Defeating Air Assaults in the Western
Pacific: Lessons from the Past, Present,
and Speculation on the Future
PDF Version
1st Lt. Grant T. Willis, USAF | Jan 27 th 2023
Historically
Hot LZs
Throughout
the 20th century, large-scale air assault operations conducted
within a near-peer high-threat environment resulted in extremely high
casualties. Modern war and the rapid
development of technology has not increased survivability amongst air assault
or airborne forces. The risk of high
loss rates amongst paratroopers today is as high as it has ever been. The wide array of surface to air threats
available to a motivated and near peer defender are highly effective and the
threat from counterattacking mechanized ground forces can lead to
disaster. Not only are the assault
forces highly vulnerable when in the delivery phase, but the transport
helicopters and aircraft are at a high risk with little chance of recovering
the troops they carry once they get shot down.
Students of the profession of arms can look to various campaigns and
nations that emphasize the consequences of conducting a high-threat air
assault. The Dutch during World War II
are particularly experienced in defending against Axis air assaults and can
provide specific lessons to be applied to contemporary operations from their battle
history in Europe and the Pacific.
Ironically, the Allied attempt to airdrop into victory in September 1944,
Operation Market Garden, was executed in Holland. Another case study that receives little
attention is the Japanese airborne assault on American airbases on Leyte in
1944, which can provide a keen insight into some of the objectives that
illustrate the Pacific centers of gravity, primarily revolving around
land-based air power. Had the Russians
in their current war against Ukraine studied the Dutch, Japanese, and American
experiences more intensely, they may have saved themselves from a series of
airborne catastrophes in their recent adventure in Ukraine. The legend of “A Bridge Too Far” continues to
repeat itself in 21st century Europe and the lessons learned must
not be forgotten in the Pacific tomorrow.
Palembang: Jumping for Oil
After
the surrender of Holland in May 1940, the Dutch still possessed sovereignty
over their overseas colonies. One of the
primary motivations for the Japanese to choose war with the Allies in December
1941 was because the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), modern day Indonesia,
possessed some of the most plentiful bounties of oil on the planet. For the Japanese, oil was their Achilles heel. They required massive amounts of fuel for
their planes, tanks, and ships to operate and due to Japan lacking any domestic
oil capacity, any cut from their main oil supplier would be catastrophic to the
maintenance of the Empire. When the
United States cut off this main supply of oil, the path to war had begun and to
take their much-needed gas, the Imperial High Command set their eyes on the
rich oil fields of the NEI. The air
assault would be called upon as a primary maneuver to capture the Dutch oil
refineries intact for future use. Just as
their German allies in 1940 experienced, the Dutch would prove to be much more
capable in counter air assault defense than expected.
The
island of Sumatra and the city of Palembang were strategic targets for the
Japanese in their quest for resources. To
the east of the city sat two large oil refineries at Plaju
and Sungei Gerong. These two facilities processed roughly
one-third of the total production of oil in the NEI. This was the only high quality 100 octane jet
fuel producer in the NEI. There were
also two airfields surrounding Palembang, one civilian (Palembang I) and
another under constructed for military use (Palembang II) which was unknown to
the Japanese. The airfields, oil
refineries, and city of Palembang were all key objectives for the Japanese 38th
Division and 1st Raiding Group (airborne).[1]
At
1126 hours, on Saturday morning, 14 February 1942, the 2nd Raiding
Regiment dropped from their Ki-57 “Topsy” transport aircraft near Palembang I.[2] The airfield was prepped prior to the drop by
strafing Japanese fighters while British fighters dashed in to take their shots
against the incoming transports and escorts.
The airfield was defended by British 3.7-inch AAA crews from the 15th
Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment and a section of the 78th Battery and a
troop of the 89th Battery armed with 40mm Bofors.[3] 150 NEI troops with two APCs defended the
base as infantry and the Allied defenders organized anti-paratroop patrols
hunting the Japanese raiders who were dropped with only their pistols and
grenades while attempting to locate their separate cases full of their small
arms. Although the Japanese were unable
to take the airfield all day, once the ammunition for the heavy guns ran low,
the garrison was ordered to retire, and the base was eventually taken.
One of the most iconic scenes from this airborne
oil battle was at the Plaju refinery on 14 February.[4] The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) paratroopers
of the 1st company, 2nd Raiding Regiment (less than 99
men) were to secure both the refineries at Plaju and Sungeri Gerong at Palembang.[5] The 1st company commander,
Lieutenant Nakao, led his men into the jump on the oil at 0930 hours. 60 men in all landed at the Plaju refinery, setting themselves into defensive positions
behind shelter trenches, inside earth banks around the oil tanks. Nakao also placed troops in the upper
platforms overlooking the oil tanks to provide top cover. At roughly 1320 hours, a reinforced rifle
company of the Menadonese 2nd Company, 10th
Battalion under Captain J.H.M.U.L.E Ohl began to counterattack the Japanese
positions.[6] Attached to his command, Ohl had two heavy
machine gun platoons, one mortar section, and an anti-tank rifle group with a
total strength of 312 soldiers. The
advance against the refinery began slowly due to the sniper fire from Nakao’s troopers
positioned in the upper railings of the oil tanks.[7] 2nd Lieutenant E.J. Van Blommestein led his men against the Paras behind their
earth work trench lines. With “Klewang” swords drawn, the Dutch charged forward, sweeping
the Japanese from their positions while provided additional fire support from
mortars and heavy machine gun fire. After
the refinery was recaptured by Ohl’s men, Lt Blommestein
and two Menadonese privates scaled three towers at
the refinery, pulling down three Japanese flags under intense fire.[8] The remainder of the paratroopers scattered
into the nearby swamp forest. The Dutch
units were organizing to mop them up until around 0330 hours Capt. Ohl received
orders to pull back.[9] Many oil tanks caught fire from the mortar
fire and spread due to high winds. With
the site ablaze, the Dutch pulled out and the Japanese recaptured the
installation with surprisingly little damage to the refinery.
Although
both Dutch defenses in Europe and the Pacific were futile in the end, the high
casualties inflicted upon the axis air assaults demonstrated that against a
highly motivated and well-equipped force, high-threat air drops are a huge dice
roll for the side that tries to carry it out.
The overall success of these operations against the Dutch defenders, in
the end, are not due to the success of the airborne forces themselves, but they
are instead due to the outside influence of ground forces arriving to relieve
the embattled paratroopers or given the field due to a decision to retreat. Both in Holland 1940 and Sumatra 1942,
conventional combined arms defenses by air, land, and sea had put up an intense
fight against the German and Japanese airlanding offensives. The casualty rates in both operations
provided above are far beyond the “catastrophic” 10 percent casualty rate threshold
for continued combat effectiveness. The
lessons learned by the Axis dropping into hell against their Dutch opponents
could have been studied more closely by 21st century operators.
The
Battle of the Airfields: Leyte ‘44
By October 1944, General
Douglas MacArthur’s forces were poised to return to the Philippines.
Establishing American bases in the archipelago, threatening to cut Japan off
from the vital resources it risked all to secure. To the Americans, the
return to the Philippines was a means to an end, further leaping towards the
Imperial home islands. For Japan however, an American foothold in the
Philippines spelled eventual defeat by starvation. By establishing naval bases
and air bases in the Philippines, the Americans could sever Japan’s lifeline of
oil and other materials required to continue the war. Imperial General
Headquarters (IGHQ) viewed any landing as an opportunity to achieve a decisive
battle, throwing all available assets into a push to destroy the Americans.
The Sho-Go 1 (victory) series of plans envisioned
what remained of the Imperial fleet to converge on any landing in the
Philippines while masses of available land based IJAF and IJNAF air power built
up in the Philippines. Air power was to
play a critical role for both sides in the coming battle and both sides’
ability to retain land base air assets despite a lack of Carrier based aircraft
became critical to victory or defeat. IGHQ was unaware for sure where the
Americans would land, but the forces in and around the Philippines were poised
to respond to wherever MacArthur would come ashore.
To begin the liberation
of the Philippines, the island of Leyte, with its central position in the
archipelago, was chosen as a strategic location to jumpstart the eventual
return to the main island of Luzon. With the taking of Leyte, MacArthur could
utilize General Kenney’s land-based air forces to project striking power over a
series of follow up operations to clear the rest of the islands. On October 17th, the 6th Ranger Battalion
landed uncontested on the Suluan and Dingat Islands in Leyte Gulf.[10]
After securing the openings to Leyte Gulf, Gen. Kruger’s 6th Army began landing
XXIV Corps and X Corps on the eastern beaches of Leyte on A-Day, 20 October
1944.[11]
Operation King II was underway and Sho-Go 1 was
initiated to begin the naval and air counter-offensive against the American
fleet supporting the landings.
After the Imperial
Japanese Navy failed to achieve victory at the naval battle of Leyte gulf, they
turned their attention to the destruction of American air power on Leyte by
utilizing a combined air and ground assault to sweep the Americans from their
captured airbases. Several Kamikaze strikes had crippled the U.S. escort
carriers providing naval air support to the 6th Army and forced Kruger to rely
on artillery and the limited land-based air assets General Kenney could
provide.[12]
With the fleet required to return to bases to resupply and refuel, a small task
force of escort carriers was permitted to remain in Leyte Gulf to protect the
beachhead and provide air power to support the troops fighting on Leyte.
With IGHQ reinforcing positions on Leyte with more divisions, fire support
became vital for any advances by XXIV and X corps. As escort carriers
took hits from Kamikazes and land-based bombers, the amount of air power the
Americans could project was dwindling. Understanding the importance of
land-based air power on the outcome, IGHQ devised a plan that would call upon
the elite imperial airborne troops to attack the air bases on Leyte. By
destroying or severely crippling Kenney’s air forces, IGHQ believed that they
could even the odds for the 5 divisions facing US 6th Army on the
island.
Further understanding of
the Japanese leadership’s mindset on their chances of success stems from a
false belief in intelligence that the American fleet had been significantly
mauled off Formosa and that many exaggerated losses on the American carrier
force had been reported throughout the 1944 battles.[13]
This faulty Intel resulted in command decisions being made based on losses that
didn’t occur. Understanding the combined naval, air, and ground mobile
defense plan to halt and destroy the American amphibious plans should also be
noted as a significant effort to thwart the American war machine in a late war
scenario.[14] Therefore, the importance of objective and
unbiased intelligence is a key to sound judgment and operational
planning.
There were two airborne
attempts to silence American air power on Leyte. First being on 27
November when 4th Air Army officers devised a plan to use 40 paratroopers of
the Kaoru Raiding Detachment with four aircraft that would crash land on the Baureun airfields in the Gi Operation.[15]
Their mission was to disperse and wreck planes and facilities with explosive
charges. Unfortunately for the Japanese, some pilots failed to drop or
land on the correct sites, and one was shot down on their way into their
landing zone by the Americans. Operation Gi failed completely to reach
any of the intended objectives, but this attempt did not deter planners in
Manila from considering more airborne operations to tip the air power
balance.
The next attempt would
be a two-pronged ground and airborne offensive on the US air bases on Leyte
with the intent to take away the American’s air power on the island while
struggling to retain a strong naval air component. The IJA’s 16th and
26th Divisions would launch their ground assaults from the east out of the
mountains in Operation Wa with the support of the 3rd
and 4th Parachute Regiments who would land on the Buri, Bayug,
and San Pablo airfields in Operation Te.[16]
Unknown to the Japanese, General Kenney’s air bases were void of significant
combat aircraft due to bad weather conditions.[17]
Airborne troops would also attack the air bases at Dulag
and Tacloban. Before the offensive, IJAAF and IJNAF bombers attacked
targeted airfields to prepare the ground during the nights of 1-3 December.[18]
Due to weather complications, the airborne assault was delayed 24 hours, but
this delay failed to reach General Makino’s 16th Division, who assaulted on the
original timetable with limited strength due to previous losses.[19]
On 6 December 16th division remnants reached the Buri airfield with 300 men,
routing the light American defense. The paratroopers dropped into the
area to reinforce Makino’s position later that night, assisting in the taking
of Buri the next day. On the evening of 6 December, out of the 35
transport planes that took off from Luzon, 17 made their drops successfully.[20]
Another wave was planned for the next day, but poor weather canceled the
mission. Around 1840 hours on 6 December, approximately 300 IJA
paratroopers jumped from Type 100 Ki-27s braving heavy anti-aircraft fire.[21]
Their target was the air base at San Pablo and despite spirited resistance from
the airfield’s occupants, the paras overwhelmed the 11th Airborne headquarters
staff, signals personnel, and service troops. The paratroopers managed to
damage facilities, jeeps, and destroy an L-4 “Grasshopper” light observation
aircraft. The Japanese mocked the Americans during the assault in English
yelling obscenities and asking questions like, “Where are your machine guns?”[22]
After losing San Pablo and Buri airfields days later, the remaining Japanese
units retired into the mountains.
The Japanese airborne
assaults launched across multiple air bases certainly caught the Americans by
surprise, but it failed to overcome the US’ ability to reorganize units from
the 11th Airborne Division, 38th Infantry Division, engineers, Air Corps
personnel, and a tank battalion to counterattack and retake these bases. A
failure in operational intelligence preceded the airborne attacks due to a lack
of respect on behalf of XXIV Corps Headquarters regarding Japanese desperation
and capability. It was well known that
the Japanese possessed the airborne units and transport range ability, but the
opening was not taken seriously.
According to the official history of the US Army in World War 2, “The intelligence officers of the XXIV Corps, however, thought that
the Japanese were not capable of putting this assault plan into effect. Although the intelligence officers of the XXIV Corps believed
there was no possibility of a coordinated ground and aerial assault, General
Hodge alerted the XXIV Corps to a possible enemy paratroop landing. All units
were directed to strengthen local defenses and establish in each sector a
twenty-four-hour watching post.”[23] By 11 December, Buri
airfield was back under Allied control with no Japanese paratroopers alive to
tell the tale.
The importance of
understanding the Japanese mindset behind the battle of Leyte is critical to
seeing the strategic value of air power’s role in the INDO-Pacific.
Projecting air assets from a platform that can be bombed, but not sunk is a
vital advantage that must be coveted by the Allies across the Pacific to deter
the People’s Republic of China from aggression in the Western Pacific. Ironically, the oil that Japan had jumped
into the Dutch East Indies to capture to secure the Empire’s resources, the
American landing at Leyte threatened to cut this vital lifeline back to the
home islands. To Japan, they either threw
the Americans off the Philippines and secured their supply lines or Japan would
lose the war. Approximately
80 years after the Leyte and Sumatra jumps, the Russians decided to embark upon
a similar quest for quick victories by leaping from the sky against a perceived
decadent enemy. The lessons of the past
were ignored.
Another
Bridge Too Far
There have been few times in our
contemporary military adventures in which a large-scale conventional war has
taken place. For the Kremlin and the
Russian Army, it has been decades. Their
experience in executing air assaults traces primarily back to the Soviet Afghan
War. In February 2022, President
Vladimir Putin and his staff decided to rely upon the air assault forces to
achieve a “coup de main” against Ukraine, seeking immediate pressure upon the capital
to force a test of wills to produce capitulation and panic amongst the
government and destroy any motivation to resist in Kiev.
24
miles north of the Ukrainian capital of Kiev, lays the Hostomel
Airport. For the Russians, taking and
holding this base would provide a staging point for artillery, ammunition,
armored vehicles, and mobile air defenses to be flown in by large IL-76
transport aircraft to provide immediate pressure on the capital in the early
moments of the “special military operation”.
The hubris of the Russian mindset which characterized the Ukrainian
defense prior to this war produced a grave miscalculation. This miscalculation led to the annihilation
of the Kremlin’s elite 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade.[24] The securing of the airport fell to the elite
VDV (Vozdushno-desantnye voyska Rossii) Forces
a.k.a. “The Blue Berets”.[25] The attack began on 24 February with 30 Ka-52
“Alligator” attack helicopters flying at tree top level to avoid Ukrainian
early warning search and acquisition radars.
The heliborne force arrived near the airport launching their
guided/unguided missiles and 30mm cannons against airport defenses and AA
sites.[26] Although the Alligators provided effective
fire, several were shot down by determined Ukrainian defenses. Next came the Su-25 “Frogfoot” attack
aircraft flying low to deliver their ordnance and fires ahead of the assault force.[27] Ukrainian Su-24 “Fencer” fighter bombers,
Mi-24 “Hind attack helicopters, and Mig-29 “Fulcrum” fighter jets responded and
claimed several helicopters and attack aircraft shot down during the attack
while also suffering losses in the air themselves.[28] The aerial melee was intense and various Tik
Tok, Twitter, and Instagram videos displayed the carnage taking place in almost
real time.[29]
After
the Russians believed that they had effectively suppressed the Ukrainian air
defenses, the VDV were sent in for the assault.
Waves of Mi-17 “Hip” helicopters carrying the paratroopers crossed the
border flying low, above the treetops and foliage. As they approached the landing zone (LZ) they
received heavy amounts of ground fire and man portable air defense systems
(MANPADS). Several helicopters were shot
down on their way in, but enough got through to land their troops and fan them
out, setting up a defensive perimeter to wait for the 18-20 IL-76 transports to
land further troops and equipment.[30] The small unit of Ukrainian National
Guardsmen were dispersed from the field and fell back. Although the VDV had taken the airport, they
failed in securing the surrounding areas or setting up blocking points along
lines of supply, axis of advance, and lines of communication that lead to the
airport. The Ukrainian 3rd
Special Forces Regiment and 4th Rapid Response Brigade quickly organized
to counterattack before the IL-76s could land.[31] By the evening of the 24th, a
Ukrainian Light Division had retaken the airport, destroyed the 31st
Guards Air Assault, and forced the airlanding element to turn back to Moscow
and abort their landing. The Russian
commander of Airborne Forces, Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky, was killed in the fighting by a sniper.[32]
Another
failed air assault by the Russians in the early stages of the Russo-Ukrainian
War was at the Vasylkiv airbase (central Ukraine) on
25 February. This time, garrison troops
of the Ukrainian Air Force’s 40th Tactical Aviation Brigade repelled
an air assault by Russian Guards paratroopers to take the airbase.[33] Two IL-76 transports full of reinforcing
paratroopers were falsely reported to be shot down fully loaded as they were inbound
with many open source intelligence collectors across the globe tracking the
incoming aircraft on an aircraft tracking phone application, sharing it across
social media platforms.[34] What was remarkable about this failed assault
was the fact that it was defeated by the Ukrainian Air Force base ground and
security personnel who stood fast and held their positions despite the notion
that is attached to the perceived ground combat ability of air base garrison
personnel in a high-intensity conflict.
This was another miscalculation made by Moscow that led to a deadly air
landing disaster. The similarities
between the German experience in Holland 1940 and the Russians at Hostomel and Vasylkiv are too
near to ignore or not acknowledge as ironically repetitive.
What
the current war in Ukraine has shown us is that conventional war as an
instrument of real geopolitical policy is not a thing of the 20th
century and it could be argued that the era of the airborne/air assault
operation is not dead but may reveal to be a too costly adventure for little
reward. The current war in Europe
deserves study within the air assault realm and it would be naïve to believe
that Beijing is not present in the front row of this new classroom.
Red
Dawn Taiwan
The
rising tensions in the Taiwan Straights between the
PRC and Taiwan produce the threat of a cross channel communist invasion of the
free and democratic republic. If the
Chinese dream of national reunification were to be implemented by force, an
amphibious component would be required to land, D-Day style, to establish a
significant beachhead or series of beachheads, combined with PLAAF (People’s
Liberation Army Air Force) airborne forces landed behind the lines to disrupt
any movement of Allied reserves to the fronts or to capture strategic positions
like port facilities or airbases.
The current structure the PLAAF Airborne
Corps consists of six combined arms airborne brigades (空降兵旅),
including three light motorized brigades, two mechanized brigades, and one air
assault brigade.[35] There is also one transportation aviation
brigade (运输航空兵旅)
with one helicopter regiment and one special operations brigade (特种作战旅).[36] The PLAAF Airborne Corps also possesses a special
combat support brigade, a main training base, and a new training brigade.[37] All these units are supported by
self-propelled artillery, attack helicopters, heavy jet transport aircraft,
transport helicopters, light tanks, and infantry fighting vehicles. Associate researcher at the RAND Corporation,
Cristina L. Garafola describes the likely use of the
PLAAF Airborne in a cross-channel invasion scenario when she states,
“Airborne forces would likely participate
in the first and third phases. During the preliminary phase, forces would be
inserted via airborne operations to conduct “sabotage raids” behind enemy lines
to help the PLA seize command of the air. Described as “elite special
operations units,” these forces would target key enemy airfield, radar, command
and control, and munitions infrastructure. The Airborne Corps would also likely
play a supporting role during the assault landing phase, when the first echelon
of the invasion, including both amphibious assault and vertical landing forces,
maneuver toward their objective areas. According
to Science of Campaigns, this operation is described as an airborne landing
combined “with [a] frontal assault onto land… to assist and complement landing
force operations with active actions.” Airborne
forces would then do the following: “Immediately initiate attacks against
predetermined targets, taking advantage of the situation when the enemy’s state
is unclear and they cannot organize effective resistance in time and the
counter-airborne landing units have not arrived, to quickly seize and occupy
objectives, actively complement landing force operations, and accelerate the
speed of the assault onto land, ensuring that the assault onto land succeeds in
one stroke.” Airborne forces are also
expected to support the resistance against counterattacks that enemy forces
undertake against the PLA’s lodgment”.[38]
Conclusions
The
PLAAF Airborne Corps is a heavy air assault force that requires a large area to
deliver their units rather than simply dropping paratroopers into combat with
light small arms. To deliver this
multi-divisional force will require significant preparatory fires against an
enemy with modern air defense capabilities, as Taiwan currently possesses. If Taipei has learned anything from the Russo-Ukraine
experience and that of historical scenarios like Holland and Sumatra, it is
that a well-motivated defender armed with the proper equipment can make any air
assault attempt a disaster. The lack of
applicable large scale combat experience by the PLA is also a potent caution
signal to any Beijing war planning conclusions.
Militaries must either learn from their own mistakes or take lessons
properly applied from other’s mistakes so that they are not repeated in their
own operations. Just ask the Russians
how important this principle is. Prominent
historian and author Antony Beevor’s article, “Putin
Doesn’t Realize How Much War Has Changed”, Beevor
quotes one of history’s greatest statesmen, Otto Von Bismarck, by stating, “only a fool learns from his own mistakes. I learn from other people’s”.[39]
The PLA’s airborne planning for any cross-channel
invasion must consider the recent history we have witnessed in Europe combined
with what went right and what went wrong in World War II.
Taiwan, on the other hand, must pay close attention to the
Dutch and Ukrainian experiences to develop their own plans to counter not only
an amphibious assault, but the threat from the communist airborne forces. Identifying prime landing sites, drilling in
air base defense by all available personnel, and close coordination with air
defense troops to cause as much mayhem as possible to an air assault must be
considered and implemented as standard operating procedure within troops’
training and mindset. The allies,
including the United States, Japan, and South Korea must also pay close
attention to the applicability of the air assault in a modern conflict against
the PLA or Korean People’s Army (KPA). The
lessons previously discussed in this piece in relation to the utility of allied
airborne operations in a high-threat/near-peer environment should be
self-evident. The proliferation and
density of Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and American Forces’ MANPADS and layered
air defenses should be increased to make any thought of an effective PLA air
assault impossible in the minds of the central military commission (CMC). The opportunity costs
of committing large air assault forces in a conventional war in the Pacific may
prove to be too much of a dice roll for the PLA. Beijing may only opt for the use of airborne/air
assault forces if they believe that their preemptive fires have sufficiently
suppressed an acceptable number of Allied IADS in the vicinity of the DZs or
area of operations. Regardless of the
armchair general forecasting, both sides of the Pacific Iron Curtain must examine
the viability of the air assault now that the probability of it being conducted
in our time has increased.
Author Biography: 1st Lt Grant T. Willis, USAF Lieutenant Willis is an RPA pilot
currently stationed at Cannon AFB, NM. He is a graduate of the University of
Cincinnati with a Bachelor of Arts and Sciences, majoring in International
Affairs, with a minor in Political Science. References:
[1] Lohnstein,
Marc, Graham Turner, and Graham Turner. The Netherlands East Indies Campaign
1941-42: Japan’s Quest for Oil. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2021. Pg 57.
[2] Lohnstein,
Marc, Graham Turner, and Graham Turner. The Netherlands East Indies Campaign
1941-42: Japan’s Quest for Oil. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2021. Pg 58.
[3] Lohnstein,
Marc, Graham Turner, and Graham Turner. The Netherlands East Indies Campaign
1941-42: Japan’s Quest for Oil. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2021. Pg 58.
[4] Lohnstein,
Marc, Graham Turner, and Graham Turner. The Netherlands East Indies Campaign
1941-42: Japan’s Quest for Oil. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2021. Pg 60-61.
[5] Lohnstein,
Marc, Graham Turner, and Graham Turner. The Netherlands East Indies Campaign
1941-42: Japan’s Quest for Oil. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2021. Pg 62.
[6] Lohnstein,
Marc, Graham Turner, and Graham Turner. The Netherlands East Indies Campaign
1941-42: Japan’s Quest for Oil. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2021. Pg 62.
[7] Lohnstein,
Marc, Graham Turner, and Graham Turner. The Netherlands East Indies Campaign
1941-42: Japan’s Quest for Oil. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2021. Pg 62.
[8] Lohnstein,
Marc, Graham Turner, and Graham Turner. The Netherlands East Indies Campaign
1941-42: Japan’s Quest for Oil. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2021. Pg 62.
[9] Lohnstein,
Marc, Graham Turner, and Graham Turner. The Netherlands East Indies Campaign
1941-42: Japan’s Quest for Oil. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2021. Pg 62.
[10] S., Chun Clayton K, and Giuseppe
Rava. Leyte 1944: Return to the Philippines.
Osprey Military, 2015. Pg 10.
[11] S., Chun Clayton K, and Giuseppe
Rava. Leyte 1944: Return to the Philippines.
Osprey Military, 2015. Pg 36.
[12] S., Chun Clayton K, and Giuseppe
Rava. Leyte 1944: Return to the Philippines.
Osprey Military, 2015. Pg 57-58.
[13] Toll, Ian. “Twilight of the
Gods: War in the Western Pacific, 1944-1945 with Ian Toll.” YouTube. The
National WWII Museum, October 2, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0HXYxaVu0b4&t=2847s.
[14] Gatchel,
Theodore L. At the Water’s Edge: Defending against the Modern Amphibious
Assault. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996. Pg 6.
[15] S.,
Chun Clayton K, and Giuseppe Rava. Leyte 1944:
Return to the Philippines. Osprey Military, 2015. Pg
[16] M. Hamlin Cannon. “U.S. Army in
World War II: The War in the Pacific.” Hyper war: US Army in WWII: Leyte: The
return to the Philippines [Chapter 17]. Department of the Army, 1993.
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294-295.
[17] S.,
Chun Clayton K, and Giuseppe Rava. Leyte 1944:
Return to the Philippines. Osprey Military, 2015. Pg 77.
[18] S.,
Chun Clayton K, and Giuseppe Rava. Leyte 1944:
Return to the Philippines. Osprey Military, 2015. Pg 77.
[19] M. Hamlin
Cannon. “U.S. Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific.” Hyper war: US Army
in WWII: Leyte: The return to the Philippines [Chapter 17]. Department of the
Army, 1993. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Return/USA-P-Return-17.html. Pg
295-296.
[20] S.,
Chun Clayton K, and Giuseppe Rava. Leyte 1944:
Return to the Philippines. Osprey Military, 2015. Pg 77.
[21] S.,
Chun Clayton K, and Giuseppe Rava. Leyte 1944:
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