North
Korea’s Missile Program and Security in the Korean Peninsula
Jeongeun
Kim | June 3rd, 2025
Introduction
On January 10, 2025,
North Korea launched a ballistic missile in response to the ROK-U.S. joint
military exercise.[1]
This event reignited longstanding tensions on the Korean Peninsula and raised
critical questions about North Korea’s strategic intentions. Is the missile
launch merely a routine provocation, or does it represent a calculated move
aligned with broader geopolitical goals? To discuss this question, we need to
further examine the situation not only in the Korean Peninsula, but also in the
United States. Since the possibility of the re-election of Donald Trump
emerged, South Korea grew increasingly concerned about escalating tensions
between North Korea and the United States, due to the failed denuclearization
talks between Trump and Kim Jung-un in the past.[2] North
Korea has faced increasing international criticism– particularly for actions
such as its participation in supporting the Russian military. As a result, the
position of North Korea in the international community has significantly
weakened.[3] The
situation seemed to be worse because President Yoon was known for his hardline
stance toward North Korea.[4] However,
it remains too early to judge whether the situation is entirely unfavorable, as
several variables still exist. Trump has not expressed hostile sentiments
toward North Korea while preparing for his presidential campaign; on the
contrary, he has shown a favorable stance, including support for resuming
U.S.-North Korea negotiations.[5] Additionally,
North Korea might not be at the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda given his
emphasis on other priorities, like enforcing tariffs. This implies that there
might still be time for South Korea and its allies to plan for different Korean
Peninsula scenarios.
In
this dynamic, the paper will first examine the intention of North Korea’s
missile provocation and what impacted South Korea security first. Then, the
paper will explore potential strategic shifts by North Korea in the second
administration of Trump. Lastly, it will discuss the implications of the
martial law declared by President Yoon Suk-yeol and
the impeachment South Korea’s national security, offering suggestions for how
to respond effectively to future provocations from the North.
North
Korea’s Missile Provocation and Its Impact on South Korean Security
North Korea’s missile
launch in January 2025 must be understood within a broader strategic pattern.
Historically, Pyongyang has demonstrated a tendency to conduct military
provocations during transitions in U.S. leadership, such as during the early
months of the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations.[6] These
actions appear to serve a dual purpose: projecting strength to a new American
president while increasing North Korea’s leverage ahead of any potential
negotiations. The 2025 launch fits this pattern, coming around the time of
Donald Trump’s return to office.
Do
North Korea’s Military Intentions Indicate a Real Possibility of War?
Prior to the martial
law controversy, the Yoon administration had already begun preparing for
potential military conflict with North Korea.[7] According
to investigative reports, South Korean authorities drew up military contingency
plans that included the possibility of preemptive measures, even before the
public discourse on martial law emerged. Notably, one leaked document, notes
taken by former Defense Intelligence Command chief Roh Sang-won, contained the
phrase “induce North Korean attacks at the NLL (the Northern Limit Line).” This
raised concerns that the administration may have been considering scenarios in
which a limited conflict could be initiated or provoked.[8] These
preparations suggest that the administration viewed a direct confrontation with
the North as a tangible threat, rather than a distant possibility. This
interpretation is further supported by the fact that South Korea conducted
multiple live-fire exercises near NLL throughout 2024, actions which may have
been perceived as escalatory by Pyongyang.
In
contrast North Korea’s response, particularly the demolition of parts of
inter-Korean roads[9],
can be seen as a calculated message to avoid direct armed conflict. Rather than
signaling a willingness to escalate toward war, this move appears to be a form
of controlled provocation. While severing infrastructure may seem hostile,
interpreting it as a complete breakdown in inter-Korean relations could be an
overreach. If the DPRK were genuinely preparing for an invasion, it would
likely preserve key logistical routes rather than destroy them. By targeting
symbolic infrastructure instead of military assets, North Korea appears to be
sending a calibrated message of strength while avoiding direct confrontation.
Trump’s
Re-Election and North Korea’s Strategy
In addition to
exploiting South Korea’s domestic instability, North Korea’s strategic behavior
in 2025 must also be understood within the broader context of its deteriorating
international position. The country continues to face stringent economic sanctions
imposed by the United Nations and the United States, severely limiting its
access to global financial systems and trade networks. These sanctions, though
aimed at curbing nuclear development, have contributed to chronic economic
hardship and internal pressure to assert strength externally.
Simultaneously,
Pyongyang has deepened ties with Moscow and Beijing. Its alleged provision of
artillery shells and small arms to Russia during the war in Ukraine has further
isolated the regime from the Western bloc but also strengthened its alignment
with authoritarian powers.3 China has maintained trade relations and resisted
more severe sanctions despite its formal commitment to denuclearization,
providing North Korea with limited but vital diplomatic and economic support.
Even though these ties are unstable, they give Pyongyang flexibility that
defies complete Western isolation.
Taken
together, these dynamics suggest that North Korea’s provocations are shaped by
more than just inter-Korean politics or the recent U.S. election. They are also
driven by a need to maintain internal regime legitimacy, reinforce domestic
unity, and signal strength in the face of external pressure. Missile tests,
therefore, function as military threats, diplomatic signals, and tools of
internal consolidation.
Within
this context, the re-election of Donald Trump raises additional strategic
considerations. While Trump engaged in high-profile summits with Kim Jong-un
during his first term, these talks ultimately failed to produce lasting
outcomes.[10]
Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy, which puts trade, tariffs,
and domestic issues before alliance management, raises the possibility that
North Korea won’t be a top priority for him in a second term. However, this specific fact might encourage Pyongyang to take proactive
measures to attract U.S. attention and influence the terms of engagement, such
as launching missiles or sending political signals.
This
combination of international isolation, economic necessity, and changing
geopolitical dynamics explains why North Korea continues to rely on high-impact
provocations in 2025, particularly in a moment when both Seoul and Washington
are politically vulnerable.
Possible
Changes in the ROK-U.S. Alliance
Equally critical is the
potential transformation of the Korea-U.S. alliance under Trump’s second term.
One of the defining features of Trump’s first administration was his
transactional view of military alliances. In 2018 and 2019, Trump aggressively
pushed for a dramatic increase in South Korea’s contribution to the cost of
stationing U.S. troops.[11] These
demands were accompanied by public remarks questioning the necessity of
maintaining U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula. Though no actual troop
withdrawals occurred, the rhetoric alone sent shockwaves through South Korea’s
national security establishment.
After
his re-election in November 2024, President Trump began his second term with
renewed focus on reshaping U.S. foreign policy. One of his early moves was to
task his administration with reviewing alliance cost-sharing agreements, and
there are concerns that he may again pressure South Korea to increase its
defense contributions or risk reductions in U.S. troop presence. Such moves
place considerable pressure on the South Korean government, especially during a
time of internal political instability.[12]
However,
recent developments point to a continued U.S. commitment to regional stability
under the new administration. At the trilateral meeting in Brussels on April 3,
2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio reaffirmed America’s extended deterrence
commitments to both South Korea and Japan.[13] This
clear messaging from the highest levels of U.S. diplomacy reflects
institutional continuity, reducing the likelihood of sudden or drastic shifts
such as troop withdrawals.
Still,
questions about the durability of U.S. commitments may linger, especially in
North Korea’s strategic calculus. However, the consistent reaffirmation of
extended deterrence, as demonstrated in recent high-level trilateral meetings,
sends a strong message of allied unity. While Pyongyang may continue to test
boundaries, it does so against a more visibly coordinated front among the U.S.,
South Korea, and Japan.
Moreover,
these alliance frictions could spill over into trilateral cooperation with
Japan. The Biden administration had made significant strides in strengthening
U.S.-ROK-Japan security cooperation.[14] But
this framework might not be given priority in a second Trump administration.
Trump has previously criticized Japan and South Korea for their defense
contributions. This could lead to a renewed crack among allies in the region,
which would give North Korea and even China or Russia more strategic openings
to take advantage of.
In
this light, the real security risk for South Korea is not simply the missile
launches themselves, but the broader strategic realignment that may occur in
response to a shifting U.S. foreign policy posture. If Trump places less
emphasis on the Korean Peninsula, demands more from allies, and re-engages
North Korea on his own terms, South Korea’s ability to shape and protect its
own security environment may be severely constrained. Therefore, South Korean
policymakers must consider not only how to deter North Korea’s provocations but
also how to hedge against uncertainty within the alliance itself.
Political Turmoil After
Martial Law and Impeachment
The Yoon Suk-yeol administration was plunged into unprecedented
political chaos following revelations that martial law had been considered
during a period of domestic unrest. To add further context, on December 3,
2024, President Yoon declared Martial Law due to what he described as an effort
to eliminate anti-state forces and prevent the opposition from establishing a
dictatorship.[15]
With the support of 190 members of the national assembly, martial law was
lifted just six hours after it was declared. The National Assembly subsequently
introduced the impeachment motion against President Yoon. The first motion was
rejected due to the boycott from PPP (People Power Party) which is the ruling
party in South Korea. However, following the series of peace protests in Korea,
the second impeachment passed. On April 4th, 2025, the constitutional court
ruled that President Yoon’s declaration of martial law was unconstitutional,
ultimately leading to his impeachment.[16]
Originally
perceived as a hypothetical response to potential threats, further reporting
revealed that actual planning and operational discussions had taken place
within military and government institutions. These disclosures sparked
widespread public outrage and raised fundamental concerns about the state of
South Korea’s democracy. Critics viewed the consideration of martial law as a
dangerous overreach of executive power and a sign of authoritarian tendencies
within the administration.
As
the political firestorm escalated, opposition parties mobilized rapidly,
calling for transparency, accountability, and ultimately, impeachment. The
impeachment of President Yoon triggered a severe leadership vacuum, weakening
both the executive and legislative branches of government. Civil-military
relations became strained, as public trust in the armed forces declined due to
their perceived involvement in undemocratic planning. The crisis caused
problems for national governance, postponed the implementation of policies, and
took focus away from urgent security concerns, particularly those related to
the Korean Peninsula.
This
political upheaval did not end with the impeachment itself. In fact, it marked
the beginning of a deeper period of instability that would continue to affect
the country’s governance, security posture, and international credibility. The
removal of a sitting president under such extraordinary circumstances triggered
not only a leadership vacuum but also widespread institutional uncertainty. In
the months that followed, South Korea struggled to restore effective civilian
control, rebuild public trust, and reestablish a coherent security strategy—all under the shadow of an
increasingly aggressive North Korea.
Increasing Political
Instability in South Korea
Following the
impeachment, South Korea entered a phase of deep political instability. While a
transitional government was installed, its authority was limited, and it
struggled to maintain control over national security policy. Protests, public
distrust, and political gridlock created a volatile domestic environment.
Unclear rules and unstable systems made it harder for South Korea’s defense
teams to work together. Because of this, it wasn’t certain if
the country could quickly and effectively respond to a serious threat from
outside.
The
domestic instability also led to growing concern among international observers.
Allies questioned whether Seoul could fulfill its security commitments, while
adversaries may have viewed the situation as an opportunity to exploit. The
power vacuum weakened South Korea’s deterrence posture, both symbolically and
operationally, leaving the country vulnerable to external pressure or even
coercive diplomacy.
North
Korea’s Strategy Toward South Korea Amid Increasing Political Instability
South Kora faces a
degree of instability both externally and internally. In such an unstable
domestic environment, North Korea may seek to advance its strategic objectives
by exploiting the chaos in the South. One plausible scenario is that Pyongyang
could intensify its psychological warfare against South Korea while using
military provocations to test Seoul’s capacity to respond. This strategy would
serve dual purposes: undermining the credibility of South Korea’s government on
the international stage and reinforcing internal cohesion within the North.
Historically,
North Korea has used periods of South Korean political crisis to amplify
propaganda efforts and deepen its domestic narrative of a corrupt, unstable
South. The current situation, marked by public protests, political deadlock,
and impeachment, offers a fertile ground for such psychological operations.
Pyongyang may portray the South as a divided and weakened state, unable to
maintain order or defend its sovereignty. This narrative could be used to
justify North Korea’s continued military buildup or to rally public support
behind the regime.
More
provocatively, North Korea might use missile tests or localized military
actions to escalate tensions. If such provocations occur during South Korea’s
transitional leadership or governmental paralysis, the South may struggle to
issue a timely or coordinated response. The perception of hesitation or
indecision would further bolster North Korea’s leverage, both domestically and
in its engagements with the United States or China. The critical danger lies in
the symbolic value of these provocations: a single missile test, conducted at
the height of South Korea’s political crisis, could be interpreted not just as
a military threat, but as a statement about the South’s inability to govern
itself effectively.
In
this context, North Korea’s missile program is not merely a security threat
that it also becomes a political instrument. A missile test, launched during a
period of South Korean instability, could serve as both a show of strength and
a strategic tool for undermining the South’s legitimacy. It would reinforce
internal unity within the North by focusing attention on an external adversary
and justify further militarization as a defensive necessity. This dual function,
external provocation and internal consolidation, has been a recurring pattern
in North Korean strategy and is particularly relevant in the current political
climate.
Therefore,
South Korea’s political crisis must be understood not only in domestic terms
but also as a factor that directly shapes the regional security environment.
The more unstable the South becomes, the more room North Korea has to maneuver, provoke, and influence strategic outcomes
in its favor.
Conclusion:
Korean Peninsula Security Outlook
As tensions on the
Korean Peninsula rise once again, the strategic meaning of North Korea’s
missile provocations in 2025 demands close scrutiny.
While such launches are alarming, they are more likely a calculated signal
aimed at gaining leverage in future negotiations, rather than a direct
precursor to war. North Korea has historically used missile provocations as a
bargaining tool, raising tensions in order to prompt
dialogue or concessions from the international community, particularly from the
United States.
However,
the current situation differs from the past in several critical ways. South
Korea is facing a period of significant political instability following the
martial law controversy and the impeachment of President Yoon. This domestic
turmoil has weakened institutional capacity and public trust, creating
potential vulnerabilities in the South’s security posture. In this context,
North Korea may feel emboldened to test the limits of the South’s response
capacity, both militarily and psychologically. Missile tests, or other forms of
provocation, could serve not only to threaten but also to exploit and amplify
the South’s internal divisions.
At
the same time, the trajectory of U.S. foreign policy under Trump’s second
administration remains a major unknown. If North Korea is not a strategic
priority for Trump, and if the Korea-U.S. alliance undergoes significant
changes, such as increased burden-sharing demands or diminished military
coordination, South Korea could find itself increasingly isolated. As a result,
South Korea’s security in 2025 hinges not only on managing North Korea’s
provocations, but also on navigating the shifting dynamics of its alliance with
the United States.
Regardless
of domestic political instability, South Korea must remain vigilant. It should
closely monitor North Korea’s actions, reinforce its defense posture, and
prepare to respond swiftly to any form of provocation, military or political,
while also strengthening multilateral cooperation to maintain regional
stability.
Author’s Biography
Jeongeun
Kim is a graduate student at Korea University in Seoul. Her academic focus lies
in international security, North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, and the
ASEAN-South Korea partnership. The author expresses gratitude to Mr. Chris
Kolakowski, Prof. Terence Roehrig, and Dr. Indu Saxena for their valuable
feedback and review.
Disclaimer:
Views are personal.
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