Indonesia’s Neutral
Approach Amid US-China Conflict
PDF Version
Rania Rayhana | Apr 22nd 2023
Abstract
This article is aimed to examine
Indonesia’s non-alignment diplomacy in the midst of a
great power competition. Being at the edge of the South China Sea, it places
Indonesia in a vulnerable position in the US-China geopolitical rivalry. In
this article, the author discusses Indonesia’s relations with China and the
United States under escalating tensions, as well as Indonesia’s potential role
in the conflict resolution.
The Sino-American rivalry in the
Indo-Pacific has posed a major threat to the peace and stability of the
Indo-Pacific region. For almost a decade, China has been asserting aggressive
claims over the East and South China Sea, which infringes the territorial
integrity of Indo-Pacific countries. While the United States attempts to
counter Beijing’s coercion, it has only increased the region’s vulnerability.
Aside from the high US military presence, the US has also repeatedly provoked
China—with the visitation of the US Former House Speaker to Taiwan or the US
expanding military bases in Indo-Pacific countries. Accordingly, Beijing’s
response was equally belligerent; firing missiles near
Taiwan following Nancy Pelosi’s visit and in the disputed waters as a warning
to the United States.
As tensions between the two states
escalated, Indonesia became increasingly susceptible due to their geographical
proximity. Therefore, Indonesia engaged with both the United States and China
with utmost caution, sidestepping any political decisions that may provoke
either state. Indonesian President Joko Widodo has repeatedly stated they will
maintain a neutral stance in the face of intensifying US-China spat. However,
as the leading power in
Southeast Asia, both China and the United States seek Indonesia’s support in
their geopolitical competition; thus, calling into question Indonesia’s neutral
position.
The Strategy of Neutrality
The
guiding principle of Indonesia’s foreign policy is underlined by the concept of
‘Free and Active’ diplomacy, which refers to Indonesia’s non-alignment in
international conflicts and major power blocs, thus, allowing an active diplomatic relations with all nations. With this
strategic approach, Indonesia seeks to have ‘a
million friends and zero enemies,’ enabling the country to reap significant
economic and political benefits from active interstate partnerships. In
accordance with the ‘free and active’ policy, Indonesia remains neutral in the
US-China rivalry and still maintains their relations with both Washington and
Beijing.
Economic Relations
Indonesia has a long history of trading relations with
both the United States and China. Indonesia began their trading ties with the
United States in the mid-1980s and has since expanded their relationship,
reaching a total trade volume of billions of dollars per year. In the 1990s,
the United States was Indonesia’s second largest trading partner, with exports
totaling over US$1 billion in 1990 alone. Meanwhile, Indonesia and China’s
history of trading relations stretches back to the 1950s. Compared to
Indonesia’s trade with the US, the Sino-Indonesia bilateral trade was
relatively small in the 90s but continued to grow steadily. In 1990, Indonesian
export volume to China
rose exponentially, growing by more than 100% only in a span of
seven years. Initially, Indonesia’s total exports to China amounted to around
US$800 million in 1990, significantly exceeding US$2 billion in 1997[1].
As trade relations with both the US and China continue to
expand, Indonesia’s economy rises to become one of the most advanced and
fastest growing economies in the world—earning Indonesia a place in the G20. To
this date, China and the United States remain Indonesia’s largest trading
partners, especially after the establishment of the Indonesia-China Strategic
Partnership, where China surpassed the US as Indonesia’s largest trading
partner. Only last year, China’s trade value with Indonesia significantly
exceeded that of the United States, reaching over US$109 billion while the US
merely contributed around US$21 billion[2].
While trade relations with China continued to grow, ties
between China and Indonesia expanded as well. In 2017, Chinese President Xi
Jinping and Indonesian President Joko Widodo signed a loan agreement during
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) summit. China agreed to provide
infrastructure assistance across large Indonesian provinces. The BRI funding
will cover many infrastructure projects, including the Jakarta-Bandung
High-Speed Railway, to which China has contributed over US$7 billion just to
this project[3].
Accordingly, the investment to fund the infrastructural development across
Indonesia’s provinces will be massive, estimated to reach over US$90 billion
for a total of 28 projects[4].
As a result, China became the third largest investor in Indonesia, with over
US$24 billion in investment since the year 2000[5].
Military
Cooperation
Considering Indonesia is highly concerned about China’s
claims to the South China Sea, Indonesia-China military ties seem implausible.
Especially after China’s threats when an uninvited Chinese vessel loitered near
a submersible oil rig conducting tests of Indonesia’s gas reserves for one
month—warning Indonesia to halt the drilling process, claiming that it was within China’s territory. Although Natuna Island is legally part of Indonesia’s Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZ) according to UNCLOS’s standard, it is also within the
so-called nine dash line claimed by China. This is a clear violation of Indonesia’s
territorial integrity, which therefore enters the US into the picture.
Indonesia and the United States have a long-standing
defense tie. The US has provided the Indonesian military service with Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training
(IMET) to foster professionalism and technical expertise while enhancing the
overall operational capability[6].
Since 2006, the US and Indonesian military relations have undergone joint
defense and security activities in countering transnational threats. However,
considering China’s threat to Indonesia’s territorial rights, the partnership
shifted their focus to deterring Chinese forces from Indonesia’s maritime
territory. The US has invested over US$3.5 million in a military training
center and naval base in Batam to monitor and deter
any Chinese presence within Indonesia’s territorial border[7].
Staying Neutral or Choosing Sides?
While neutralism may offer Indonesia
the benefits of China’s infrastructure assistance and boost their military
power with the United States, people are concerned it will allow the conflict
to escalate even further, extending to Indonesia’s territorial border and
creating implications for Indonesia in many aspects. As Former US Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles stated during the cold war; neutrality is merely a ‘short-sighted’ conception.
The vast majority of Indonesians seems to agree,
considering 60% of Indonesians believe their country should join the
United States in limiting China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific[8]. It is true that there are
many frictions in the Sino-Indonesia relationships, specifically the SCS
maritime dispute. However, it is important to note that Indonesia’s economy is
also highly dependent on China’s assistance; therefore, the idea of Indonesia
choosing the US’s side seems far-fetched. As previously stated, China is the
country’s biggest trading partner and one of their largest investors; thus,
maintaining a good relationship with China is critical for Indonesia’s economy.
Taking Australia as an example, where
China unofficially imposed sanctions on Australian exports after the Australian
government demanded an independent probe into the origins of Covid-19. Similar to Indonesia, Australia was an economic province of
China, accounted for
one-third (32%) of the nation’s foreign trade in 2019[9]. However, with China’s trade restriction, Australia has
not exported any timber logs to China for over two years, affecting about US$600 million in trade[10]. Although China’s sanctions against Australia did not
have a major impact on the country’s economy, it does not guarantee the same
fate for Indonesia. That is why it is wiser for Indonesia to avoid any
entanglements in the US-China rivalry, while also urging both parties to pursue
a peaceful settlement to prevent further escalations of the conflict.
A peaceful resolution certainly serves
Indonesia’s national interest; enabling the country to extract the benefits of
their relations with China and the US without worrying about an open conflict
on their doorstep. Although Indonesia’s first attempt at bringing China and the
US together during the 2018 APEC meeting may be a failure, the G20 Summit in
Indonesia showed hope of reducing tensions between the two countries. During
their first in-person meeting, US President Joe Biden and Chinese
President Xi Jinping have agreed to work together to improve their strained
relationships while addressing global challenges such as debt relief, food
security, and climate change.
President Joko
Widodo attributed the success of the summit to the country’s long-standing
neutral foreign policy that has fostered good relations with both China and the
US. Initially, several G20 member states boycotted the summit in protest of Russia’s
participation. However, Indonesian President Joko Widodo successfully
negotiated the presence of both President Biden and President Xi at the summit.
It is clear that Indonesia’s good relations between
nations served as a valuable asset in the US-China spat, enabling the two
rivals to collaborate, and produce the maximal and concrete result for the 2022
G20 Summit, as stated by the Indonesian President.
Conclusion
Unfortunately,
as we enter the new year, the US-China rivalry continues to exist. Just
recently, China’s Foreign Minister threatened a potential confrontation with
the United States following the US response to a Chinese surveillance balloon
over US airspace. Although the current situation may undermine their commitment
during the G20 meeting, both China and the United States are still willing to
communicate with each other and attempt to rebuild their strained relationship[11][12]. As
Indonesian President Joko Widodo stated during the G20 Summit;
"Competitions and rivalries are
normal. What is important is to keep them under control, and don’t
let them turn into an open conflict. Big countries have to
share responsibility to preserve stability and peace in the region and
globally, which means that they should communicate and meet often [13].”
As
such, the rising tension will likely remain, but not all is lost for a peaceful
resolution. As long as the US and China honor their
promises, and Indonesia or other nations continue to show support as the
middleman, there is still hope. Therefore, unless things drastically
deteriorate, remaining neutral is the best policy for both Indonesia’s national
interest and the international community—enabling the country to reap the
benefits of interstate cooperation and being a mediation between the rivals when
necessary.
Author
Biography:
Rania
Rayhana is a student from Indonesia studying in
Japan. Currently, she is pursuing a Bachelor’s degree
majoring in International Relations and Peace Studies at Ritsumeikan
Asia Pacific University.
References
[1]World Integrated Trade Solution.
(n.d.-a). Indonesia Trade Balance,
Exports and Imports by Country and Region.
https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/IDN/Year/1997/TradeFlow/EXPIMP
[2] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Indonesia. (2023). Bilateral
Cooperation. https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/page/22/kerja_sama_bilateral
[3]
Statistics
Indonesia. (n.d.). Foreign Direct
Investment. Badan Pusat Statistik. Retrieved
February 24, 2023, from
https://www.bps.go.id/indicator/13/1843/1/realisasi-investasi-penanaman-modal-luar-negeri-
menurut-negara.html
[4]
Investment Coordinating Board. (n.d.). Billions
on Offer for Belt and Road. BKPM. Retrieved February 24, 2023, from https://www2.bkpm.go.id/en/publication/detail/news/billions-on-offer-for-belt-and-road
[5] Statistics
Indonesia. (n.d.). Foreign Direct
Investment. Badan Pusat Statistik. Retrieved
February 24, 2023, from https://www.bps.go.id/indicator/13/1843/1/realisasi-investasi-penanaman-modal-luar-negeri-
menurut-negara.html
[6]Indonesia. U.S. Embassy and
Consulates in Indonesia. Retrieved February 24, 2023, from
https://id.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/embassy-fact-sheets/fact-sheet-unite
d-states-indonesia-relations/
[7]
Yuniar, R. W. (2021, June 28). US funds Indonesian
maritime training centre at edge of South China Sea. South China Morning Post.
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3139087/us-funds-indonesian-maritime-train
ing–centre-edge-south-china
[8]
Lowy Institute. (n.d.). United
States–China – Indonesia Poll 2021. Lowy Institute 2023.
https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/indonesia-poll-2021/topic/us-china/
[9]
China country brief. (n.d.). Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/china-country-brief
[10]
Smith, M. (2023, February
13). China trade sanctions: Beijing moves
to wind back curbs on Aussie beef and timber. Australian Financial Review.
https://www.afr.com/world/asia/china-moves-to-wind-back-aussie-beef-and-timber-trade-sanctions-20230213-p5ck60
[11]
White House (2023, February
16). Remarks by President Biden on the
United States’ Response to Recent Aerial Objects. The White House.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/02/16/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-united-states-response-to-recent-aerial-objects/
[12]
Foreign Minister Qin Gang Meets the Press_Embassy
of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America. (n.d.). http://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202303/t20230307_11037190.htm
[13]
Maulia, E. (2022, November 17). Jokowi says G-20 meetings helped cool U.S.-China tensions. Nikkei
Asia. https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/Jokowi-says-G-20-meetings-helped-cool-U.S.
-China-tensions