Chinese
Power Projection: How the Invasion of Tibet relates to 21st Century
Taiwan
PDF Version
1st Lt. Brendan H.J. Donnelly, USAF | Feb 26 th 2023
Ever since the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under the reign of Mao Zedong
in 1949 power projection and the annexation of territory has been the primary
objective for China. Today this power projection spans the Indo-Pacific region
in the East and South China Seas, the intent being to annex Taiwan under PRC
control, and influence the continent of Africa as well. This power projection
is possible since the PRC is one of the dominant powers in the region. Yet the
PRC had to first annex the land that now makes up the current nation after
their civil war. After the civil war in China ended, the next territory that
was annexed was Tibet. This annexation is a prime case study that can be used
to better understand the situation between China and Taiwan today. The intent
is to discuss similarities and differences between the situation with Tibet and
Taiwan, and draw conclusions on what we may see the
PRC do in the future when potentially invading Taiwan.
A
Brief History: Tibet and China
The issues between
China and Tibet begin a few decades before 1949. After Chinese revolutionaries
overthrew the last imperial dynasty the Qing, in 1912 these revolutionaries
proclaimed the Republic of China (ROC). One year later in 1913, Tibet also
proclaimed its independence as well. The proclamation of independence of the
ROC and Tibet is the beginning of the issue. Then in 1914 at the Simla Convention, where representatives from Great Britain,
China and Tibet attended, the border between Tibet and British India was
cemented.[i]
Tibet and Great Britain had signed the agreement but China refrained from
signing since they wanted to claim control over Tibet. Even though China at the
time did not agree with the sovereignty of Tibet, the ROC was pre-occupied with
issues in their own territory that lead to a civil war. Since the civil war was
raging in the ROC, the independence of Tibet stood until 1949.[ii]
Once the
civil war ended, with Mao Zedong leading the now Peoples Republic of China
(PRC) and Chiang Kai-shek defeated and fleeing to Formosa (Taiwan), Mao could
then turn his focus to Tibet once more. Mao originally was open to either
annexing Tibet peacefully with the acceptance of the Three-Terms Agreement, or
forcefully using the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). The terms of the agreement
sent in 1950 were for Tibet to accept itself as being part of China, allow
Chinese troops to care for the defense of Tibet and for the government of China
to control Tibet’s foreign and trade relationships.[iii]
The government of Tibet, in Lhasa, did not agree to these terms and attempted
to stall the response to China so they could try in gaining support from the
United States and Great Britain to assist them. Unfortunately, the call for
allies was too late and China eventually grew impatient and invaded Tibet on 6
October 1950.
At the start
of the conflict in the Battle of Chamdo, the vast
differences between the Tibetan Military and PLA were clear. The Tibetan
Military consisted of 8,500 troops while the PLA consisted of 40,000 troops.[iv]
The PLA was five times larger than the Tibetan Military and was equipped with
Soviet equipment and machines. Furthermore, the PLA was better trained and battle hardened. Coming from the civil war in
China the PLA had combat experience while the Tibetan Military was under
equipped and poorly trained. Clearly the Tibetan Military was outmatched.
Cold
War Documentaries “How China Annex Tibet” YouTube, (June 18, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=enQuH7 TVw7Q.
Although the
PLA was a superior force, they still used specific tactics to ensure the swift
defeat of their adversary. First of these tactics was surprise, even though
there was a buildup of Chinese forces on the border, the actual start of the
invasion was still a surprise and forced the Tibetan Military to react. Second
being that the Chinese strategy was to encircle and cut off Chamdo
so they had no other choice but to surrender. The PLA was able to surround Chamdo since they had the numerical advantage as well. All
of this in mind there was another factor that played into the swift defeat of
the Tibetan Military, which was a lack of communications capability. By the
time Lhasa knew of the invasion it was too late to send reinforcements or to
attempt to fend off the Chinese invasion.
As the
Chinese forces were encircling Lhasa, the Tibetan government was beginning to
consider surrender and acceptance of the three-point agreement with some
stipulations. But instead, there was one last effort to bring support for
Tibet, which was a call on the United Nations (UN). Since Tibet was not already
a member of the UN, a member had to bring the issue of the Chinese invasion
into Tibet to the General Assembly (GA). El Salvador supported the issues and
brought it to the GA, and at first India supported Tibet, as did the U.S. and
Great Britain, following the path of India. That was until China agreed to
build a trade relationship with India if China had control of Tibet.[v]
This swayed India’s stance and instead China had the support of the GA. Since
the UN and the Security Council did not react and permitted this invasion into
Tibet there were no more options left but to accept the Chinese agreement.
In 1951 the
Tibetan representatives re-entered negotiations with China and instead of the
original three-point agreement, they were forced to accept the 17-Point
Agreement also known as “The Agreement of the Central People’s Government and
the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.”
To summarize the 17-Point Agreement, the agreement solidified China’s control
over Tibet, the Tibetan military was to be absorbed by the PLA and the Chinese
government would control all external affairs for Tibet.[vi]
Additionally, the power and position of the Dalai Lama would remain as is in
1951, and the religious freedom of the people in Tibet would be protected.
Finally, the PLA forces in Tibet would set up a military headquarters and to
the greatest extent not disturb the living situation of the people. Of course,
this then led to a decade later in 1959 the Tibetan resistance against the
Chinese government.
Overall, there
are multiple similarities that can be drawn from the invasion of Tibet in 1950
and what can be assessed for the invasion of Taiwan in the 21st
Century. This comes with the understanding and assumption that China will
invade Taiwan in the near future based on reporting from President Xi Jinping’s
plan for reunification of China.[vii]
Connections
to Taiwan Today
Aside from
Tibet being an invasion, and Taiwan being an invasion plan, there are multiple
similarities between the two situations. During the annexation of Tibet, China
used propaganda claiming that the reunification was actually a “liberation”,
asserting that China was setting the people of Tibet free from some
unidentified oppression. Another similarity is that China has the element of
surprise once again. Although during the invasion of Tibet the build-up of
forces on the border was known, the Tibetan Military still did not know the
exact day or time that the PLA would cross the border and invade. It is the
same situation in the East China Sea: even though the United States and its
allies can identify when there is a build of logistics, naval vessels and troops
on the east coast of China, the exact timing is still unknown. Therefore, the
coalition to support Taiwan has to react whenever the time comes.
Regarding
tactics, the Tibet experience suggests that China will attempt during the first
phase of the invasion of Taiwan to surround the island. Like the PLA did when
invading Tibet, surrounding Taiwan will force the Taiwanese military to engage
on all sides of the island and pressure the government immediately. Not only
will the military be pressured but the Taiwanese economy will be stressed as
well.[viii]
With a blockade around the island, U.S. and coalition aid will be blocked,
exports and imports will cease and an aerial blockade will completely stop any
resources from making it into Taiwan. Not only can China place a blockade
around Taiwan but the Chinese military at large is the largest military in the
world. China currently has a force of 2.8 million members to include active
military and reserve.[ix]
The PLA is broken out into ground forces, air forces, rocket forces, naval and
special forces, and the sheer number of troops under the military is staggering
in comparison to the coalition partners individually. Thus, in order to match
the might of the Chinese military by numbers, Taiwan must have the entire
coalition on their side to include but not limited to the United States, Japan,
Australia, Great Britain, South Korea, and India.
GMA News
Online “US must prepare now for
China invasion of Taiwan” GMA News Online (October
2022), https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/world/848698/us-must-prepare-now-for-china-invasion-of-taiwan-admiral/story/.
The fact that
Taiwan has nations pledged to protect them in the event of the Chinese invasion
is something that Tibet did not have. The allies providing military technology,
training and collective defense in support of Taiwan, that if Tibet had the
same support in 1949, who knows what western China would look like today. But
it is clear that in order for Taiwan to survive a Chinese invasion, having
allies that are willing to start and continue a war with China is key.
Impacts
For All Indo-Pacific Nations
Although
there are many allies for Taiwan such as India, the Philippines, Vietnam,
Australia, U.S., Japan, and South Korea, not all nations have the same
capabilities. The coalition brings numbers but not overall capabilities. By
this meaning that other nations that will oppose China each of them brings a
force but a different quality and with different technological levels. This is
a significant limitation to the coalition previously stated. China has the
largest military in the world that is also equally supplied and trained, while
the coalition facing off against the behemoth which is the PLA, work with
different equipment, tactics, communications, training, and capabilities. In
terms of centralized command and common Training, Tactics and Procedures (TTPs)
the advantage leans in favor of the PLA. In order to
rebalance the scale, all coalition players must continue the exercises that
occur in the Pacific, but also practice with severe limitations such as
degraded GPS, communications and logistics support. In a real-world war, the
capabilities that we take for granted could be degraded or completely denied.
Lastly, one
of the significant faults on Tibet during 1949 is that the Tibetans attempted
to advance and build new capabilities for their military too late before the
invasion occurred. This lesson can be carried into today’s fight, so that all
players in the coalition such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and India that do
not have the most up to date weaponry or communication system must upgrade and
develop military technology that can stand up to China’s advanced systems. The
lack in technological capability by the other nations then only provide numbers that may not last long in a stalemate or
long-term war. Agreements such as the Australian, United Kingdom and United
States Agreement (AUKUS) should be spread to the other militaries in the region
so that all players can face off against Chinese abilities sufficiently.
In
light of
this information, the similarities between the Chinese invasion of Tibet in
1950 and the oncoming invasion of Taiwan in the 21st Century are
daunting. The history of the conflicts is alike, as are the potential
diplomatic agreements. Although more importantly, the military tactics that can
be drawn from the Tibet situation to the Taiwan invasion should be used to
identify gaps in the coalitions ability to react to the Chinese invasion. The
key to a successful reaction in the near future is to
be prepared, across each military and to be swift in the response before Taiwan
is cut off from the world and is forced into a corner.
Author
Biography: 1st
Lt Brendan H.J. Donnelly, USAF
Lieutenant Donnelly is an intelligence officer stationed at
Cannon AFB, NM. He has held intelligence supervisor roles at Cannon AFB and
Special Operations Forces Africa. He graduated Bowling Green State University,
with a Bachelor of Arts of Sciences, majoring in History.
References
[i]
Cold War Documentaries “How China Annex Tibet” YouTube, (June 18, 2022).
[ii]
Ibid.
[iii]
Apri, Claude “The “17-point
Agreement” Context and Consequences” DIIR Publications (22 May 2022), https://tibet.net/.
[iv]
Cold War Documentaries.
[v]
Cold War Documentaries.
[vi]
Tibet Justice Center “The Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local
Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” Tibet
Justice Center, (1999) Seventeen-Point Plan
for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet (1951) [p.182], http://www.tibetjustice.org/materials/china/china3.html.
[vii]
Kyodo, “Xi to make Taiwan reunification long-term goal at party congress”,
Japan Times, (September 20, 2022), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/09/20/asia-pacific/china-taiwan-xi-jinping-reunification/.
[viii]
Buckley, Chris; Robles, Pablo; Hernandez, Marco; Chang Chien, Amy, “How China
Could Choke Taiwan” New York Times (August 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/08/25/world/asia/china-taiwan-conflict-blockade.html.
[ix]
Gill, Bates; O’Hanlon, Michael, E. “China’s Hollow Military” Brookings, (June
1, 1999) https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-hollow-military/.