Enigma Unveiled: Understanding Russian
Strategic Mindset and the Implications for the Indo-Pacific
PDF Version
Shaheer Ahmad | Apr 30th 2023
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Introduction
The successor
state of the former Soviet Union has always portrayed a strategic culture
distinct from its Western counterparts. Russian discourse on characteristics of
warfare have always been unique which led towards the coining of different terms
and tropes referring towards the Russian strategic thought. The recent action
in Ukraine demonstrates that the element of surprise is still present in the
international relations. The consequences of the conflict are thereby far
reaching as it has raised questions regarding the vitality of what we call
rule-based order, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Even so, Indo-Pacific is a
distant geopolitical field, yet it will be affected by the aftermaths of the
war. The article therefore tries to understand the implications of Russian actions are far-reaching to the distant
geopolitical fields. Indo-Pacific is a critical theatre in generating a
response towards the Russian actions in Ukraine. Biden’s pledge to garner
support from allies in generating a stiff response increases the vitality of
the Asian allies. Despite the centrality of the European states in aiding
Ukraine, they are vulnerable to Russia’s arm twisting due to the overt
dependence on natural gas. The situation therefore diverts US attention towards
the Asian allies. The bilateral meetings between US, Japan and South Korea
suggests that the Asian allies are important in making any responsive mechanism
effective. Notwithstanding that Japan and South Korea plays an important role
in the global supply chain, yet they are also the vigorous democracies. Hence,
they are an important asset in US efforts to preserve the rule-based order in
the face of growing authoritarian threats.
Russia is the largest landmass on the planet, with its
limits stretching from Vladivostok in East to Kaliningrad in the West. Russia is
a unique civilization, bridging the continents of Europe and Asia which has led
many scholars to argue that Russian perception of war, history and politics is
a complex puzzle distinct yet lying in its own interpretation of the events.
Several books and articles have been written on the mysterious “Russian soul,”
often connoted with the famous Matryoshka doll.[1] Western powers have occasionally downplayed
the role of Russian state of affairs and viewed it as an anomaly in European
security architecture. The famous Russian political philosopher Boris
Kagarlitsky argued that the universal European models usually fails in Russia,
nonetheless, understanding Russia through the standpoint of national
exclusivity also fails as well.[2]
So, it is necessary to understand Russia through its own view shaped by its
unique interactions with the outsiders. Therefore, the article has attempted to
analyze Russia’s strategic mindset and its impact on Indo-Pacific power
dynamics.
A Mystery Inside an Enigma
While examining the Russian strategic thought it is
noteworthy to mention Winston Churchill’s famous saying that “Russia is a
riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma, but perhaps there is a key. That
key is Russian national interest.”[3]
Likewise, Fyodor Ivanovich Tyutchev’s famous verse narrates that,
You cannot
grasp Russia with your mind
Or judge her by any common measure,
Russia is one of a special kind –
You can only believe in her.[4]
Different ideological schools have tried to paint the
Russian history, culture, and strategic mindset through different prisms. The
Westerners have viewed Russia as a part of the great European civilization
which due to ill-fated circumstances left behind. While the Slavophiles viewed
Russia as a distinct and unique civilization which was shaped even before the
Asian and European civilizations left its imprints on it.[5]
The bitter rivalry between the two schools led the former conceptualizing
Russia as an anomaly while the latter perceived it as a Russian special way of
dealing with its state of affairs.
Since the end of Cold War, the attention towards Russian
scholarship witnessed a drastic decline regarding the fundings on Russian
studies. This decline resulted into the vague conceptualization of Russian way
of war in 21st century. These inquiries led towards the crafting of
several terms and tropes connoting to Russian strategic thought notably
‘Gerasimov doctrine’ and ‘Russian Hybrid Warfare’. Nonetheless, all conceptions
failed miserably as they proved to be flawed in analyzing the Russian Modus
Operandi. Russian intervention in Syria, annexation of Crimea and the recent
invasion of Ukraine are pertinent illustrations of what we call it as a
‘strategic surprise’.
Why is the ‘West’
continuously misreading Russian Designs?
In past, Russian annexation of Crimea come as a surprise to
the western policymakers. It turned out to be one of the major interstate
security crises in European continent following the collapse of the Berlin
Wall.[6]
Fiona Hell thus argued that “Why are we constantly surprised? They [Russians]
do all these things, and sometimes they do signal quite clearly, but we missed
a lot.”[7]
This attitude reflects the underestimation of the Russian military prowess
which has led towards the superficial analysis of its intentions and actions.
Nonetheless, these views have attributed towards the understanding that Russia
is combining a blend of military and non-military synergies in its
conceptualization of war. However, this conception became inaccurate when
Russia did otherwise in Crimea. In 2015, Western powers were once again
surprised when President Putin ordered Russian intervention in Syria.[8]
Even so, the transfer of Russian military hardware and troops already begun in
August.[9]
The question arises that why the ‘West’ is unclear about the
Russian actions when it can foresee the signals coming from Moscow. For
instance, it appeared that the demonstration of the T-14 Armata at Moscow’s
Victory Day Parade made Western military experts unaware of its development.
According to UK military intelligence’s report, ‘the tank has caused a
sensation’.[10] It also
called an urgency to upgrade the existing inventory of the battlefield tanks.[11]
However, it is unclear that how the demonstration of Armata came as a surprise
as Russia has never cloistered its development. In fact, Russian Ministry of
Defence has stopped financing the T-95 in errand of Armata development.
These illustrations suggest that Russia has already signaled
its intentions clearly before starting the actions. It is now the duty of the
Western policymakers to change the perceptions of the West of Russia as an
over-securitized and over geared state.[12]
In past years, the role of Russia has been downplayed by the politicians and
policymakers while knowing that Russia has one of the strongest militaries,
largest nuclear stockpile, and an aspiring space program. The assumption of a
weaker Russia created a misleading picture of the Russian affairs which often
lead towards the inability of West to read Russian strategic designs. Ivan
Ilyin therefore argued that ‘Russia as a nation still appears to be a hidden
world for the Western world’.
Assessing
the Response of Indo-Pacific Actors
Russia’s policy of ‘looking towards East’ sought to play a
greater role in the Indo-Pacific. Russia’s declining energy assets and its status
as an energy superpower is prompting it to diversify the market for its LNG
products.[13]
Nonetheless, its hopes for reorientating the East Asian markets have resulted
into strained relations with the Indo-Pacific states. The region may be far
from the Ukraine, yet it will be affected by the dynamics of energy security
and geopolitics. The Asian states affected mostly by the Ukraine war are the
Russia’s immediate neighbors, South Korea and Japan. The recent Japanese
defense documents signals sensation towards the deteriorating regional security
environment in its backyard. The deepening Sino-Russian partnership coupled
with China’s assertive actions over Senkaku Islands is threatening for the Japan’s
strategic calculus.
South Korea on other hand is also concerned with the Russian
actions in Ukraine. Korean concerns are oblique with respect to China, yet it
is more concerned with the lessons North Korea’s is drawing in the current
situation. North Korea’s support of Russian actions and even recognizing the
annexed territories is likely to reduce the Russian pressure on the nuclear
issue. This situation has compelled South Korea to ask US to redeploy nuclear
weapons in South Korea and building a domestic capability. Moreover, Russia’s vision of Eurasian connectivity will
likely limit the options for South Korea. Nonetheless, considering alternative
response will enable it to assist Ukraine.
If Russia succeeds to undermine the Zelensky’s government in Ukraine, it
will be a serious imperative for the democracies across the world.
In this regard, Biden
administration has taken some practical steps notably encouraging South Korea and
Japan to provide military assistance and contributing LNG to the European
states, respectively. Japan responded positively to US pledge to supply LNG to
the European partners. Likewise, Biden administration should solicit Japan and
South Korea to halt their diplomatic overtures with Russia. Russia’s ‘Far East’
is among the area of its core national interests. Thus, suspending new
investments on the joint development projects in the ‘Far-East’ is also a need
of time until the resolution of crisis. In the light of these factors, it can be argued that Russian
actions in Ukraine coupled with growing Sino-Russian partnership resonates the
Russia’s aspirations for creating a multipolar world with great powers having
respective sphere of influences. The access to the East Asian markets is likely
to grant Russia enough leverage to arm twist Europe regarding the energy
security. In this regard, East Asian allies notably Japan and South Korea
should be encouraged to employ alternative responses to Russia. Certainly, the
diversified energy and diplomatic pool of Russia will limit the response of
Japan and South Korea. However,
encouraging them to augment their international participation will strengthen
the global response against the aggression.
Unveiling the Enigma: Analyzing Contemporary
Russian Mindset
The shifting of the geopolitical tectonic plates has always
been uncontrollable and unpredictable. It is evident that Russia is unable to
fight a conventional war with NATO due to the deficiencies in conventional
domain. Hitherto, it is more inclined towards using the threat of nuclear
deterrent combined with net-centric warfare aimed at disrupting the critical
nodes of adversary’s civilian infrastructure. Russian strategic mind intends to
employ multiple tactics to fuel disunity among the adversarial parties and
rendering them incapable of generating a collective response. Ofer Fridman put
it as ‘to end the enemy’s political will to fight.’[14]
Russian doctrinal patterns are aimed at sowing discord among
the adversary’s alliances and trying to influence their public’s opinion.
Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, India called off on the last moment
the UK high level delegation due to Modi’s government reluctance to express its
stance on the Ukrainian crises.[15]
Similarly, twenty-six out of 54 African countries didn’t favor the UNSC
resolution condemning the Russian actions in Ukraine. On other hand, Russia has
initiated its economic onslaught in face of Western dependency on Russian gas.
The disruption of Nord stream is link to the same thread where Western states
found themselves in an immediate haste due to their dependence on the Russian
gas.
Ukraine is part of the contested geopolitical field of
post-Soviet space and attains a vital position in Russian geopolitical culture.
Russia has considered these territories as a part of its vital national
interests which is outlined in the so-called Primakov doctrine.[16]
Ukraine’s current tilt towards EU and NATO fueled the Russian strategic
anxieties of the expansion of the NATO in the near abroad. Russian strategic
mind is concerned with regaining the Russian influence in the former Soviet
territories. Gerard Toal argued that the goal is not to recreate the Soviet
Union but to make Russia great again. Therefore, the Russian demands from NATO
to cease the new membership of alliances lies in the fear of regime change at
home.
Sun Tzu’s famous maxim argues about knowing the enemy and
oneself. During the Cold War era, the Western powers overestimated the Soviet Union,
and its dismemberment came as a surprise. The realist school also witnessed a
shift in the paradigm as it also failed to predict the end of the Cold War. However,
following the dissolution of Soviet Union, the Western powers underestimated
the Russia as a rogue regime struggling with the former Soviet Union’s
nostalgia. Russia however annexed Crimea and secured Sevastopol to prevent the
bottling of its crucial Black Sea Fleet. The current invasion of Ukraine is
call for the US and its allies to view and handle Russia with care which
involves a careful examination of its political and military strengths.
The series of events in past have demonstrated that Russia
is trying to enhance its geopolitical influence across the world. West should
be mindful of the consequences of downplaying Russian role in the international
politics. Russian political system and strategic culture is distinct from the Westerners;
however, it doesn’t imply that application of the European universal models can
provide a nuanced picture of the Russian strategic mindset. The relationship
between the Russian people and the power is complex as compared to that of
West. Russian famous proverb “Master will come – Master will judge us” presents
a picture of the mysterious Russian soul and its own interpretation of the
events.
Conclusively, one can see that President Vladimir Putin has
manipulated the traumatic experience of the 1990’s and has legitimized the
regime at home. The Russian ‘black box’ is a complex phenomenon and
understanding it requires a deep analysis of the Russian history, society, and
strategic culture. Therefore, West need a comprehensive and careful
understanding of knowing and interpreting the Russian signaling. Indo-Pacific field
will be impacted by the far-reaching consequences on geopolitics, energy, and
food security. Despite of being far from Ukraine, Russian ambitions pose an
alarm to the allies including Japan and South Korea. Therefore, their
participation in global response will signal the resolve of democracies against
authoritarian threats. Hitherto, making sense of the Russian strategic and
doctrinal pattern is hereby necessary to understand its broader geopolitical
agenda. Sun Tzu’s maxim of knowing the
enemy is relevant because without knowing Russian real intentions in the light
of Russian strategic culture, history and society, West will remain unable to
understand the mysterious Russian soul.
Author’s Biography:
Shaheer Ahmad is a research scholar based in National
Defence University, Pakistan. He is the member of Consortium of Indo-Pacific
Researchers and is also serving as a Research Assistant at Institute of
Strategic Studies, Pakistan.
References
[1]
Brad Cabana, “The Matryoshka Complex And Russian Politics,” Vocal Europe, last
modified October 5, 2017, https://www.vocaleurope.eu/the-matryoshka-complex-and-russian-politics/
[2]
Boris Kagarlitsky, Peripheral Empire: The Cycles of Russian History, (Moscow:
Algoritm, 2009), 8.
[3]
Alan Cowell, “Churchill’s definition of Russia still rings true,” New York
Times, August 1, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/01/world/europe/01iht-letter.1.14939466.html#:~:text=Famously%2C%20Winston%20Churchill%20defined%20Russia,who%20choose%20more%20open%20regulations.
[4]
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[5]
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[6]
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the Caucasus (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 19.
[7]Karoun
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[8]
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[9]
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[10]
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[11]
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[12]
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[13]
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[14]
Ofer Fridman, Russian Hybrid Warfare: Resurgence and Politicisation (New
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[15]
"India says no to
‘high-powered’ UK delegation planning to visit Delhi to persuade govt against
Russia, trip canceled last minute," Op India, last modified March 25,
2022, https://www.opindia.com/2022/03/india-says-no-to-high-powered-uk-delegation-coming-to-persuade-govt-against-russia-trip-cancelled-last-minute/.
[16]
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