North Korean Troops to Ukraine: Outsourcing the Axis

By: Capt. Grant T. Willis & Capt. Brendan H.J. Donnelly, USAF | Dec 7th, 2024

DPRK troops
Figure 1: DPRK troops on parade

The DPRK Enters the Fray

On February 24th 2022 the world was stunned with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, being the largest invasion in Europe in almost 80 years. Since then, we have witnessed continuous combat between the two nations to include ground combat operations, naval combat and aerial engagements using missiles, aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). As reported by the United States Department of Defense (DoD), Russia has lost 350,000 soldiers over 31 months of conflict with Ukraine.[1] This drastic loss of life has forced Russia to look towards its allies such as Iran, Peoples Republic of China (PRC), and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) for support with military supplies and now as reported military forces. Although disputed by Russia and China, multiple intelligence agencies and reports from numerous countries have identified that in October, the DPRK sent 1,500 special operations forces to assist the Russian military fighting against Ukraine.[2]

Since October, several sources have now identified the first deployment of 1,500 has grown to a total of 10-12,000 DPRK soldiers.[3] These additional soldiers “considered to be the best” from the DPRK 11th Corps, were deployed to the Kursk region within Russia to mass with other Russian military forces, making up a total of 50,000 troops ready to combat the Ukrainian advances in Kursk.[4] According to Newsweek there have been mixed reports on if DPRK soldiers have been casualties already or have been kept of the front lines to train in artillery and infantry basics.[5] Many sources speculate as to why the DPRK deployed soldiers to support Russia, yet the most likely reason has to do with the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership that was signed by Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-Un. The treaty stated “in case any one of the two sides [Russia or DPRK] is put in a state of war by an armed invasion from an individual state or several states, the other side shall provide military and other assistance with all means in its possession without delay”.[6] Within the last two years of fighting between Russia and Ukraine, the DPRK had already been sending missiles, munitions and supplies to Russia. Although, with the Ukrainians mounting operations in Kursk, the treaty was enacted and is likely a driving reason for why the DPRK has sent military support. It also must be mentioned that even though the Russian’s have not openly identified or promised any support for the DPRK, it is likely that there has been some agreement between President Putin and Kim Jong-Un for Russian assistance in either missile technology, nuclear technology or the DPRK space program.

This situation now has the attention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and nations providing support to Ukraine, as the deployment is a serious move from Russia and the DPRK. Although, in history, the DPRK has acted in very similar ways in relation to North Vietnam and Egypt. Further, these historic examples will illuminate similar deployments of troops and could identify potential next steps from the DPRK in the Russian scenario.

DPRK troops
Figure 2: R/Panarab, “Rare photos taken during the honoring of the North Korean MiG pilots who fought for Egypt during the October War in 1973” Reddit, (August 17, 2022), Courtesy: https://www.reddit.com/r/Panarab/comments/wqotd4/rare_photos_taken_during_the_honouring_of_

 

Historic DPRK Deployments: North Vietnam and Egypt

A little more than a decade after the end of the Korean War between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK), the DPRK had pledged support to North Vietnam in 1965. The original agreement between Kim Il-Sung and Ho Chi Minh was “The Korean people will provide any kind of support, including weapons, to the Vietnamese comrades and upon request will send volunteer forces”.[7] This support was two pronged. First, for the DPRK it was about supporting socialist nations and their struggle. Second, to combat the support that the United States was providing to South Vietnam. Thusly, the DPRK pushed propaganda within their media to rise a volunteer force willing to deploy to North Vietnam, to protect from a future invasion of North Korea from the United States.

The forces sent by the DPRK included 500 workers and experts to assist the North Vietnamese in building their tunnel system.[8] One year later, in 1966, the DPRK then sent an Air Force regiment to North Vietnam. Reports disagree on the total number of personnel sent, but the number was roughly 87-100 pilots.[9] These pilots would fly Soviet equipment on behalf of the North Vietnamese, and were directed to be disguised as North Vietnamese airplanes as well. The DPRK pilots primarily operated in and around Hanoi protecting the North Vietnamese capital and fighting off U.S. aircraft in North Vietnamese airspace.

The next conflict that the DPRK supported was in 1973, the Yom Kippur War. Leading up to this conflict Egypt had claimed that their military strength was insufficient to take on the Israeli military, backed by the United States. Therefore, Egypt had looked to the Soviet Union to support them with advanced military equipment and training to prepare the Egyptian military and specifically their Air Force for combat later in 1973. Yet, at the time in 1972, the Soviet Union was reluctant to provide Egypt with advanced weaponry and training, which resulted in Egypt expelling most of the Soviet advisers from their country.[10]

 Egypt then turned to China and their militant approach to dealing with the Middle East. Additionally, Egypt sought support from the DPRK as they had recent combat experience in North Vietnam, and their pilots were experienced with Soviet equipment.[11] In early 1973, Egypt requested from the DPRK a regiment of Air Force personnel to train the Egyptian Air Force prior to the Yom Kippur War later that year. By the end of the conflict the DPRK had sent Egypt 1,500 advisors and 39 Air Force personnel.[12] During this time DPRK pilots flying their MiG-21s engaged Israeli Air Force (IAF) F-4 Phantoms in dogfighting. Although, both the deployment of forces to North Vietnam and Egypt included pilots there are still some similarities that can be drawn between them and the deployment to Ukraine.

Havana Syndrome

Another, indirect, Cold War connection to the deployment of a DPRK expeditionary force to fight on behalf of Russia can be drawn from a series of interventions by the communists in Africa by Fidel Castro’s Cuba.  Heavily involved in the ideological mission of fighting wars of national liberation, Fidel found a way to not only exercise his internationalist fever, but to gain prestige amongst the East by deploying troops and air forces to fight directly where the Soviets would not.  In 1975, the Portuguese had been driven out of their former colony Angola by several insurgent factions, jockeying for power.  The MPLA (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola) was Marxist and battled western backed factions attempting to take control of the West African nation’s capital, Luanda.  Although the CIA and American military, after the withdrawal from Southeast Asia, would not be allowed to intervene against the establishment of a communist government after the Portuguese route and the Soviets were unwilling to send more than advisers and light material support, Fidel Castro’s Cuba unilaterally decided to prevent a collapse of their socialist brothers.  A massive Cuban buildup of thousands of troops, armor, artillery, air defense/radar, and combat aircraft would be sent into Angola.  Alongside the Cubans, Moscow felt compelled to send material aide as well as advisers from across the East Bloc.  Pro-western South Africa, fighting its own counterinsurgency against SWAPO guerillas in Namibia, along the southern border of Angola, soon clashed directly with Angolan and Cuban military forces in the field.  Several cross border operations to destroy SWAPO base areas involved direct combat against Cuban mechanized formations and air/anti-air battles ensued.  Throughout the 80s, the South African Defense Force and Castro’s Cuban led communist forces clashed in the Angolan Bush seeing some of the largest conventional battles on the African continent since World War II.[13] By the late 80s, Castro and the South Africans made terms for the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.  Castro’s goals had prevailed and a socialist government controls Angola today. 

DPRK troops

Across the African continent, in the horn of Africa, a series of Cold War political reverses pitted Somalia and Ethiopia against one another. Somalia, seeing value in switching from a Moscow supported government in Mogadishu to a pro-American venture, decided to expel their Soviet advisers and invade their neighbor, Ethiopia. The Somali forces seized large treks of the Ogaden desert and with their Soviet weapons, sought a new patron from President Jimmy Carter’s administration. Carter, not wishing to get involved in an area that seemed of little strategic value to the United States refused. Ethiopia, on the other hand, having embraced the Soviet bloc in a revolutionary coup which placed a Marxist military commander in power, requested assistance to repel the Somalis. Once again, Fidel Castro sent his Cuban expeditionary force to fulfill their internationalist duties.  Cuban armored formations, artillery, and advisers assisted the Ethiopians in battle against the Somali invaders, eventually driving them out of the Ogaden.[15] These series of Cuban interventions, although unprompted by Moscow, seemed to disrupt the balance between the Great Powers in the halls of Washington, who viewed the deployment of Cuban combat units to Cold War hot spots as a tool Moscow could employ without risking the direct involvement of the Red Army.  In CNN’s 1998 documentary series titled, Cold War, episode 17 titled, “Good Guys, Bad Guys”, provided a keen insight to Washington’s views on the Cuban interventions.  In the series, former American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger states, “We thought, with respect to Angola, that if the Soviet Union could intervene at such distances from areas that are far from the traditional Russian security concern, and when Cuban forces could be introduced into distant trouble spots and if the West could not find a counter to that, then the whole international system could be destabilized.”  It would be remarkable to be a fly on the wall within some of the security discussions taking place within the United States’ defense establishment and possibly hearing a parallel to the possibility of North Korea’s entry into Ukraine with the Cuban interventions in Angola and Somalia during the Cold War.

Conclusions

          Looking at the last two months in relation to the historic examples from North Vietnam, Egypt and the Cold War, two key conclusions can be extrapolated. First, as the DPRK is outwardly anti-United States and anti-Western culture, it is clear that the deployment of soldiers to Russia will support the DPRK’s overall goal of combatting the United States influence. This is an obvious reason that supported the deployments to Egypt and North Vietnam. Second, as mentioned, although Russia has not publicly release compensation to the DRPK, it is likely that Russia will provide missile technology or space technology to assist the DPRK efforts in those areas in the short term. It is possible that Russia may also assist the DPRK nuclear program in the long term, but this has not been corroborated. Further, the DPRK action resemble those of Cuba attempting to obtain the favor of Soviet Russia. In a similar line of thought, like the Cubans did, the DPRK may also be seeking diplomatic support from the Russians in the future, as an international security blanket of support.

          When it comes to the DPRK and Russia, what may come next is up for debate, but based on historic examples and the capabilities of the DPRK there are a few probable actions to come. Based on the deployment experience in Egypt, and since the Russian Air Force has been degraded throughout the conflict, it is probable that the DPRK could send over in the next deployment of troops, pilots that are familiar with Soviet Era aircraft to provide air support to Russian ground operations. Finally, since “Russia is struggling to meet its monthly recruiting goal of roughly 25,000 troops as its casualties mount […]”, it is very probable that the DPRK could send thousands more soldiers to fill the Russian requirement to take back land invaded by Ukraine.[16]

          Like many events that happen today there are historic examples, therefore it should not be a significant surprise that the DPRK has deployed troops to Russia. It could be assessed that, the DPRK especially wants to project to the world that the regime and the country is strong enough to impact geopolitical issues beyond its immediate region, projecting a position of strength. Therefore, additional soldiers to support DPRK’s historically closest ally, is a very likely eventuality. Although what is yet to be seen in the near future, will be if these thousands of soldiers will actually turn the tides of war in the Kursk region and put the Ukrainians back on the defense.

Author Bios:

Captain Willis is a U.S. Air Force officer stationed at Cannon AFB, NM and a Fellow with the Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers (CIPR).  He is a distinguished graduate of the University of Cincinnati’s AFROTC program with a B.A. in International Affairs, with a minor in Political Science.  He has multiple publications with the Consortium, United States Naval Institute’s (USNI) Naval History Magazine, Air University’s Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (JIPA), Air University’s Wild Blue Yonder Journal, and Air Commando Journal.  He is also a featured guest on multiple episodes of Vanguard: Indo-Pacific, the official podcast of the Consortium, USNI’s Proceedings Podcast, and CIPR conference panel lectures available on the Consortium’s YouTube channel.

Capt Donnelly is a U.S. Air Force officer stations at Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA and is a Fellow with the Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers (CIPR). He has an undergraduate degree in History with a double minor in Political Science and Aerospace Leadership Studies from Bowling Green State University in Ohio. Capt Donnelly additionally has a graduate degree in Global Security Studies with a specialization in National Security from Angelo State University in Texas. He has published multiple articles with the Consortium and Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (JIPA). Finally, Capt Donnelly is also featured as a moderator and guest on the Vanguard: Indo-Pacific podcast series and has served as an academic mentor to interns with the consortium.

 


[1] Micah McCartney, “North Korea Responds to Claims Troops Deploying to Russia-Ukraine War”, Newsweek, (October 22, 2024), https://www.newsweek.com/north-korea-news-responds-troops-deploy-russia-ukraine-war-1972718.

[2] Greg Wehner, “South Korea demands withdrawal of North Korean troops allegedly helping Russia fight Ukraine”, Fox News, (October 21, 2024), https://www.foxnews.com/world/south-korea-demands-withdrawal-north-korean-troops-allegedly-helping-russia-fight-ukraine.

[3] Julian E. Barnes, Eric Schmitt and Michael Schwitz, “50,000 Russian and North Korean Troops Mass Ahead of Attack, U.S. Says”, New York Times, (November 10, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/10/us/politics/russia-north-korea-troops-ukraine.html?smid=nytcore-android-share.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Brendan Cole, “Russia resists deploying ‘Highly Trained’ North Koreans in Combat: Report”, Newsweek, (November 28, 2024), https://www.newsweek.com/russia-resists-deploying-highly-trained-north-koreans-combat-1993052.

[6] Michael Shear, “Why is North Korea deploying troops to help Russia? Here’s what to know”, New York Times, (October 24, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/24/us/politics/north-korea-russia-ukraine.html?smid=li-share.

[7] Benjamin R. Young, “The Origins of North Korea-Vietnam Solidarity: The Vietnam War and the DPRK”, Woodrow Wilson Center NKIDP, (February 2019), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-origins-north-korea-vietnamsolidarity-the-vietnam-war-and-the-dprk.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Balazs Szalontai, “Courting the “Traitor to the Arab Cause”: Egyptian-North Korean Relations in the Sadat Era, 1970-1981”, S/N Korean Humanities, Vol 5, Is 1, (March 2019), https://doi.org/10.17783/IHU.2019.5.1.103.

[11] Niu Song, “North Korea’s Middle East Diplomacy and the Arab Spring”, Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, (May 18, 2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2016.1181921.

[12] Balazs Szalontai, “Courting the “Traitor to the Arab Cause”: Egyptian-North Korean Relations in the Sadat Era, 1970-1981”.

[13] Fontanellaz, Adrien, Jose Matos, and Tom Cooper. War of Intervention in Angola Volume 3: Angolan and Cuban Air Forces, 1975-1985. Helion and Company, 2020.

[14] Tom Cooper, Adrien Fontanellaz, Jose Augusto Matos, ”War of Intervention in Angola” Vol 5., Helion Company, (2019), https://www.helion.co.uk/military-history-books/war-of-intervention-in-angola-volume-5-angolan-and-cuban-air-forces-1987-1992.php.

[15] Cooper, Tom. Wings over Ogaden:  The Ethiopian-Somali War, 1978-1979. Helion and Company, 2015.

[16] Julian E. Barnes, Eric Schmitt and Michael Schwitz, November 10, 2024.