South Korea’s Strategic Clarity: A Quest to Become a
“Pivotal State” in the Indo-Pacific
PDF Version
Euihyun Kwon (Evan) | March 2nd, 2023
Abstract
This article
aims to examine the most prominent challenges and anticipated benefits of South
Korea’s new “strategic clarity” for a strengthened US-South Korea-Japan
trilateral security cooperation. With South Korea’s Yoon Suk-yeol administration and Japan vigilantly striving to repair
the deteriorated South Korea-Japan bilateral relations, South Korea’s more
active participation in the trilateral security cooperation with the US and
Japan is expected to provide a more effective extended deterrence pressure on
North Korea and allow South Korea to assume to the role of a global leader in
the Indo-Pacific along with the US and Japan.
Introduction
In December 2022, South Korea revealed
its own Indo-Pacific strategy, called “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful and
Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region.”[1]
Closely echoing the overall vision of the latest US version, South Korea’s
Indo-Pacific strategy signaled a decisive shift in its approach to the
Indo-Pacific, from the former administration’s “strategic ambiguity” to one
that is more clearly aligned with the US intent to contain China. For decades,
Seoul has maintained a delicate balance between the two great powers, the US
and China, so that it can ensure security assurance from the US and benefit
from its economic dependence on China – hence the name strategic ambiguity. With
an evolving North Korean nuclear threat and the ongoing US-China strategic
competition, however, Seoul has now opted for a position of “strategic clarity”
which emphasizes South Korea’s more active role in the Indo-Pacific as a
participant of the US-led extended deterrence strategy, with a greater
significance placed on the US-South Korea-Japan trilateral security
cooperation. In evaluating the current challenges a s well as anticipated
benefits of South Korea’s ambition to be a “pivotal state” in the Indo-Pacific
with its groundbreaking security policy shift, this article aims to provide
justifications for its newfound emphasis on the US-South Korea-Japan trilateral
security cooperation.
Current Challenges of Strategic Clarity
Despite their shared security concerns
in the Indo-Pacific vis-à-vis North Korea, South Korea and Japan throughout the
years have had a strained relationship due to some
unresolved historical concerns between them. Naturally, according to Professor
Yoichiro Sato, Dean of College of Asia Pacific Studies at Ritsumeikan
Asia Pacific University and an expert analyst of security in the Indo-Pacific, “the
greatest challenge now for a strengthened US-Japan-South Korea trilateral
security cooperation is the deterioration of the Japan-South Korea relations.”[2] In
particular, relations between the two countries dropped to their lowest point
in decades after South Korean courts in 2018 ordered that two Japanese companies
pay compensation for wartime forced labor. The Japanese government refused to
comply with the South Korean rulings, arguing that “all compensation issues
were resolved under the 1965 basic treaty which included a payment of $500
million from Tokyo to Seoul to cover all compensation stemming from historical
issues.”[3] The
South Korean rulings, which were backed by then South Korean president Moon
Jae-in, reignited the historical feud between South Korea and Japan; following
Japan’s imposition of export controls on South Korea on the grounds of national
security concerns in 2019, South Korea responded by not renewing the General
Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan, effectively
suspending all US-South Korea-Japan trilateral security cooperation and
creating a “breakdown in communication in the air [and] sea space in the
Indo-Pacific region actively patrolled by US forces.”[4]
While a complete dissolution of the
GSOMIA between South Korea and Japan was prevented with a timely US
intervention, Japan’s adoption of a “counterstrike” capability in its new
national security strategy in 2022 is inviting new concerns from South Korea. From
the Japanese perspective, the major break from its strictly self-defense-only postwar
principle is in response to North Korea’s rapid progress with its nuclear
program and China’s apparent ambitions in the Taiwan Strait. In essence, according
to Professor Sato, the counterstrike capability is “strictly defense-oriented
in nature”[5] and
is an outcome of nearly ten years of debating by Japan’s ruling parties. With
North Korea and China continuously developing new types of missiles, Japan’s
current interceptor-reliant defense system is considered insufficient. On the
South Korean side, some experts have advised the South Korean government to
“discuss with Washington how the US can prevent Japan from executing an attack
on North Korea without prior South Korean consent,”[6] so
that Japan’s new counterstrike capability can be coordinated with South Korea’s
own preemptive strike, or the “Kill Chain” defense system. Without a close
coordination, Japan’s new counterstrike capability may become an additional
obstacle for South Korea’s strategic clarity for a strengthened US-South
Korea-Japan trilateral security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.
Justifications for Strategic Clarity
With the current Yoon Suk-yeol administration of South Korea and Japan actively
seeking “mutually acceptable mechanisms”[7] to
resolve the thorny issues between the two countries, it is essential to
investigate some of the most anticipated benefits for South Korea’s strategic
clarity, assuming an expedient progress on the ongoing South Korea-Japan
rapprochement. With an improved intelligence sharing between South Korea and
Japan pledged as part of a joint statement with the US in November 2022, South
Korea’s strategic clarity for a strengthened trilateral security cooperation
with the US and Japan can “detect and assess the threat posed by incoming
[North Korean] missiles, [achieving] a major step for deterrence and stability”[8] in
the Indo-Pacific. While Japan’s new counterstrike capability caused some
pushback in Seoul, the three countries’ real-time sharing of North Korean
missile warning data as agreed in the joint statement would allow Seoul and
Tokyo to coordinate their missile defense capabilities, thus more effectively
deterring North Korean threat in the region. In the event of contingency on the
Korean Peninsula, South Korea “will depend on rapidly deployed US military
forces, but limitations in South Korean airfields, ports, and fuel availability
require the US to use airfields and ports in Japan.”[9] Knowing
this, North Korea may use “some nuclear weapons and missiles to coerce Japan
into denying US access in a conflict, thereby preventing many US forces from
being available”[10]
in South Korea when needed. South Korea and Japan must accept that, “when it
comes to North Korea, [their] fates are inextricably linked”[11] with
each other, and their respective preemptive defense systems – South Korea’s
“Kill Chain” and Japan’s new counterstrike capability – can apply effective
deterrence pressure on North Korea only through a close coordination with the
US. Indeed, Japanese destruction of even one North Korean nuclear weapon in the
time of contingency can save at least tens of thousands of lives in South
Korea, the same way South Korea’s Kill Chain can save tens of thousands of
lives in Japan.
In addition
to a greater extended deterrence pressure exerted on North Korea, South Korea’s
strategic clarity for a strengthened trilateral security cooperation with the
US and Japan could help South Korea become more aligned with the US
Indo-Pacific strategy, enabling it to cooperate with other countries more
actively on many functional issues, “ranging from health to climate change,
supply chain, digital economy, cybersecurity, nonproliferation,
counterterrorism, and others.”[12] Since
the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy clearly stipulates “strengthening extended
deterrence and coordination with our ROK and Japanese allies and pursuing the
complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”[13] as
one of its security imperatives, South Korea’s more active participation in the
trilateral security cooperation with the US and Japan has allowed it to
establish proper institutional frameworks upon which the US, Japan, and other
countries with shared interests and values cooperate to reinforce the
rules-based international order. This is in stark contrast with South Korea’s
previous Moon Jae-in administration, which sought strategic ambiguity between
the US and China and had a “restrained voice and lack of connections to the
institutional frameworks built among democracies, [with] South Korea’s confined
diplomatic space and influence in the region.”[14] With
an evolving North Korean nuclear threat, South Korea’s strengthened three-way security
coordination with the US and Japan and its clear alignment with the US
Indo-Pacific strategy can allow for more robust partnerships in the region involving
the US and Japan, which South Korea can join to “expand the horizon of its
regional diplomacy”[15] and
step up to the role of a “global pivotal state” that it envisions to become.
Conclusion
Some may question if the challenges of
South Korea’s strategic clarity for an enhanced trilateral security cooperation
with the US and Japan are too great to overcome for it to become a durable
foreign policy doctrine. Fortunately, there is some substantial progress which South
Korea’s Yoon administration has taken the initiative to repair the damage done
to the US-South Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation. For examples, to swiftly
resolve the forced wartime labor compensation issue, South Korea proposed
creating a domestic fund to compensate the victims in January 2023; to reinforce
intelligence sharing between Seoul and Tokyo, South Korea has publicly
announced its plan to completely normalize GSOMIA in June 2022; to expand
military cooperation with the US and Japan, South Korea has also conducted
joint field exercises with the US and Japan in November 2022 to respond to
North Korean threat. While more can be done, South Korea’s aspiration to become
a regional and global leader alongside the US and Japan as a pivotal state in
the Indo-Pacific is evident, and a growing North Korean threat and the
intensifying US-China competition provide unmistakable justifications for South
Korea’s strategic clarity, which aims to advance “freedom, peace, and
prosperity through liberal democratic values and cooperation”[16] in
the region along with the US and Japan.
Author Biography:
Mr. Euihyun Kwon is an MA International
Commerce student at Korea University, Republic of Korea. He has a BA degree in
Economics from University of California, San Diego, where he graduated cum
laude with honors. His area of focus is on ASEAN, US-China relations, and
Indo-Pacific geopolitics.
References:
[1] Republic of Korea
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous
Indo-Pacific Region,” Press Releases, accessed February 10, 2023, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322133.
[2] Yoichiro Sato,
“Assessing the U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Security Alliance,” interview
by Euihyun Kwon, Consortium of Indo-Pacific
Researchers, February 3, 2023.
[3] Takahashi Kosuke,
“History Overshadows Japan-South Korea-Rapprochement,” The Diplomat,
September 29, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/history-overshadows-japan-south-korea-rapprochement/.
[4] Scott A. Snyder,
“What South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Says about the Development of a ‘Yoon
Doctrine,’” Council on Foreign Relations (blog), December 29, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-south-koreas-indo-pacific-strategy-says-about-development-yoon-doctrine?amp.
[5] Yoichiro Sato,
“Assessing the U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Security Alliance.”
[6] Hanna Foreman and
Andrew Yeo, “Promise and Perils for the Japan-South Korea-US Trilateral in
2023,” The Diplomat, January 30, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/promise-and-perils-for-the-japan-south-korea-us-trilateral-in-2023/.
[7] Yoichiro Sato,
“Assessing the U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Security Alliance.”
[8] Scott A. Snyder,
“What South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Says about the Development of a ‘Yoon
Doctrine.’”
[9] Bruce W. Bennett,
“Japanese ‘Counterstrike’ May be Good for ROK Security,” The RAND
Corporation (blog), December 28, 2022, https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/12/japanese-counterstrike-may-be-good-for-rok-security.html.
[10] Bruce W. Bennett,
“Japanese ‘Counterstrike’ May be Good for ROK Security.”
[11] Bruce W. Bennett,
“Japanese ‘Counterstrike’ May be Good for ROK Security.”
[12] Ellen Kim,
“Assessment of South Korea’s New Indo-Pacific Strategy,” The Center for
Strategic and International Studies, January 19, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessment-south-koreas-new-indo-pacific-strategy.
[13] The White House,
“FACT SHEET: Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” October 27, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/02/11/fact-sheet-indo-pacific-strategy-of-the-united-states/.
[14] Ellen Kim,
“Assessment of South Korea’s New Indo-Pacific Strategy.”
[15] Ellen Kim,
“Assessment of South Korea’s New Indo-Pacific Strategy.”
[16] Scott A. Snyder,
“What South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Says about the Development of a ‘Yoon
Doctrine.’”