1^st Lt. Brendan H.J. Donnelly, USAF & 2^nd Lt Grant T. Willis, USAF | Apr 30 ^th 2022

A Victory Amongst Months of Defeat

Many engagements throughout American military history are unknown or undervalued to students of the profession of arms.  Blockbuster struggles like Normandy and Midway often overshadow other contests that can offer considerable lessons to the joint force today. 

In the early days of the Pacific War, the Allied efforts were characterized by defeats.  The fall of Malaya and Singapore, Hong Kong, The Dutch East Indies, the surprise attack against the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and the loss of the Philippines often overshadow victories against Imperial Japan’s Centrifugal Offensive across the Pacific.  When one thinks of the nature of the Pacific War, we picture a naval struggle, supplemented by massive waves of amphibious assault craft landing Marines and Army troops onto a fanatically defended beachhead.  The tank is often an afterthought in our minds when it comes to battles in tropical jungles or remote islands, but they were used in great numbers by both the Allies and the Axis in the Pacific theatre.  In this piece, we will explore a little-known engagement that takes place in America’s opening rounds with the Japanese Empire.  Our story takes us to the battle for the Philippines in which American tank crews battled Japanese tanks at a small Filipino town called Baliuag. 

Origins of Battle

On December 8th, 1941, across the international date line, General Douglas MacArthur and his staff were notified of the Japanese attack on America’s Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.  Over 7,000 miles west, the American Commonwealth of the Philippines was home to the largest concentration of American military forces outside the continental United States.  Preceded by a devastating air attack, destroying the majority of the FEAF (U.S. Far East Air Forces), the Japanese 14th Army under the command of General Masaharu Homma began landing units at Lingayen Gulf, Luzon.[1]  After a failure of American and Filipino forces to defeat Homma at the water’s edge, General MacArthur, the commander of USAFFE (United States Army Forces Far East), authorized the implementation of WPO-3 (War Plan Orange-3), requiring Gen. Jonathan Wainwright’s North Luzon Force (NLF) to  conduct critical delaying actions for all forces, especially Brig. Gen. Albert Jones’ corps-sized South Luzon Force (SLF) south of Manila, to safely withdraw into the Bataan Peninsula.  If Bataan and the island of Corregidor (nicknamed the Rock or the American Gibraltar) at the mouth of Manila Bay could be held, the Americans could deny the Japanese access to Manila Bay and hold until relieved by reinforcements from America.  At least that was the idea.  The battle to hold the door open for the Bataan garrison would prove to be a pivotal display of American willingness to fight ferociously and demonstrate one of the great rear-guard actions in the history of armed conflict. 

The Battle of Baliuag

          By New Year’s Eve 1941, the situation for USAFFE was dire.  General Tsuchibashi’s 48^th Division moved south on Route 5 toward the town of Plaridel which sat along the main intersection between Routes 5 and 3.  Route 3 was a pivotal axis of retreat for the South Luzon Force moving from the areas around Manila to Bataan.  Tsuchibashi’s force, spearheaded by Colonel Seinosuke Sonoda’s 7^th Tank Regiment and a company of engineers threatened Route 3 and could reach the crucial Calumpit Bridge that sat across the Pampanga River.[2]  The Pampanga and its bridge were the only point at which the South Luzon Force could continue its withdrawal towards Bataan. 

The Filipino 21^st and 11^th Divisions defended the approaches to the crossroad town of San Fernando under threat from the Kanno Detachment at Tarlac, which would be able to lead SLF to Route 1 and safety.[3]  Elements of the Filipino 71^st and 91^st Divisions held in defensive positions near Baliuag, however General Wainwright knew from the lack of training and prior performance of these Philippine Army Divisions that they were not effectively holding their ground against the combat hardened veterans of Homma’s 14^th Army.[4] 

Seeing the threat of a breakthrough by Sonoda’s tanks, Wainwright ordered two platoons of tanks from Weaver’s Provisional Tank Group forward to hold the line and pause the Japanese advance.  The two platoons of U.S. light tanks were federalized Ohio National Guardsmen of C Company, 192^nd Tank Battalion under the command of Lt William Gentry.  Their M3 “Stuarts” were supported by a group of six self-propelled guns, American halftracks with 75mm gun mounts.[5]  This armored force was tasked with stopping Sonoda and holding the roads to Bataan open for the SLF to live and fight another day. 

On the 29th of December 1941, C Company moved up Route 5 to Baliuag and bivouacked south of the town where they attempted to receive their first full night’s rest of the war.  Their rest was interrupted when the company’s radio operator awakened the company commander, Capt. Harold Collins with a sobering message, “Hold at all costs”.  Collins gathered the company’s leadership together to assign leadership responsibility down to the lowest level in the event of casualties and stated, “We are going to stay here until we get orders to pull out.  It says, ‘Hold at all costs’ and we’re gonna stay here until we get orders to pull back”.  The serious nature of the order made the situation clear enough, command was desperate to hold off the Japanese and this Tank company was tasked to hold their position or die trying.  In the early morning hours of 30 December, the recon troop, led by Capt. John Morley, moved through the town to scout the area, and located a single narrow gauge railroad bridge left intact across the Angat river.  Planking was required for the Japanese to move heavy equipment across, and it is unknown if the Americans left this single crossing point open to draw in Sonada’s force down a predictable axis to the town.  If this was the case, then it would be one of the most adept tactical moves made by the Americans in the campaign.   Lieutenant Gentry positioned his units on the 30th of December with 5 of his tanks dug in underneath nipa huts, which stood 10 feet above the ground on bamboo stilts, roughly 1,000 yards south of the bridge.  The tanks were then camouflaged with brush, branches, and bamboo.  This hidden position was well constructed due to the Japanese Infantry and Sappers who crossed the river that evening not noticing the American light tanks when they set camp south of Baliuag.  2Lt Kennady’s platoon of 5 tanks were similarly positioned and camouflage on the other side of the town with Capt. Collins’ headquarters track blocking the southernmost access road to the town.  2Lt Preston’s platoon was sent further south of town with a map procured from a local gas station to locate unblown and unblocked bridges and fords and to cross, if possible, back behind the Japanese to attack them from the rear.  Preston and his tanks would never make it back to the battle because he got lost on this adventure.  Preston’s mission was an odd one because the Recon platoon’s halftracks would have been better suited for this objective rather than the precious tanks that could have been utilized within the rear-guard counterattack against Sonada.[6]  

          On the morning of 31 December, the Japanese infantry continued to cross the bridge into Baliuag with Gentry and his men watching every move.  The Filipino 71st Artillery’s fifteen 75mm artillery pieces alongside the 6 self-propelled guns began to shell the Japanese.  Sonada’s vanguard then dug themselves in around the bridge and town, waiting for their tanks to cross and provide further support.  The Filipino infantry holding portions of the barrio began to fall back without orders by mid-afternoon with the Japanese hot on their tail.  The Japanese then established an observation post in the balcony of a church steeple.  As the Japanese poured into town, the American armored ambush was set, and Gentry’s tanks were ready for a fight.  Just before Gentry was to spring the ambush, Maj. John Morley drove up to the side of Gentry’s camouflage tank.  Unaware of what was about to take place, the two officers were attempting to gather a situation report from Gentry.  Agitated and aware that the Japanese OP was watching them, he told the captains, in a frustrated fashion that needs no examination, to leave quickly and quietly.[7]  Once Morely cleared the town, Gentry sent the prearranged signal of the start of the ambush to Kennady and the Filipino artillery.  Gentry’s five Stuart light tanks burst from their covered positions underneath the nipa hut, racing north towards the Japanese artillery park.  The Stuarts opened fire on two Japanese Type 89 Bs which immediately burst into flames.  The armor on the Type 89Bs were no match for a 37mm gun and was no match to outmaneuver or outshoot their American counterparts.  The Type 89s possessed a 57mm gun which only fired high-explosive ammunition rather than any type of armor-piercing rounds.  The Japanese infantry inside Baliuag also failed to possess any anti-tank weapons as their small arms bounced harmlessly off the American tanks.  The stage was set for a disaster for “His Imperial Majesty’s” 7th Tank Regiment.[8] 

          The M3 tanks knocked out all the Japanese guns in the artillery park without firing a single 37mm round by running them over and destroying them as they rumbled toward the center of town.  For the first time in the war, the American tankers were setting the momentum and pace of battle.  The roughly 500 Japanese infantry and tanks fled back into the town just as Lt Kennady’s platoon sprung their ambush, hitting the Japanese in the side as they were driven back to the river.  The Japanese and American tanks chased each other up and down the streets of Baliuag with the US coaxial machine guns raking the area, killing exposed infantry who had no defense against the M3s other than what they could hide behind.  The American tank crews had exposed the lack of Japanese anti-armor experience and doctrinal training as they out maneuvered their Japanese counterparts.  The Type 89 B crews could not hand-crank their turrets fast enough or provide rapid effective fire fast enough to defeat the Americans.  The battling tanks laid waste to the barrio, rumbling through huts, setting them on fire, and knocking down buildings.  After the Japanese tanks were destroyed, Gentry and Kennady turned to the infantry with their machine guns, slaughtering most of them and driving the rest back to the bridge.  The 192nd Battalion HQ tuned into Gentry’s frequency, listening with excitement as the battle unfolded and interjecting encouragement and praise just as if they were listening to the Army-Navy game![9]  

C Company ran out of ammunition by 6:30pm and withdrew from the destroyed town back to their original bivouac position.  Gentry had enough time to inspect a destroyed Type 89 B for intelligence and then backed his tanks out of town.  The Japanese reentered the town after the Filipino artillery screen lifted around 10pm that evening and followed the retreating Americans at a hesitant distance.  C Company’s only casualty from the melee was a sprained ankle suffered by a tanker who fell off his tank in his own excitement to tell a buddy about what they had just accomplished.  Gentry and his men were credited with 8 tanks destroyed and several hundred Japanese killed in the rear-guard ambush at Baliuag.[10] 

The success of C Company, 192d Tank Battalion stalled the Imperial 7th Tank Regiment, keeping the door open for the SLF to pull all available units back across the Calumpit Bridge and into Bataan.[11]  Without the SLF being able to escape, the Bataan defense could not have successfully repelled the Japanese offensive against I and II Corps for 5 months.  By 0600, New Year’s Day, the bridge at Calumpit was blown and by January 7, 1942, the Bataan initial defense line was set and ready for action.[12]

The action at Baliuag was a historic moment in the history of American armored warfare and of armor in the Pacific.  Looking forward, as the 21^st century enters its 20s and 30s, we must not discard the tank (whether light-wheeled or heavy-tracked) as a relic of the 20^th century but promote its development to meet our current needs for defense in the Western Pacific tomorrow.  Battles like Baliuag show our joint force today that although the tank has been seen as an open country vehicle, it can play a significant role in island warfare.  Learning to properly execute holding and rear-guard actions with highly mobile mechanized forces may prove to be a necessary skill to slow the advance of an enemy amphibious force. 

Lessons for the Joint Force in the 21st Century

The day of the tank is not over.  The advancement of armored vehicles and their use on the modern battlefield as instruments of ground power will continue to field a decisive impact on engagements between state and non-state actors for the foreseeable future.  Recent combat between Ukraine and Russia has demonstrated that the era of armored warfare is simply expanding beyond the preconceived doctrines of the past and is continuing to play a significant role within our ever changing and dynamic multi-domain battle space.  Today in the Western Pacific, there is little direct fire support equipment that can surpass the presence of highly mobile and destructive armor. 

The Taiwanese Armed Forces current structure includes some 1,200 tanks which illustrates the plausibility of armor within a fluid island defense plan.[13]  The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may choose to exercise a forced political change into its free and democratic neighbor to the east.  If Beijing were to execute that attack, significant consideration will be given to the allocation of firepower amongst the amphibious and air assault units that would have to spearhead the assault.  Tanks and armored vehicles will be vital to the successful establishment and breakout of a PLA beachhead.  The landing of significant armored forces to stem an armored counterattack will be difficult to maintain, supply, and coordinate if significantly pressured by the defender.  Taiwan’s terrain may not be the open and desolate deserts of southern Iraq or the great steps of Ukraine, but the tank and anti-tank weapon will dominate a Taiwan area of operations if an invasion were to take place. 

Taiwan and the allies will not only have to deter the PLA from an assault of the main island of Taiwan itself, but along the entire Allied 1^st island chain.  Japan’s commitment to Taiwan’s defense has brought the Japanese into the potential crosshairs of the PLA in any future war plan consideration made by the Chiefs in Beijing.[14]  Tokyo has, once again, become a major military player in the Pacific, but this time they work for the principles of free nations and have developed a significant capability in expeditionary light armored warfare. 

 The advantage in a PLA attempt to take Taiwan would lie in the defender.  Napoleonic War veteran and military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz speaks of this advantage when he states, “If, therefore, we imagine to ourselves a defensive, such as it should be, we must suppose it with every possible preparation of all means, with an Army fit for, and inured to, War, with a General who does not wait for his adversary with anxiety from an embarrassing feeling of uncertainty, but from his own free choice, with cool presence of mind, with fortresses which do not dread a siege, and lastly, with a loyal people who fear the enemy as little as he fears them (Book Six, Ch 5, Pg. 389-390)”.[15] 

In the Pacific, Japan has demonstrated the importance of retaining an armored capability to employ in island defense and light reaction forces.  The JGSDF (Japanese Ground Self Defense Force) Rapid Deployment Regiments (RDR) illustrate Tokyo’s understanding that a defense of the first island chain will involve anti-armor capabilities and high mobility.  Although these units are vulnerable to high end precision strike platforms that the PLA can employ, the structural idea of amphibious and mobile forces capable of defending island bastions is a promising step forward to defeat the enemy at the water’s edge, while his forces are vulnerable and burdened with the frontal assault.[16] 

The Allies will require interoperability between units of the JGSDF and the US Army/Marine Corps to plan a joint defense of possessions within the 1st island chain such as the Senkakus, Yonaguni Jima, and Okinawa.  These islands may become prime targets for PLA aggression in a Taiwan response scenario gone hot.  Within the structure of rapid deployment regiments are light armored companies consisting of the Type 16 maneuver combat vehicle.  The 8 wheeled armored fighting vehicle looks like a heavy armored car, but this combat system packs a heavy punch.  The Type 16, at 26 tons, mounts a 105mm L/52 smoothbore gun with a max speed of 62 mph and a combat range of 250 miles.[17] These “light tanks” or “assault guns” can provide the infantry companies within these rapid response units necessary fire support and anti-armor capability that can make a great difference in counter amphibious operations, allowing for units to hold in delaying actions until relieved by heavier follow-on forces as a crisis deepens.  The PLA’s light armored vehicles and self-propelled artillery units that are attached to the amphibious assault brigades are lightly armored and can be destroyed in mass as they hit the beach by light, highly mobile, and heavily armed units revolving around assault guns light the Type 16. 

The Japanese 6th and 8th Divisions along with the 11th and 14th Brigades are currently in the process of switching to the rapid deployment (RDR) model.[18]  The 8^th Division stationed on Kyushu currently possesses such a unit in the form of the 42^nd Rapid Deployment Regiment, which contains Type 16s and other light vehicles with formations that can be amphibiously deployed, and air dropped from C-2s or U.S. transport aircraft.[19]  This will provide a joint capability with their American, Australian, British, and Taiwanese allies with an advantage of advanced rapid deployment in the early days of a crisis and can add to overall deterrence as units begin to mobilize.  The U.S. Army’s M1128 Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS) can also complement this light armor contingent for island defense garrisons and rapid response forces sent to relieve garrisons if attacked.  With the U.S. Marine Corps’ decision to do away with their heavy armored components, it will become increasingly necessary to replace this gap with armored vehicles of similar capability to the Type 16 or M1128.       

Allied assault guns, that’s a term rarely utilized since World War 2, in the Western Pacific can be a vital asset, required to establish a stable and credible defense of island positions.  The United States Marine Corps Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) structure is meant to compensate for the new reality of amphibious warfare in the 21^st Century with a focus in near-peer anti-shipping and anti- air capability; however, the decision to discard their heavy armored units may have been too far too fast.[20]  There is little on a modern battlefield that can provide the same direct fire support that a tank can.  The M1A2 Abrams main battle tank may have been too heavy and too difficult to transport and maintain in a rapidly developing crisis scenario in the Western Pacific, but light and mobile armor may be the solution to fill this gap.[21]  The Marine Corps of World War 2 fought hard to establish the tank within their landing forces when attempting to break the Japanese Defense Perimeter.  Their light tank doctrine was developed over hard-fought victories as the amphibious aggressor at Tarawa, Saipan, and Okinawa.  The 1943 USMC official light tank manual of operations can provide a historical look into the usefulness tanks present to Pacific operations, for example section 6 states, “Tanks for Marine Corps Use. —a. Basis of Choice. — In selecting the type of tank best fitted for use by the Marine Corps, two very important points have been considered, i.e., weight and size. Since the greatest use of tanks anticipated by the Marine Corps will be their employment in landing operations, the most suitable type is of such size and weight that it can readily be handled by the ship’s loading and unloading facilities and transported to the beach by landing craft”.[22] 

The burden placed on the attacker is one of size and weight.  The heavy armor possessed by the PLA ground forces cannot make it to the battlefield unless their lighter amphibious forces and naval logistics can firmly establish a beachhead and move the fight inland and away from the water’s edge.  If significant pressure can be applied to these landing forces by destroying the light armored vehicles that the PLA will deploy before their heavier forces can be introduced, then the matter can be solved before the Allied light armor can be negated.  Heavy firepower combined with high mobility and well-prepared defensive positions operating within a joint war plan to hit the enemy at the water’s edge while simultaneously eliminating their logistics and echelon forces can and will win the day.  Ultimately this conclusion can not only assist in winning victory in the Pacific today but help deter Beijing tomorrow.   

The Stryker M1128 MGS or the Type 16 (or U.S. future equivalent) can provide the services required for these regiments at the company level.  Purchasing Type 16s could increase the interoperability between Japan and the United States with an effective combined mobile platform for infantry fire support and anti-armor focused on destroying the initial echelons of Chinese light amphibious assault vehicles.  Main battle tanks may not be the primary solution due to their weight, deploy ability, and maintenance requirements, but the introduction of a mass producible assault gun may be the answer to multi-island defense garrisons. Main battle tanks aren’t necessary in this theatre, but perhaps light anti-armor vehicles that look and smell like tanks can do the job.  Call it what you want, “assault gun, light armored vehicle, etc.”  Regardless, you will not think you need a tank until you need one.

What was true in 1941 is true 80-plus years later: the light tank has an important role to play in island defense. The experience of Gentry and his comrades can inform present decisions regarding force requirements and possible future employment. The U.S. and our Pacific allies ignore those lessons at our peril.

Author Biographies:

1^st Lt Brendan H.J. Donnelly, USAF

Lieutenant Donnelly is an intelligence officer currently stationed at Cannon AFB, NM. He has held intelligence operations supervisor roles at Cannon AFB and JSOAC-Africa. He is a graduate of Bowling Green State University, with a Bachelor of Arts of Sciences, majoring in History.

2^nd Lt Grant T. Willis, USAF

Lieutenant Willis is an RPA pilot currently stationed at Cannon AFB, NM. He is a graduate of the University of Cincinnati with a Bachelor of Arts and Sciences, majoring in International Affairs, with a minor in Political Science.   

Sources:  

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Portland: Mint Editions, 2021.

The fall of the Philippines-chapter 12. Accessed April 10, 2022. https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/5-2/5-2_12.htm.

Morton, Louis. The Fall of the Philippines. Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2004.

Chun, Clayton K. The Fall of the Philippines: 1941-42. Oxford: Osprey Publ., 2012.

Caldwell, Donald L. Thunder on Bataan: The First American Tank Battles of World War II. Guilford, CT: Stackpole Books, 2019.

Kolakowski, Christopher L. Last Stand on Bataan the Defense of the Philippines, December 1941-May 1942. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2016.

South, Todd. “Goodbye, Tanks: How the Marine Corps Will Change, and What It Will Lose, by Ditching Its Armor.” Marine Corps Times. Marine Corps Times, July 12, 2021. https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/03/22/goodbye-tanks-how-the-marine-corps-will-change-and-what-it-will-lose-by-ditching-its-armor/.

“Arming without Aiming? Challenges for Japan’s Amphibious Capability.” War on the Rocks, October 1, 2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/arming-without-aiming-challenges-for-japans-amphibious-capability/.

Suciu, Peter. “Meet the Type 16: Why Japan Is Buying More of These Deadly Tanks.” The National Interest. The Center for the National Interest, May 7, 2020. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/meet-type-16-why-japan-buying-more-these-deadly-tanks-151551.

“Dogface Soldiers and Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces Learn Together during Orient Shield 21-2.” www.army.mil. Accessed April 10, 2022. https://www.army.mil/article/247917/dogface_soldiers_and_japan_ground_self_defense_forces_learn_together_during_orient_shield_21_2.

Story, Courtesy. “Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR).” United States Marine Corps Flagship, August 2, 2021. https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2708146/marine-littoral-regiment-mlr/.

“Japan’s New Rapid Deployment Forces [Explained] – Youtube.” Accessed April 11, 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bGKHiqjaa6Y.

Ap. “Japan Vows to Defend Taiwan alongside the US If China Invades the Island Because It ‘Could Be next’.” Daily Mail Online. Associated Newspapers, July 6, 2021. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9761205/Japan-vows-defend-Taiwan-alongside-China-invades-island-next.html.

Axe, David. “The Taiwanese Army Has More Tanks than a Chinese Invasion Force Does-until China Captures a Port.” Forbes. Forbes Magazine, July 29, 2021. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/07/29/the-taiwanese-army-has-more-tanks-than-a-chinese-invasion-force-does-until-china-captures-a-port/?sh=31c006bd477d.

Light Tank Tactics . Quantico , VA: Marine Corps Schools , 1943.