Israel’s Firebees: UAVs & the Future
of the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
PDF Version
2nd Lt. Grant T. Willis, USAF | Aug 28 th 2022
“Look man…I hate SAMs. Gets me all worked up, just thinking about
them.” – LCDR Virgil Cole’s character played
by Willum Dafoe in Flight of the Intruder (1990)
Forward
Air Defense Forces
across the globe have attempted to bend the wing of the aircraft through the
surface to air missile, known to aircrews as “SAM”. In Southeast Asia the United States Air
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps were dealt a vital lesson in the importance of
destroying an enemy’s integrated air defense system (IADS). From the launch of Operation
Rolling Thunder to today, the SAM has created a dilemma that has sparked
innovation amongst the Air Forces of the world, bringing new ways of fighting
in this deadly dance amongst the clouds.
The evolution of
the unmanned aerial vehicle’s (UAV) utility in modern warfare has been preceded
by circumstances throughout the previous century that showcased its
capabilities as a vital asset of air combat.
Today’s headlines are dominated by the unforeseen and underestimated
performance of relatively small and cheap drones used to strike enemy targets
ranging from high value individuals (HVI) to main battle tanks (MBT). From America’s shadow wars marked by the
Predator and Reaper to Turkey’s Bayraktar TB-2 in Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine,
the UAV has proven itself as a vital instrument in modern war. Its capabilities have shown an unorthodox
ability to execute one of the most dangerous duties known to airmen,
“Weasel”. The suppression of enemy air
defenses (SEAD) has been a deadly ballet between aircrew and air defense (AD)
batteries since the loss of Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 to Soviet SAMs on May 1st,
1960. The purpose of SEAD (suppression
of enemy air defenses) is to detect, degrade, and destroy the enemy’s ability
to conduct an orchestrated and effective IADS; therefore, the inherent danger
of aircrew tasked to execute this mission is simple. One must get the enemy search and acquisition
radars to go active, track, and eventually shoot at you to achieve the desired
detection, degradation, and hopefully destruction of SAM and radar sites. During America’s War in Southeast Asia
(1965-1973), so called “Wild Weasel” missions conducted by the United States
Air Force and “Iron Hand” sorites conducted by the United States Navy and
Marine Corps taught aircrews valuable lessons within this deadly duel in the
air. Cold War author Tom Clancy explains
the dangers of “Weasel” missions in a 1986 lecture at the National Security
Agency (NSA) when he states, “What’s the most dangerous mission in the Air
Force today? It’s “Weasel”. The guy who goes around looking for SAM sites
to shoot at him. It’s like trying to
kiss a porcupine”.[i]
One great advantage the technology of new unmanned aerial systems can provide
modern air thinkers is the fact that if UAVs could effectively participate in
the coordinated art of SEAD, the less risk is present of losing manned aircrew
in a high threat environment. The Israeli
Air Force has provided 20th century examples of innovative usage of UAVs within
the SEAD concept and can provide valuable lessons for the development of joint
UAV “Weasel” doctrine for tomorrow.
War
of Attrition: The War Between the Wars
After the
sweeping Israeli defeat of the United Arab Command (UAC) in the 1967 Six Day War, the Suez Canal Front
demanded continued air activity between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and
Egyptians. Although major operations had
ended, a peace settlement was never signed, and the War of Attrition began. The
Israelis required a method of collecting signals intelligence, locations, and
jamming of the Soviet supplied Egyptian IADS that were pouring in from the
Eastern Bloc. In many cases these SAM
sites were manned and directed by Soviets themselves as they trained their
Egyptian/Syrian counterparts in the complex operation of these systems. Proliferation of SA-2 “Guideline” and SA-3
“Gao” sites were erected across eastern Egypt, opposite of the canal,
threatening to deny the IAF the ability to conduct effective aerial intelligence. The Israeli Air Force realized the extensive
air defense umbrella and its dismantling was required to maintain the vital air
and ground intelligence advantage Tel Aviv held over their adversaries in Cairo
and Damascus. In late July 1970, the IAF
secretly ordered Teledyne Ryan American Firebee 1241
UAVs.[ii] The 1241 model was improved for Israeli use
with longer range and a capability of conducting both high and low altitude
reconnaissance. The first 12 UAVs
arrived in Israel by July 1971 and by August 1st, 1971, the 1241’s first unit
was established at Palmachim Air Base on the
Mediterranean coast. Several squadrons
of IAF drones are stationed there to this day.
The 1241s were tasked with aerial photography of areas heavily defended
by SAM sites and to act as decoys to draw missile fire.[iii] The Israelis also ordered the Northrop
Chukar, a smaller UAV designed to draw enemy anti-aircraft and missile fire,
exposing the location of the hidden batteries for strike crews to locate and
destroy the sites. 27 of the small UAVs
reached Israel in December 1971 and were christened “Telem”,
meaning “Furrow” in Hebrew.[iv] The 1241s would see their baptism of fire
over the canal during the War of Attrition while the Chukar would have to wait
for 1973.
October
War 1973: The SAM Massacre
On October 6th,
1973, Egypt and Syria launched a premeditated two front attack against
Israel. It was Yom Kippur, the Jewish
Day of Atonement. As Israel’s tiny
regular forces stood hopelessly outnumbered by their Arab counterparts, the IAF
was called upon to make up the difference in forces, holding the enemy back
while the IDF’s reserves mobilized. In
the Israeli intelligence community, the capability of their post-1967 defeat
Arab adversaries was collectively known as “The Concept”.[v] “The Concept’s” 1971-1972 thesis was the
IDF/AF’s complete victory in 1967 would neutralize any chance of an Arab attack
for at least 10 years and that Syria would never attack without the cooperation
of Egypt.[vi] Over-confidence in this wishful thinking and underestimation
of the Arabs combined to allow Egypt and Syria to achieve strategic surprise on
October 6th, 1973. The IAF’s
preconceived notions and Six Day War hubris combined to make the opening days
of the war the deadliest in IAF history.
74 SA-2 and 64 SA-3 batteries had been established on the west side of
the canal to provide high-altitude protection and 40 SA-6 mobile SAM batteries
covered at medium altitudes.[vii] This layered defense forced IAF strike
aircraft to fly at lower altitudes into the envelope of over 1,500 conventional
anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), 100 mobile-radar-guided ZSU-23-4 “Shilka” batteries, and 366 SA-7 MANPADS (Man portable air
defense system).[viii] The most well-equipped unit of the Egyptian Air
Defense Command (ADC) was the 149th Air Defense Division, armed with
30 SA-2 SAM, 14 SA-3 SAM, and 10 AAA batteries.
With its headquarters at Inchas Air Base, the
149th was responsible for the Suez Canal Zone with 8 SAM regiments each
consisting of 5-8 SA-2/3 batteries in every regiment.[ix] A similar mix of air defense platforms were
employed by the Syrians along the Golan Heights front. By the end of the first afternoon of the war,
the Israelis lost 30 A-4 Skyhawks and 10 F-4E Phantom IIs. By the end of the first week, 80 IAF aircraft
had been lost- 24 percent of the Israeli Air Force inventory.[x] The missile had bent the aircraft’s wing and
the IAF had suspended operations in areas of high threat to limit unacceptable
attrition. To help counter Egypt and
Syria’s effective Soviet style IADS, the IAF utilized their small fleet of
American made UAVs to detect and decoy enemy SAM and radar sites. On October 7th, the Chukars were launched
North against Syria in the Golan Heights which misled the Syrian AAA and SAM
batteries into believing that a large IAF strike package was vectored their way.[xi] This action drew fire from the batteries and
exposed the positions of radar and missile sites, noted for later
suppression. During the October War, 5
of the 23 Chukars launched were lost to enemy action with each section of two
to four UAVs drawing 20-25 missiles.[xii]
On several occasions
the lack of availability of UAVs for both fronts caused more risk to strike
packages attempting to conduct defensive counter-air missions against Egyptian
airbases. One such absence of the drones
occurred along the Southern Front on 7 October when the IAF launched Operation Challenge-4. This pre-war orchestrated strike launched
at 0645 hours with the objective of striking Jiyankis,
el-Mansourah, and Tanta Air Bases in the Nile Delta,
while Qutamiyah AB east of Cairo, and Bir Arida and Beni Suweif Air Bases south
of Cairo would be knocked out. The
package consisted of 87 aircraft including A-4 Skyhawks, F-4E Phantom IIs, S-61
helicopter stand-off electronic countermeasures platforms, with KC-97 command
and control aircraft.[xiii] However powerful this strike force seemed on paper,
it lacked its principal SAM decoy force of No. 200 Squadron’s UAVs who were
deployed along the Golan Front against Syria, not having enough time to
re-deploy south the support Challenge-4.
The absence of these UAVs would allow Egyptian air defense units to
concentrate their fire on the incoming strikers without risk of biting off on
the decoys or diversionary attacks.
When available,
the outstanding performance of Israel’s Firebees and
Chukars demonstrated the effectiveness of the UAV SAM decoy as an effective
SEAD tool to waste enemy missiles and expose their positions. Throughout the duration of the war the United
States would continue to resupply the Israelis with more Chukars as a part of Operation Nickel Grass, the American
military airlift to send immediate assistance to the IDF to make up for the
high attrition rates suffered in the first weeks of the war.
On the Sinai
front, a Firebee squadron was deployed along the
Bar-Lev Line along the canal but was withdrawn to their rear Air Bases due to
increased Mig-17 ground attack sorties.
The Firebee 1241s operated throughout the war,
flying 19 sorties in which 10 were lost to enemy action. By the end of the war only 2 Firebees remained operational.[xiv] Their effectiveness during the conflict was
immense, illustrated by the fact that the IDF ordered 24 more after the
war. Like the Chukars, the 1241s
provided critical intelligence on SAM and radar positions, drawing fire from
manned strike packages, and forcing the Egyptian and Syrian battery commanders
to waste their missiles on relatively cheap decoys rather than Israel’s
precious F-4 Phantoms and A-4 Skyhawks.
During the war, Firebee 1241s drew 43 Egyptian
missiles while in turn locating sites destroyed by 11 HARM (high anti-radiation
missile) missiles.[xv] Like their American patrons in Southeast Asia,
the Israelis learned the value of utilizing the UAV to augment SEAD. Just as the American versions did over North
Vietnam, the Israelis could add yet another riddle to the difficulty of
conducting an effective air defense campaign in this cat and mouse contest
between men and machine. By the end of
the war, the military situation had been completely reversed. After a daring Israeli armored thrust back
across the Suez Canal, the Egyptian 3rd Army was completely cut off. Three Israeli Armored Divisions sat 65
kilometers from Cairo. General Ariel
Sharon’s tankers assisted General Benjamin Peled’s airmen by directly attacking
the Egyptian SAM positions at point blank range from the ground on the Western
side of the Canal, opening the skies for the IAF to conduct effective close air
support and air interdiction missions. This
action by the ground forces to open the skies for their air force above refers
to a ground type of SEAD that should never be overlooked on a modern and
dynamic battlefield. On the Syrian
Front, the IDF had driven the initial Syrian divisions back beyond their
pre-war positions and deep into Syria towards Damascus itself. Negotiations and American-Soviet Cold War posturing
eventually allowed the crisis to come to an end, but the war had displayed how
fast and deadly a modern conventional conflict between U.S. and Soviet
equipment could be.
After 1973, the
American military began to restructure itself.
After the defeat in Southeast Asia and the critical lessons of the
October War, American war planners across the various branches sought to
improve and develop their doctrine to develop conventional American military
power to counter the growing advances by the Soviets. Concepts like Active Defense and Air Land
Battle were born from this military renaissance and the hard lessons learned by
the USAF, USN, USMC, and the IAF contributed to the pinnacle of 20th century
SEAD doctrine.[xvi] It was paramount for the U.S. Department of
Defense, specifically the United States Air Force, to avoid another vicarious
learning experience like the Yom Kippur War that NATO could il-afford until
their equipment and doctrine met the Soviet echelon threat.
The year 1982
would prove to be an even more complimentary year in the development of warfighting
doctrine. In 1982, Argentina invaded the
Falkland Islands, the Soviets and Cubans were in Angola fighting the South
Africans, and the Syrians and Israelis would clash again, in Lebanon.
Lebanon
1982: Scout versus Gainful
On
June 9th, 1982, the IAF launched Operation
Mole Cricket 19 with the objective of knocking out Syria’s SAM batteries in
the Bekaa Valley.
The Syrian defenses consisted of some of the latest equipment available
to Soviet satellite nations including the deadly and mobile SA-6
“Gainful”. The Syrian Air Force
possessed the latest versions of Mig-21 “Fishbed”
and the new Mig-23 “Flogger”. The
Flogger was the newest Soviet swept wing fighter armed with a GSh-23L
autocannon and four AA-2 “Atoll” missiles in the air-to-air role. The IAF entered the arena with their Cold War
patron’s newest toys as well, including F-16s, F-15s, and E-2 “Hawkeye” AWACS
aircraft. Alongside their F-4 and A-4 older
brothers, this force was ordered, trained, and designed to take the hard
lessons of 1973 and reverse the legacy of the October War’s “SAM massacre”
inflicted upon the IAF by Arab IADS. To
counter the SAM threat the Israelis called upon their fleet of UAVs to open the
door for their Weasels. The Israel
Aircraft Industries (IAI) manufactured the “Scout” UAV with a 13-foot wingspan
and piston-driven engine.[xvii] This aircraft possessed an extremely low
radar signature, making it almost impossible to shoot down. It also possessed a TV camera that could
relay 360-degree real time footage and intelligence data to operators and
decision makers. The Scouts were sent
ahead of the strike force of HARM armed Phantoms to entice the Syrians to fire on
them and expose their positions. This
tactic proved to work beautifully with the Syrians activating their radars and
physically being located by the drones above.
With their locations confirmed and their radars active, the Phantoms
popped up over the mountains, launching their HARMs and annihilated the Syrian
SAM batteries. All but two of the
missile sites were destroyed in one day, forcing the Syrians to desperately
send their interceptors into the air to contest the Israelis.
The air-to-air
battle that would follow would become the largest in the history of the Middle
East resulting in an aerial display of East versus West. 82 Syrian Migs were destroyed with 0 Israeli
losses.[xviii] This one-sided humiliation of Soviet aircraft
and doctrine was made possible by the destruction of the Syrian IADS, who were
located and decoyed by the UAVs in the initial wave. Rather than the missile bending the wing of
the aircraft, the aircraft had bent the missile. It is often rumored that due to the complete
and utter destruction of the Soviet supplied Syrian Air and Air Defense Force
in June 1982, the Soviets fully exposed to this disaster understood their
technological inferiority to the West.
This aerial disaster to Soviet prestige and self-image combined with
Afghanistan and Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of Glasnost and Perestroika aided
in the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.
Lessons
Learned & Direction for Tomorrow’s War
The IAF’s use of
UAVs in the 20th century is a case study worth exploring by future war planners
and doctrinal authors of today. UAV
technology is growing and its use in modern combat in the conventional realm is
expanding daily. Tik Tok and Instagram
footage of Ukrainian TB-2 attack drones striking a Russian SA-11/17 “Gadfly” or
SA-15 “Gauntlet” shows modern air power enthusiasts that UAVs are relevant in
the conventional fight at a low risk to the side who chooses to use them.[xix] Many similar systems used by the IAF during
the Yom Kippur War are being utilized as “SAM Bait” in Ukraine. Soviet Tu-143 (NATO designation, “Reys”) reconnaissance drones are being used by the
Ukrainians and Russians as flying bait to draw trigger happy target and
acquisition radars to turn on, who’s location can then be relayed to artillery
or other strike assets to target them.[xx] As the present Russo-Ukraine War drags on, we
must look at the use of UAVs in the conventional role closely to learn the
lessons required to expand on the possibilities the UAV possess in the
Pacific.
Rising tensions
in the Taiwan Straits and Korean Peninsula have combined with the reality that
the days of high intensity wars are not over.
Our adversaries and friends will learn valuable lessons from the War in
Eastern Europe, but it is the changes that these lessons will drive that will
make the difference in next conflict.
From the Eastern
Baltics to the Taiwan Straits the Joint Force must develop a flexible and
reliable capability to conduct UAV SEAD to effectively decoy, deceive, and
destroy enemy SAMs and radars. We must also
be mindful of the possibility of a PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air Force) move
to trick Allied air defense commanders into the same trap the Egyptians and
Syrians found themselves in from the IAF’s UAVs. Offensive doctrine to utilize the deceptive
nature and low risk to human life potential of our own UAV fleets must be
considered and developed, but countermeasures to such an assault by any future
enemy is also necessary to ensure that the Allies are not caught off guard in
the opening phases of an attack.
One advantage
that the United States and the West possess over their competitors is a long
history of trial and error within the art of the air campaign. Conducting large air wars with interlocking
and joint assets to defeat an enemy’s IADS is something we have done time and
time again, learning more and more each time.
From Korea to Kosovo, we have developed a deep understanding of how to dismantle
and destroy an air defense system. The
Russian Air Force now is going through a deadly lesson in the consequences of
an absence of experience in these matters.
The PLA on the other hand hasn’t fought a war since 1979 and hasn’t
participated in a major conflict since 1953; therefore, their lack of
experience in actual combat may force opportunities for exploitation within
their war plans that near-future UAVs may be able to penetrate. The only primary adversary we face who has a
relatively recent air campaign under their belt is Iran with their war against
Saddam Hussein in the 1980s. The Allies
must take this experience into account and exploit their opponent’s dearth of joint
air planning and execution while developing new techniques, tactics, and
procedures (TTPs) for developing the unmanned and manned mix to bend the
missile.
The
possibilities and the future of the UAV is only as expansive as one allows themselves
to dream. Dedicated UAV SEAD crews across
the Joint Force can provide an adaptive, effective, and low risk/high reward
asset for the future of modern air combat.
We must not wait to adapt and innovate after we fight through a
vicarious learning experience against a future adversary. The development of new methods and weapons to
meet the objectives stated above should be pursued across the Joint and Combined
Force to retain our aerial dominance and deterrence we have enjoyed in this
century.
The fact of a war
stimulates evaluation and reaction. It
is a vivid and instructive experience.
– Dr. Malcolm Currie, Director
Defense Research and Engineering to House Armed Service Committee, 26 February
1974.
Author Biography:
2nd Lt Grant
T. Willis, USAF
Lieutenant Willis is an RPA pilot currently
stationed at Cannon AFB, NM. He is a graduate of the University of Cincinnati
with a Bachelor of Arts and Sciences, majoring in International Affairs, with a
minor in Political Science.
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