber Corsairs in battle, and inserted special forces teams of Marines and sailors to build internal allies by, with, and through to defeat the enemy and bend them our terms.  The small American teams marched hundreds of local partner irregulars to Barbary strongholds, and with American audacity, led their them to victory over the marauders.  Supported by the mobile guns of the American squadrons offshore, the famous line of the Marine Corps hymn, “…to the shores of Tripoli” was coined by these 18th century versions of Green Berets or MARSOC Raiders.  When the Tripolitan city of Derna fell, the Stars and Stripes flew, for the first time, over enemy soil abroad.[5]  Not to remain or occupy for decades building a new government in our image, but to inspire the world to stand up to a tyranny which no one before dared to confront, execute corrective action, and withdraw without quagmire.  Punitive campaigns are commonplace throughout our history such as the Battle of the Pearl River Forts in 1856[6], The U.S. Expedition to Korea in 1871[7], The Mexican Expedition of 1916 to 1917[8], The Mayaguez incident in 1975[9], Operation Urgent Fury 1983[10], Bekkaa valley Strikes in 1983[11], Operation El Dorado in 1986[12], Operation Praying Mantis in 1988[13], Operation Infinite Reach in 1998[14], Operation Desert Fox in 1998[15], Operation Odyssey Lightning in 2016[16], the 2018 U.S. strikes on Syria[17], Operation Rough Rider in 2025[18], and Operation Midnight Hammer in 2025[19], just to name a few.

 

Figure 2: F-111 bombing run on Libyan Airfield 1986

Figure 3: U.S. troops in Mexico, 1916

The American populace and their post Global War on Terror (GWOT) sentiments of “war weariness” have resulted in a lack of will to support involvement in the long and costly process of nation building through expeditionary counterinsurgency.[20]  The U.S. Military must embrace a different doctrine and course of action to mitigate the threat from organizations bent on doing us harm while also retaining public support for limited military action. 

 

The American political system dictates civilian control and leadership over the military.[21]  That civilian authority is exercised by political leaders who are commissioned by the people of the United States to govern on their behalf.  If the people are dissatisfied with their leaders, they exercise their electoral power through elections.  Those political leaders are then put out of a job by their dissatisfied constituents.  Therefore, that vital variable in the exercise of military force by civilian leadership is the consent and support of our citizens.  To ignore the opinion of majority of the population is to slip into a compounding military hubris.  Author and naval historian Ian W. Toll wrote of our founding fathers’ earliest anxieties in committing the young American Republic to a long and endless struggle against radical Islam.  Toll recounts an exchange between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson on the prospects of engaging the Barbary States writing, 

…Adams did not believe the American people or their leaders were ready either to rebuild the navy or to fight a war in the Mediterranean. ‘We ought not to fight them at all,’ he wrote, unless we determine to fight them forever. This thought is, I fear, too rugged for our People to bear.’ The more likely outcome, Adams predicted, would be that the United States would fight for years at great expense, only to pay for peace in the end. He concluded with the pessimistic thought that the entire debate was irrelevant. Congress was so weak and indecisive, he told Jefferson that it would not be capable of doing anything at all about the Barbary threat: I perceive that neither Force nor Money will be applied… your Plan of fighting will no more be adopted than mine of negotiating.’ No effective response to the problem was possible, short of sweeping constitutional reform to correct the deficiencies of American government.”[22]

 

Upon reflection, many modern observers could view Adams’ and Jefferson’s points as rather prescient.

 

In On War, Prussian Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz states, “No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses does so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by the war and how he intends to conduct it.  The former is the political purpose; the latter its operational objective…the political object-the original motive for the war-will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.”[23]  In this maxim lies the primary duty of military professionals to assist in shaping civilian leaders’ political objectives and the necessary measure to achieve them without lazily moving the goalposts of those objectives.  It was James Madison ghost writing as Publius, in Federalist 10 who wrote, “Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm…”[24]  To clearly define the nature of the enemy and type of warfare to be fought will produce the force structure needed to meet the political objectives or challenge the feasibility of those objectives if they cannot be won through a military campaign.

 

To execute global Counter Terrorism (CT) operations post-GWOT, the United States MUST take the time to frame the nature of the problem.  American citizens, reeling from the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, will only accept low costs, short durations, and high precision.  The costs of such ventures will always be counted and skeptically reported.  It is vital that our professional joint warfare practitioners define the nature of the CT as it stands today.  CT professionals must weigh the supporting population’s perceptions at home and design a force capable of meeting our national security objectives with those public perceptions in mind.  American citizens’ wishes will dictate how the military is used by elected officials; therefore, the military must adapt its force structure to be able to strike anytime anywhere without flirting with quagmires and igniting “forever war” or “war weariness” hysteria amongst the public.[25]

 

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks by Al-Qaeda, public demands for retaliation sparked a punitive expedition to Afghanistan, but despite initial success against AQ and the Taliban with light losses, the war grew into a nation building adventure and counterinsurgency prompting several administrations with competing or often unclear objectives, sinking deeper into the sands of immeasurable progress resulting in a humiliating withdrawal in August 2021 and ultimate Taliban victory through forfeit.

 

Figure 4: Battle of Takhar Gar, 2002, Osprey Publishing

Definitions Define the War

 

If the above circumstances are generally correct, what kind of CT warfare must the United States engage in?  The answer lies within the Punitive Expedition: unrelenting, mobile, and undeterred lightning bolts struck from the sea, land, and air against far off enclaves and sanctuaries of VEOs within the nations whose own internal disintegration has allowed these groups to grow unimpeded.  Free to train, organize, plot, and export violence, these VEO’s can exercise the freedom of maneuver offered through the chaos found in “failed states”.  Our navy provides us with the ability to exercise joint CT fires in ways many nations can only dream of wielding.

 

It is fundamental for understanding this corollary to CT operations by comprehending the differences between counterinsurgency and counter terrorism.  This is not to say that counter insurgency should be neglected.  Valuable lessons in the execution of effective COIN operations have been won through great blood and sacrifice.[26]  However, executing American-led counterinsurgencies abroad is not on the bucket list of most American citizens after Iraq and Afghanistan and the political nightmare of convincing the public to not draw upon the “forever war” syndrome is a battle many may find difficult to master while retaining office.

 

The following definitions are necessary to understand:

 

–       Counterinsurgency (COIN) is a comprehensive effort to detach insurgents or rebels from the local community and methods of sustainment and support.[27]

 

–       Counter terrorism (CT) is best defined by Fabiana Natale as “Activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists, their organizations, and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals.”[28]

 

–       A punitive expedition is a military or other forceful action undertaken to punish a group, entity, or individual for perceived wrongdoings, often outside the territory of the punishing power. It’s a display of force meant to exact retribution, deter future misbehavior, or exert diplomatic pressure, rather than a full-scale war.[29]

 

Modern CT campaigns could be compared to the well-known historical military practice of so-called “Punitive Expeditions” and are often criticized as “ineffective” at dealing with the real problem of eradicating the ideology from the society it came.  But within many post-GWOT civil populations, we do not necessarily wish to invest in that counter-ideological effort through the long and costly adventures counterinsurgency produces.  That sentiment leaves professional CT forces with few other realistic options. 

Another consideration for the future is that we may not have the same basing access or enduring presence we have enjoyed in the post-WWII global order.  Troop drawdowns, domestic political decisions, and geopolitical events may drive American CT assets, once permanently based, out of regions which allow VEOs to grow in strength and organization without a continuous CT presence and pressure.  Some locations may not allow the U.S. basing access or diplomatic clearances to carry out kinetic actions or overflights against groups found hostile in the vicinity of those host nations who wish to not draw attention to themselves or invite domestic or geopolitical complications.  The current status quo is not guaranteed. As the fluidity of geopolitics and domestic demands shape foreign policy, the US must adapt its CT forces NOW to be ready to operate in defense of its citizens tomorrow.  One of our most unparalleled capabilities is our expeditionary projection through joint air and naval forces. Joint maritime mobility and its organic air power will grow in demand as well as its CT value.

 

With all the variables of the problem laid out above, the solution to maintaining a force capable of executing short, intense, and precise CT campaigns is the Joint Counter Terrorism Raiding Force (JCTRF) concept.  The JCTRF utilizes some of the most valuable combinations of joint capabilities possible.  These being the size of our Navy, its mobility, and the lethal joint nature of our special forces.

 

One of the major victories of the GWOT era are the lessons learned by American commando units and their supporting assets.  The battles fought through GWOT to post-GWOT have taught America’s joint forces invaluable lessons when combating terror groups and hybrid non state actors possessing everything from the AK-47 to kamikaze drones.  The threat these increasing well-armed groups pose is not going away any time soon.

 

The Solution and Order of Battle

 

To execute raiding operations and achieve our objectives, we must be mobile and hard-hitting.  To be mobile against the safe havens of these groups, we must take notes from our ancestors who fought this sort of enemy in the early 19th Century with cannon and shot.  We must strike from the mobility offered to us by the sea.  An effective and limited CT campaign with the intent to precisely raid enemy concentrations in their sanctuaries can be done from offshore.  The JCTRF’s primary mission is to set sail on short notice as a totally self-sufficient force, bring striking power across the globe whenever or wherever it is needed to quell VEOs, and significantly set them back.  This force, composed of joint special operations forces with capabilities on air, land, and sea, can project precise and overwhelming firepower.  The force would consist of a naval task force comprising the following:

 

Figure 5: Original Product: Grant Willis, 2025

Onboard the LHA or “SOF Carrier”, the air component supporting this force would comprise the following:

 

Figure 6: Original Product: Grant Willis, 2025

The airmobile direct action and special reconnaissance elements would include the following units:

 

Figure 7: Original Product: Grant Willis, 2025

The authorities would reside with a naval flag officer with the following:

 

Strike cell and joint operations center (JOC) on board with delegated target engagement authority (TEA), commanded by an O-6 or O-7. A 1 star or 2-star Admiral in overall joint command of JCTRF naval task force co-located with the JOC.

         

This joint mobile unit would act with all logistics and fire support self-contained with the intent to sustain continuous combat operations for 30 to 45 days.  Re-supply and re-fueling could be completed at sea after a brief pause in combat operations with a resumption required by the National Command Authority (NCA). 

 

The JCTRF would set off towards its intended target organization, hit them hard in their base areas, and return to their home station ready to re-coil like a ready spring to execute again if necessary.  Like a continuous game of “whack a mole”, the Raiding Force would train together and deploy together as a joint team, ready to respond unilaterally, if necessary, to any hot spot in which VEOs or non-state actors seek to challenge or threaten the United States.

 

We cannot take overseas basing for granted when planning to sustain an over-the-horizon strike capability.  Stealth bombers may be able to perform long-range global strike, but this process is long and requires multiple refueling aircraft who must station themselves from land bases along the intended strike route.  Diplomatic clearances and agreements for basing should always be cultivated to ensure forward basing, but it is not a variable we can assume will exist across the globe forever.  Large nuclear aircraft carrier strike groups require multiple escorts, and their aircraft have limited on-station times, and lack counter terror specialized assets to maintain persistent SOF strike ISR.  Unmanned, light weight, long endurance remotely piloted aircraft like the MQ-9 are still required to sustain precise kinetic fires on VEOs.  The Find, Fix, Target, Track, Engage, and Assess (F2T2EA) method continues to be the cornerstone of aerial CT warfare.  Bringing long on-station times (long amount of time over target) and precision strike ISR to SOF task forces while limiting the need to place American personnel in harm’s way will only increase in demand. 

 

Long transit times equal shorter on-station times, which leads to a lack in coverage and limited windows for strikes.  Many nations utilize MQ-9 variants, old and new, but none have the same reputation of frequency of use as the United States for their employment as strike platforms against VEOs in combat.  To adapt the capabilities of the MQ-9 to a more modern mobile CT force which does not require the same level of diplomatic allowances taken for granted today, we must look at carrier-based aviation upgrades to ensure that hard-fought and proven tactics do not fade away due to land-based limitations. 

 

Figure 8: Mojave STOL test on HMS Prince of Wales

Luckily, for the JCTRF concept, General Atomics (GA) has established and proven capabilities in their recent upgrades to the MQ-9 in the form of a carrier capable MQ-9B Short Take-Off and Landing (STOL) variant.[30] The MQ-9B STOL allows for foldable wings and is designed to be launched and recovered from amphibious assault ships or “helicopter carriers”.[31]  The air component for a SOF raiding force off a hostile coast could allow for a mobile air base, allowing for everything a SOF campaign would require, from unmanned strike ISR to rotary and fixed wing stealth fighters in the form of Marine Corps F-35Bs or AV8Bs.  The air component of this force will be supplemented by long range weapons and naval gunfire from surface escorts in the form of surface and subsurface launched Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missiles (TLAMs). The direct action and special reconnaissance elements can utilize the LHA and LPD for their staging and supply source, employing rotary aviation for insertion, extraction, CSAR, PR, and CAS on top of carrier MQ-9s and Marine VTOL fighters.  An accompanying nuclear submarine (SSN attack or SSGN guided missile) can provide significant strike options, SLUAS capabilities, covert insertion, and maritime interdiction.

 

Figure 9: MQ-9B STOL | General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc.

 

The Raiding Force’s maritime mobility creates more difficulty in targeting solutions for hybrid weapons which may be employed by an enemy VEO.  Whether it may be Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs), Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs), Uncrewed Vessels, or One Way Attack Unmanned Aerial Systems (OWAUAS), the naval squadron can provide localized air defense, Defensive Counter Air (DCA) and/or Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) used by rotary or fixed wing aircraft.[32]

 

With all strike capabilities from air, land, and sea contained within the JCTRF, the command element can exercise intent with a pre-set series of known targets prior to the execution of any D-Day as well as set dynamic targets in accordance with a Joint Priority Targeting List (JPTL).  There are several scenarios in which the JCTRF can effectively employ its capabilities as a “Punitive Expedition”.  Many enemy sanctuaries are established within failed states or nations unable to control their territory in the presence of an organized VEO or non-state entity with the intent to establish training areas, recruitment stations, command and control (C2), and weapons storage.[33]  If a group establishes a safe haven to plot, train, and carry out external operations against our homeland, the United States must have a mobile CT force that can unilaterally take decisive action in our nation’s defense to set hostile organizations back and force them to internally focus their efforts to sustain their own survival.

 

What It May Look Like In Action: Operation Askari Lightning, October 24th – November 22nd, 2031[34]

 

*The following scenario is one of fiction and introduces a hypothetical scenario in which the United States could effectively utilize the JCTRF concept.  The story is of the author’s conception and is not based on any ongoing or previous operations nor does it necessarily represent the views and opinions of the U.S. War Department or any of its components. 

 

A country in Africa, with a coastline, suffers for years under a brutal military dictatorship. Several dissident groups formed in rebellion against the government.  Years of tribal differences have split the population’s loyalties and civil war begins.  A radical Islamist element has taken root and declared its allegiance to another well-known terrorist organization hostile to the west and the United States.  As the regime struggles to maintain control over population centers, large areas of the countryside allow for the establishment of significant base areas for the new terror group and their patrons to move in with young foreign fighters to gain combat experience and training.  The VEO’s leadership makes proclamations across social media outlets calling for Jihad against the United States.  Religious leaders issue calls or “fatwas” for suicide attacks against Americans at home and abroad. 

A vehicle ramming attack against a street festival in an American Midwestern city is perpetrated by an individual who was motivated by online correspondence with VEO members who used an advanced AI software messaging system which identified and managed radicalization communication and coordination for targetable individuals.  The terror group from the failing African state, in their base area, executed their plans through an organized cyber network to inspire, fund, and coordinate homegrown attackers.[35] 14 Americans are dead, 10 injured, and 2 are in critical condition.  Intelligence methods reveal to the President that more attacks are planned, and training is active to take fighters from their sanctuary in the failed African state and bring them into the U.S.  Domestic agencies are hard at work to find and roll up known or suspected networks.  The time for action against the source of the attack is now.

The National Security Council (NSC) is assembled and the news media debates on what actions should be taken.  Many Americans are infuriated and demand action, but a great debate erupts across the traditional media outlets and on social media with congressional representatives and influencers making their cases for either action or caution.  Podcast hosts and news anchors flash memories of Afghanistan and Iraq and cite a “war weariness” amongst the population to not get involved in yet another so-called “forever war”.  Polling shows a call for retribution, but a lack of stomach or will to put “boots on the ground” or send money, arms, and advisors to support the brutal military regime which faces consistent global condemnation for its brutality.  The Congress is under majority control by the opposition party to the President and options to insert ground units to occupy closer airfields are deemed as “getting involved in another Iraq or Afghanistan”.  The President is between a rock and hard place.

 

Figure 10: New Orleans attack: New Orleans officers recovering, acted heroically: attorney | Fox News

Several options are presented to the NSC and President. There are no land bases other nations in the vicinity will allow the U.S. to launch strikes from in the area and long-range bombers must fly from the United States on 24+ hours requiring multiple refueling stages.  The bombers can reach the target area but cannot sustain a very long on station time. Certainly not long enough to precisely strike any High Value Individuals (HVIs) with a low collateral weapon in a populated area without high civilian casualties. To do that you need a long loiter time in the overhead and an asset that can employ lower collateral systems to maintain precision over multiple days of persistent surveillance.  These bomber strikes would be limited to known targets only and could not prosecute dynamic opportunities.  The nuclear-powered CSGs are committed to deterrence operations in the Pacific and Europe while others are undergoing maintenance and training. 

 

Figure 11: Terrorist fighters on parade

The other option is to send the 1st Joint Counter Terror Raiding Force.  After the JCTRF’s capabilities are presented in detail to the president’s NSC, the decision is unanimous.

 

Figure 12: SECNAV Names Future America-class Amphibious Assault Ship Fallujah – Naval News

The 1st JCTRF, centered around the America Class Amphibious Assault ship, USS Fallujah LHA-9[36], is underway, executing a combined NATO exercise off Portugal when orders arrive for all activity to cease and to rapidly sail for somewhere off the African coast, making all preparations for the sustainment of combat operations for at least 30 days. Fallujah and her escorts rapidly kick into gear.  The 6 months of pre-deployment joint training will now be tested.  Mission planning cells spin up, and intelligence and targeting packages are approved and updated.  Coordination with space and cyber assets within the force and in the United States is stepped up.  The Rear Admiral in command addresses the Raiding Force and a call from the President is broadcast to all units of the force.  A “Punitive Expedition” black pirate flag, specially made for the 1st JCTRF is hoisted above the flagship.  Days later, the American squadron arrives off the coast of the target territory.  The final execution order to commence Operation Askari Lightning now sits with the President.  The order is given by the President, “Execute.  Godspeed and good luck. America is with you.”

 

The first TLAMs are fired by the SSGN accompanying the force against fixed targets including barracks, weapons storage sites, C2 nodes, and training facilities.  On board the deck of the Fallujah, MQ-9Bs are spotted (prepared) and 4 are launched.  The first “Sea Reaper” is a modified airborne early warning (AEW) variant capable of acting as the task force’s airborne controller.[37]  One after the other, Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) crews operating the MQ-9s remotely from the United States utilize Satellite Launch and Recovery (SLR’s) Automated Take-Off and Landing from the LHA’s deck with one launched every 15 minutes.[38] The last MQ-9B launches and turns towards the shore retracting its landing gear.  After the MQ-9s launch, 2 Marine F-35Bs are launched with mixed air to air and air to ground loadouts to perform DCA and Dynamic Targeting (DT) as required.[39]  Hours before the TLAMs launched special reconnaissance teams of Marine Raiders and a U.S. Navy SEAL platoon infiltrated enemy territory by sea and by low level rotary wing insertion, slipping past any early warning infrastructure of the weak regime forces.[40]  The 2nd SEAL team onboard stands ready alongside the soldiers of a rifle company of the 3rd Ranger Battalion to act as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF).[41]  AH-1Z “Vipers” and AH-6 “Little Birds” stand ready to be brought on deck at short notice should their launch be required.

 

The first TLAMs impact on their targets, sending the enemy VEO into confusion.  The MQ-9s, now in the overhead, began to prosecute dynamic targets.  2 of the AFSOC operated MQ-9Bs are carrying Small Cruise Missiles (SCMs) just in case any regime Surface to Air Missile (SAM) sites go active.[42]  The State Department, shortly after the first TLAMs impact VEO targets, delivers a message to the military government stating our intent to target only anti-regime extremist forces and any resistance to American action will be confronted with defensive force.  In the confusion of the strikes and a fever of anti-American interventionism, 2 of the 10 available MiG-29 “Fulcrum” fighters of the regime scramble and vector towards our MQ-9s.  The MiGs activate their target engagement radars.  DCA F-35Bs launch 2 x AIM-120 advanced medium range air to air missiles (AMRAAM) beyond visual range (BVR), destroying both MiGs.[43] 

 

Figure 13: SLUAS

Figure 14: LCS firing NSM

Figure 15: Mig-29 “Fulcrum”

Figure 16: Osa Missile Boat

Meanwhile, a Submarine-Launched Unmanned Aerial System (SLUAS) tracks the main regime naval base near the capital and identifies 2 ex-Soviet Osa Class missile boats leaving harbor, turning towards the American Squadron offshore.[44]  The missile boats actively use their maritime search radars and open their missile doors on either side of the boats, “Styx” ASCMs at the ready.  The DDG’s combat information center (CIC) uses the real time footage from the SLUAS loitering above to confirm positive identification (PID) of the boats and quickly launches 2 naval strike missiles (NSM) at the lead Osa.  The LCS launches 2 NSMs on the 2nd Osa.[45]  Both boats execute evasive maneuvers and deploy chaff, to no avail.  Both missile boats receive direct hits and explode.  The regime forces stand down. 

 

Figure 17: https://aerospace.aerosociety.com/aerospace/aerospace-june-2022/regulars/blueprint

An MQ-9B tracks a suspicious covered truck to a coastal location.  The truck stops and a group of military aged males begin to uncover and set up a one-way attack drone launch battery.  The MQ-9 B’s feed is displayed in the JOC onboard the Fallujah.  The MQ-9B is out of weapons due to a previous engagement.  The task force commander has other assets committed to action and aircraft are cleared from the deck of the LHA due to recovery operations.  The commander makes a snap decision to send the LCS escorting the task force on a run to use its Mark 110 57mm gun against the enemy battery.[46]  Target coordinates are relayed real time by the AFSOC crew of the MQ-9B to the LCS’ CIC.  Once within 8 nautical miles from the enemy, the LCS opens fire.  Several rounds impact near the position with corrections called by the MQ-9B.  The rounds kill all enemy combatants and associated equipment.

 

Figure 18: USMC F-35B “Lightning II” Stealth Fighter onboard America Class LHA.

The VEO begins to take heavy losses, including a 3D printing drone factory located inside a cave complex.[47] On day 3 of the campaign, most of the known targets are eliminated and any remaining leadership targets have gone to ground in a desperate attempt to avoid elimination.  A sustained counter leadership air campaign takes place and all special recon ground elements are withdrawn via rotary wing assets.  No American special operators were killed with 2 wounded in action (WIA) from a suicide vest detonated on a direct-action mission.  In return, by day 6 of the campaign, 250+ enemy combatants were killed in action, an unknown number of wounded, and all approved targets on D-1 were destroyed.  4 one-way attack drones were launched at the American naval squadron offshore and all 4 were intercepted by a combination of AH-1Z APKWS and F-35B AIM-9X sidewinders.[48]  By D+30, the VEO base area has been cleared of all known enemy locations and the organization command structure crippled.  2 direct action (DA) missions resulted in 4 enemy detainees, and the destruction and exploitation of 2 terror cyber facilities from which foreign recruitment efforts for attacks against the homeland were coordinated.  On D+31, the 1st JCTRF was ordered to cease hostilities and return home.  The Punitive Expedition and the first combat validation of America’s “Raiding Doctrine” passed its first test.  The VEO was crippled and faced increasing pressure from its nearby enemy on the ground amid the ongoing civil war.  Its sanctuary was no more, and a long period of rebuilding and new leadership was required before they could contemplate external attacks on America.  But that was okay, because in a few years, if they regained strength, a new operational plan based on lessons learned from Operation Askari Lightning would be brought to bear against them once more.  After replenishing at sea, the 1st JCTRF returned to their home port on the Atlantic Coast for a much-needed dwell period.  USS Tripoli LHA-7 and the 2nd JCTRF set sail a few weeks later to take over alert status for any other contingency.  America’s Raiders had set back a global Jihadist network and sanctuary for years at a low cost. No further attacks on the homeland by that group were assessed as “imminent” by the intelligence community (IC). 

 

Upon intensive debrief and lessons learned sessions, several joint officers executed a joint roadshow to present the key takeaways of the campaign to service war colleges and assisted in revisions based on operational realities to the Joint Publication associated with the employment of a JCTRF.

 

Figure 19: International Maritime Staff Operators Course | U.S. Naval War College

Conclusions and Ways Ahead

 

We must be prepared to return repeatedly, if necessary.  If a terror sanctuary moves to a new failed state or ungoverned territory, so does the Raiding Force.  Had the post 9/11 2001-2002 campaign against Al-Qaeda (AQ) and their Taliban hosts been executed like a Punitive Expedition, we may have seen the successful demonstration of modern Raiding counter terrorism doctrine, retaining the force posture needed to reset and strike again wherever the terrorist threat expanded.[49]

 

If a conflict in the Pacific seems probable, the task force can return to home port, swapping its mission configuration to become a “Lightning Carrier” of F-35Bs and set sail as a second echelon of naval aviation to support any in theater CSGs and sister America or cousin Wasp class ships in an effort to battle any struggle against communist aggression in the Indo Pacific.[50]  Furthermore, the JCTRF can be tasked for action against great power outposts outside the adversary nation’s expeditionary reach, subduing far off enemy garrisons outside the primary combat area along the strategic periphery.

 

The greatest aspect to the JCTRF concept is that all the technology and units required to make up the task force’s order of battle already exist.  The combination of the various units and assets and joint training can be accomplished with the execution order from military and political leadership to make it happen.  This process would not be easy and a new doctrinal methodology for joint war fighting would be needed along with dedicated joint training between those units who would take part in such a force.  Congressional advocacy and higher military support for this concept can and should be accomplished to dedicate the funding re-allocation required to make such a force a reality. 

 

It is necessary for joint military professionals to foresee the day in which our global basing is not what it once was, and our population’s will to commit to large military adventures against VEOs in far off lands diminished.  It is only prudent to structure our counter terrorism forces accordingly for such a possibility to be able to defend the American people without acting against their tolerance.

 

We may be done with terrorism, but the terrorists are not done with us.

 

Figure 20: Taliban Marks Three Years In Power By Showing Off American Military Equipment At Former US Base

Author Bio:

 

Captain Willis is an Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) pilot and research and writing fellow with the Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers’ military history team.  He is a distinguished graduate of the University of Cincinnati’s Air Force ROTC program with a BA in international affairs and a minor in political science. His work has appeared in United States Naval Institute’s Naval History, Air University’s Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Air University’s Wild Blue Yonder Journal, Air Commando Journal, and Nova Science Publishing. 

 

 

Bibliography:

 

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Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. The wars of the Barbary pirates: To the shores of tripoli: The rise of the US navy and Marines. London: Osprey Publishing, 2014.

 

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“Salee River, Korea – 1871.” National Museum of the Marine Corps. Accessed July 15, 2025. https://www.usmcmuseum.com/uploads/6/0/3/6/60364049/salee_river.pdf.

 

“Punitive Expedition in Mexico, 1916-1917.” U.S. Department of State. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwi/108653.htm.

 

Chun, Clayton K. S. The Last Boarding Party: The USMC and the SS Mayaguez, 1975. Oxford, UK: Osprey Pub, 2011.

 

Ball, Gregory. “1983 – Operation Urgent Fury.” Air Force Historical Support Division, 1997. https://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458952/1983-operation-urgent-fury/.

 

Carroll, Ward. “This Botched Air Strike on Lebanon Changed Naval Aviation Forever.” We Are the Mighty, April 2, 2018. https://www.wearethemighty.com/articles/this-botched-air-strike-on-lebanon-changed-naval-aviation-forever/.

 

Ball, Gregory. “1986 – Operation El Dorado Canyon.” Air Force Historical Support Division. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458950/1986-operation-el-dorado-canyon/.

 

Vego, Milan. “Determining Political Objectives.” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 116 (2025).

 

Zimmer, 2Lt, USMC. “The Tanker War.” U.S. Naval Institute, April 30, 2025. https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history/2025/june/tanker-war.

 

Newsweek Staff. “‘Our Target Was Terror.’” Newsweek, July 1, 2010. https://www.newsweek.com/our-target-was-terror-169580.

 

Ball, Gregory. “1998 – Operation Desert Fox.” Air Force Historical Support Division. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458976/1998-operation-desert-fox/.

 

Ritter, Joe. “MQ-9s over Sirte: Unmanned Airpower for Urban Combat – Modern War Institute.” Modern War Institute -, March 23, 2022. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/mq-9s-over-sirte-unmanned-airpower-for-urban-combat/.

 

Diplomatic Room. “Statement by President Trump on Syria.” National Archives and Records Administration, 2018. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-syria/.

 

Hummel, Kristina. “Feature Commentary: An Assessment of Operation Rough Rider.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, June 26, 2025. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/feature-commentary-an-assessment-of-operation-rough-rider/.

 

Vergun, David. “Defense Agency Contributed toward Operation Midnight Hammer Success.” U.S. Department of Defense, July 10, 2025. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4240876/defense-agency-contributed-toward-operation-midnight-hammer-success/.

 

 

Jamie Ballard Data. “Do Americans Think the Bombing of Iran and Other U.S. Foreign Military Interventions Were the Right Decisions?” YouGov, July 7, 2025. https://today.yougov.com/politics/articles/52495-do-americans-think-the-bombing-of-iran-was-the-right-decision.

 

We The People. “Full Text of the U.S. Constitution.” National Constitution Center – constitutioncenter.org, 1787. https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/full-text.

 

Walldorf, William. “Why the American Public Is More War-Weary than Ever.” Time, January 31, 2024. https://time.com/6590408/us-biden-middle-east-war/.

 

Owens, Mackubin. “Counterinsurgency from the Bottom up: Colonel H.R. McMaster and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tel Afar, Spring-Fall 2005.” Foreign Policy Research Institute, March 24, 2017. https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/03/counterinsurgency-bottom-colonel-h-r-mcmaster-3rd-armored-cavalry-regiment-tel-afar-spring-fall-2005/.

 

Natale, Fabiana. “Choosing the Right Strategy: (Counter)Insurgency and (Counter)Terrorism as Competing Paradigms.” The Security Distillery, December 12, 2019. https://thesecuritydistillery.org/all-articles/choosing-the-right-strategy-counterinsurgency-and-counterterrorism-as-competing-paradigms.

 

Benson, Kevin. “Bringing Back the Punitive Expedition.” Marine Corps Association, December 16, 2019. https://www.mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Pros-Cons-The-Punitive-Expedition-200116.docx.

 

Lariosa, Aaron-Matthew. “U.K. Carrier HMS Prince of Wales Launches, Recovers Mojave Drone.” USNI News, November 17, 2023. https://news.usni.org/2023/11/17/u-k-aircraft-carrier-hms-prince-of-wales-launches-recovers-mojave-drone.

 

Dan Parsons, Tyler Rogoway. “New Kit Will Allow MQ-9 Reaper to Fly from Navy Flattops.” The War Zone, May 10, 2022. https://www.twz.com/new-kit-will-allow-mq-9-reaper-to-fly-from-navy-flattops.

 

“Bell AH-1Z – Attack and Reconnaissance Helicopter Engineered for the Extreme.” Bell Flight. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.bellflight.com/products/bell-ah-1z.

 

NCTC. “Terrorist Groups: National Counterterrorism Center.” Terrorist Groups | National Counterterrorism Center. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups.html.

 

Shelbourne, Mallory. “Big Deck Amphibs Bougainville, Fallujah Delayed, Budget Docs Say.” USNI News, July 9, 2025. https://news.usni.org/2025/07/09/big-deck-amphibs-bougainville-fallujah-delayed-budget-docs-say.

“FBI Statement on the Attack in New Orleans.” FBI National Press Office, January 1, 2025. https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-statement-on-the-attack-in-new-orleans.

 

“Amphibious Assault Ships – LHD/LHA(R).” United States Navy. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2169814/amphibious-assault-ships-lhdlhar/.

 

Thomas Newdick, Tyler Rogoway. “MQ-9B Airborne Early Warning Variant Could Fill Major Aerial Surveillance Gaps.” The War Zone, June 17, 2025. https://www.twz.com/air/mq-9b-airborne-early-warning-variant-could-fill-major-aerial-surveillance-gaps.

 

“MQ-9 Reaper.” Air Force Special Operations Command. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.afsoc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/2547323/mq-9-reaper/.

 

“SLR: Creating New Legacy.” Air Combat Command. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.acc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3377719/slr-creating-new-legacy/.

 

Arthur, Gordon. “General Atomics Targets East Asia – and Its Helicopter Carriers – with Its Uavs.” Naval News, June 4, 2025. https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/dsei-japan-2025/2025/06/general-atomics-targets-east-asia-and-its-helicopter-carriers-with-its-uavs/.

 

Rogoway, Tyler. “Here’s the USMC’s Plan for ‘Lightning Carriers’ Brimming with F-35Bs.” The War Zone, March 30, 2017. https://www.twz.com/8798/heres-the-usmcs-plan-for-lightning-carriers-brimming-with-f-35bs.

 

“What We Do.” Marine Raider Recruiting, March 26, 2025. https://www.marsoc.com/what-we-do/.

 

“Best Ranger: The United States Army.” Best Ranger | The United States Army. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.army.mil/ranger/.

  

“NSW.” Naval Special Warfare Command. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.nsw.navy.mil/.

 

Tucker, Patrick. “Air Force Special Operations Wants to Fire Cruise Missiles from Reaper Drones.” Defense One, May 9, 2025. https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2025/05/air-force-special-operations-wants-fire-cruise-missiles-reaper-drones/405210/.

 

Tirpak, John A., Chris Gordon, Unshin Lee Harpley, Amanda Miller, Greg Hadley, Abraham Mahshie, Brian W. Everstine, and Rachel S. Cohen. “AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM).” Air & Space Forces Magazine. Accessed July 13, 2025. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/weapons/aim-120/.

 

“US Navy Tests Submarines’ Ability to Launch Flying Drones.” SOFREP, January 10, 2025. https://sofrep.com/navy/us-navy-tests-submarines-ability-to-launch-flying-drones/.

 

“Naval Strike Missile.” RTX. Accessed July 13, 2025. https://www.rtx.com/raytheon/what-we-do/sea/naval-strike-missile.

 

“MK 110 57 Mm Gun.” United States Navy. Accessed July 13, 2025. https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2167940/mk-110-57-mm-gun/.

 

Roque, Ashley. “With Push to 3D Print Drones, Army Examines Battlefield Calculation.” Breaking Defense, July 8, 2025. https://breakingdefense.com/2025/07/with-push-to-3d-print-drones-army-examines-battlefield-calculation/.

 

Trevithick, Joseph. “Laser-Guided Rockets Shown Shooting Down Houthi Drones for First Time.” The War Zone, March 19, 2025. https://www.twz.com/air/air-launched-laser-guided-rockets-shown-shooting-down-houthi-drones-for-first-time.

 

Neville, Leigh. Takur Ghar: The seals and rangers on Roberts Ridge, Afghanistan 2002. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2013.

 

Gunn, Kyle. “Lightning Carriers: The Marines’ Secret Weapon in the Pacific.” Task & Purpose, June 26, 2025. https://taskandpurpose.com/tech-tactics/marine-corps-lightning-carrier-pacific/.

 

“Founders Online: The Federalist Number 10, [22 November] 1787.” National Archives and Records Administration. Accessed August 16, 2025. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-10-02-0178.

 

Toll, Ian W. Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy. Chicago: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008. 

 


[1] Kipling, Rudyard. “‘No End of a Lesson’: The Boer War, 1899-1902.” “No end of a lesson”: The Boer War, 1899-1902 – National Portrait Gallery, 2014. https://www.npg.org.uk/whatson/display/2014/no-end-of-a-lesson-the-boer-war-1899-1902.

[2] Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. The wars of the Barbary pirates: To the shores of Tripoli: The rise of the US navy and Marines. London: Osprey Publishing, 2014.

[3] Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. The wars of the Barbary pirates: To the shores of Tripoli: The rise of the US navy and Marines. London: Osprey Publishing, 2014.

[4] “NH 85796 ‘an Act to Provide a Naval Armament.’” Naval History and Heritage Command, 1794. https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/numerical-list-of-images/nhhc-series/nh-series/NH-85000/NH-85796.html.

[5] Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. The wars of the Barbary pirates: To the shores of Tripoli: The rise of the US navy and Marines. London: Osprey Publishing, 2014.

[6] Buse, H.W. “The Barrier Forts.” Historical Branch G3 Division USMC HQ Washington DC, 1962. https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/HD%20MCUP/HD%20Pubs/Barrier_Forts.pdf?ver=2019-02-01-113425-563.

[7] “Salee River, Korea – 1871.” National Museum of the Marine Corps. Accessed July 15, 2025. https://www.usmcmuseum.com/uploads/6/0/3/6/60364049/salee_river.pdf.

[8] “Punitive Expedition in Mexico, 1916-1917.” U.S. Department of State. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwi/108653.htm.

[9] Chun, Clayton K. S. The Last Boarding Party: The USMC and the SS Mayaguez, 1975. Oxford, UK: Osprey Pub, 2011.

[10] Ball, Gregory. “1983 – Operation Urgent Fury.” Air Force Historical Support Division, 1997. https://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458952/1983-operation-urgent-fury/.

[11] Carroll, Ward. “This Botched Air Strike on Lebanon Changed Naval Aviation Forever.” We Are The Mighty, April 2, 2018. https://www.wearethemighty.com/articles/this-botched-air-strike-on-lebanon-changed-naval-aviation-forever/.

[12] Ball, Gregory. “1986 – Operation El Dorado Canyon.” Air Force Historical Support Division. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458950/1986-operation-el-dorado-canyon/.

[13] Zimmer, 2Lt, USMC. “The Tanker War.” U.S. Naval Institute, April 30, 2025. https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history/2025/june/tanker-war.

[14] Newsweek Staff. “‘Our Target Was Terror.’” Newsweek, July 1, 2010. https://www.newsweek.com/our-target-was-terror-169580.

[15] Ball, Gregory. “1998 – Operation Desert Fox.” Air Force Historical Support Division. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458976/1998-operation-desert-fox/.

[16] Ritter, Joe. “MQ-9s over Sirte: Unmanned Airpower for Urban Combat – Modern War Institute.” Modern War Institute -, March 23, 2022. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/mq-9s-over-sirte-unmanned-airpower-for-urban-combat/.

[17] Diplomatic Room. “Statement by President Trump on Syria.” National Archives and Records Administration, 2018. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-syria/.

[18] Hummel, Kristina. “Feature Commentary: An Assessment of Operation Rough Rider.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, June 26, 2025. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/feature-commentary-an-assessment-of-operation-rough-rider/.

[19] Vergun, David. “Defense Agency Contributed toward Operation Midnight Hammer Success.” U.S. Department of Defense, July 10, 2025. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4240876/defense-agency-contributed-toward-operation-midnight-hammer-success/.

[20] Jamie BallardData. “Do Americans Think the Bombing of Iran and Other U.S. Foreign Military Interventions Were the Right Decisions?” YouGov, July 7, 2025. https://today.yougov.com/politics/articles/52495-do-americans-think-the-bombing-of-iran-was-the-right-decision.

[21] We The People. “Full Text of the U.S. Constitution.” National Constitution Center – constitutioncenter.org, 1787. https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/full-text.

 

[22] Toll, Ian W. Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy. Chicago: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008. Pg 28.

[23] Vego, Milan. “Determining Political Objectives.” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 116 (2025).

[24] “Founders Online: The Federalist Number 10, [22 November] 1787.” National Archives and Records Administration. Accessed August 16, 2025. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-10-02-0178.

[25] Walldorf, William. “Why the American Public Is More War-Weary than Ever.” Time, January 31, 2024. https://time.com/6590408/us-biden-middle-east-war/.

[26] Owens, Mackubin. “Counterinsurgency from the Bottom up: Colonel H.R. McMaster and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tel Afar, Spring-Fall 2005.” Foreign Policy Research Institute, March 24, 2017. https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/03/counterinsurgency-bottom-colonel-h-r-mcmaster-3rd-armored-cavalry-regiment-tel-afar-spring-fall-2005/.

[27] Natale, Fabiana. “Choosing the Right Strategy: (Counter)Insurgency and (Counter)Terrorism as Competing Paradigms.” The Security Distillery, December 12, 2019. https://thesecuritydistillery.org/all-articles/choosing-the-right-strategy-counterinsurgency-and-counterterrorism-as-competing-paradigms.

[28] Natale, Fabiana. “Choosing the Right Strategy: (Counter)Insurgency and (Counter)Terrorism as Competing Paradigms.” The Security Distillery, December 12, 2019. https://thesecuritydistillery.org/all-articles/choosing-the-right-strategy-counterinsurgency-and-counterterrorism-as-competing-paradigms.

[29] Benson, Kevin. “Bringing Back the Punitive Expedition.” Marine Corps Association, December 16, 2019. https://www.mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Pros-Cons-The-Punitive-Expedition-200116.docx.

 

[30] Lariosa, Aaron-Matthew. “U.K. Carrier HMS Prince of Wales Launches, Recovers Mojave Drone.” USNI News, November 17, 2023. https://news.usni.org/2023/11/17/u-k-aircraft-carrier-hms-prince-of-wales-launches-recovers-mojave-drone.

[31] Dan Parsons, Tyler Rogoway. “New Kit Will Allow MQ-9 Reaper to Fly from Navy Flattops.” The War Zone, May 10, 2022. https://www.twz.com/new-kit-will-allow-mq-9-reaper-to-fly-from-navy-flattops.

[32] “Bell AH-1Z – Attack and Reconnaissance Helicopter Engineered for the Extreme.” Bell Flight. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.bellflight.com/products/bell-ah-1z.

[33] NCTC. “Terrorist Groups: National Counterterrorism Center.” Terrorist Groups | National Counterterrorism Center. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups.html.

[34] Shelbourne, Mallory. “Big Deck Amphibs Bougainville, Fallujah Delayed, Budget Docs Say.” USNI News, July 9, 2025. https://news.usni.org/2025/07/09/big-deck-amphibs-bougainville-fallujah-delayed-budget-docs-say.

[35] “FBI Statement on the Attack in New Orleans.” FBI National Press Office, January 1, 2025. https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-statement-on-the-attack-in-new-orleans.

[36] “Amphibious Assault Ships – LHD/LHA(R).” United States Navy. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2169814/amphibious-assault-ships-lhdlhar/.

[37] Thomas Newdick, Tyler Rogoway. “MQ-9B Airborne Early Warning Variant Could Fill Major Aerial Surveillance Gaps.” The War Zone, June 17, 2025. https://www.twz.com/air/mq-9b-airborne-early-warning-variant-could-fill-major-aerial-surveillance-gaps.

[38] “MQ-9 Reaper.” Air Force Special Operations Command. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.afsoc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/2547323/mq-9-reaper/.

 

“SLR: Creating New Legacy.” Air Combat Command. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.acc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3377719/slr-creating-new-legacy/.

 

Arthur, Gordon. “General Atomics Targets East Asia – and Its Helicopter Carriers – with Its Uavs.” Naval News, June 4, 2025. https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/dsei-japan-2025/2025/06/general-atomics-targets-east-asia-and-its-helicopter-carriers-with-its-uavs/.

[39] Rogoway, Tyler. “Here’s the USMC’s Plan for ‘Lightning Carriers’ Brimming with F-35Bs.” The War Zone, March 30, 2017. https://www.twz.com/8798/heres-the-usmcs-plan-for-lightning-carriers-brimming-with-f-35bs.

[40] “What We Do.” Marine Raider Recruiting, March 26, 2025. https://www.marsoc.com/what-we-do/.

[41]“Best Ranger: The United States Army.” Best Ranger | The United States Army. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.army.mil/ranger/.    

“NSW.” Naval Special Warfare Command. Accessed July 14, 2025. https://www.nsw.navy.mil/.

[42] Tucker, Patrick. “Air Force Special Operations Wants to Fire Cruise Missiles from Reaper Drones.” Defense One, May 9, 2025. https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2025/05/air-force-special-operations-wants-fire-cruise-missiles-reaper-drones/405210/.

[43] Tirpak, John A., Chris Gordon, Unshin Lee Harpley, Amanda Miller, Greg Hadley, Abraham Mahshie, Brian W. Everstine, and Rachel S. Cohen. “AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM).” Air & Space Forces Magazine. Accessed July 13, 2025. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/weapons/aim-120/.

[44] “US Navy Tests Submarines’ Ability to Launch Flying Drones.” SOFREP, January 10, 2025. https://sofrep.com/navy/us-navy-tests-submarines-ability-to-launch-flying-drones/.

[45] “Naval Strike Missile.” RTX. Accessed July 13, 2025. https://www.rtx.com/raytheon/what-we-do/sea/naval-strike-missile.

 

[46] “MK 110 57 Mm Gun.” United States Navy. Accessed July 13, 2025. https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2167940/mk-110-57-mm-gun/.

[47] Roque, Ashley. “With Push to 3D Print Drones, Army Examines Battlefield Calculation.” Breaking Defense, July 8, 2025. https://breakingdefense.com/2025/07/with-push-to-3d-print-drones-army-examines-battlefield-calculation/.

[48] Trevithick, Joseph. “Laser-Guided Rockets Shown Shooting down Houthi Drones for First Time.” The War Zone, March 19, 2025. https://www.twz.com/air/air-launched-laser-guided-rockets-shown-shooting-down-houthi-drones-for-first-time.

[49] Neville, Leigh. Takur Ghar: The seals and rangers on Roberts Ridge, Afghanistan 2002. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2013.

[50] Gunn, Kyle. “Lightning Carriers: The Marines’ Secret Weapon in the Pacific.” Task & Purpose, June 26, 2025. https://taskandpurpose.com/tech-tactics/marine-corps-lightning-carrier-pacific/.