Christian Brose, the former Staff Director of the Senate Armed Services Committee and Senior Policy Advisor to Senator John McCain, paints a grim but complex battlespace in his book The Kill Chain. The Indo-Pacific region is the largest theater for combat by geographic area on Earth, keying into one of Mr. Brose’s points. At the start of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific the United States cannot sustain an ever-present readiness for a conflict that may never occur. Meaning many of the naval vessels, submarines, fighter and bomber aircraft, munitions and other systems that are necessary for warfare will very likely be thousands of miles away from the conflict area.[3] In this instance, we see one key fight, “the fight to get into theater”.[4] In addition to this fight, the U.S. military would have to combat Chinese cyber-attacks that seek to destroy communications, interrupt logistics and compromise security. While on the defensive, “satellites on which U.S. forces depend for intelligence, communications and global positioning would be blinded by lasers, and shut down by high-energy jammers”, potentially crippling intelligence collection and the ability to pass orders across the vast ocean.[5] Additionally, the combined force would be swarmed by Chinese hypersonic cruise missiles, U.S. Navy (USN) aircraft carriers would defend against DF-21 and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles and USAF aircraft would be targeted with advanced Surface to Air Missiles (SAM).[6] All of this creeps the thought, is it possible the U.S. military may not win a future conflict in the Indo-Pacific? How can we change the potential outcome before having to act in this theater? These questions should drive innovation within the Department of Defense, while historic lessons are taken into account, to provide context for the requirement for such innovation.

Jeffery Lewis, “DF-21 DELTA AKA CSS-5 MOD 4”, Arms Control Wonk, (October 14, 2008), https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/202049/df-21-delta-aka-css-5-mod-4/ .

View from 1926

Speaking from the experience of World War I, Maj Hap Arnold discussed the Air Corps in his book Airmen and Aircraft: An Introduction to Aeronautics during 1926, 13 years before the start of World War II. After World War I it was clear that “no nation will dare to be without a large air force to serve as its first line of defense”, a key notion when thinking about how the USAF may operate in the current Indo-Pacific theater.[7] As the aircraft in 1926 began to become more complex, breaking duration, altitude, distance and speed records for flight, these capabilities were ultimately presenting new features to add on military aircraft for World War II. While observing the new developments in aircraft technology, Maj Arnold mentioned that “they [aircraft] are the most essential elements in modern warfare […]” due to their ability to deliver destructive blows beyond the capabilities of surface armies or the navy.[8] Even so, Maj Arnold laid out that aircraft in future wars must be used to support two separate capabilities. These mission sets included acting as the aerial observation support and protection of surface allies and second, acting as an independent striking force against the adversary.[9] Just as it was in 1926, so it is in the 21^st Century, the Air Force today still needs to obtain air superiority, but first needs to fight to get airborne.

Not knowing at the time that these missions were exactly what would happen, one example of Maj Arnolds prediction and theory is seen in the Philippines 1941. December 1941, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Far East Air Forces (FEAF), the largest concentration of U.S. aircraft outside of the continental United States, is attacked by Imperial Japanese aircraft. While on the ground the FEAF’s 277 aircraft are decimated after continuous air attacks from the Japanese forces.[10] The continuous fight to get aircraft off the ground was lost by the U.S. forces at the time due to conflicting intelligence, false indications and warnings, and lack of operational readiness. Therefore, General MacArthur and his forces continued to fight a losing battle as they were forced back to Bataan and Corregidor until the United States forces had to surrender. Without supporting air forces, operating in one of the two key missions identified by Maj Arnold, the FEAF and U.S. forces in the Philippines were captured and put through horrific conditions waiting for General MacArthur’s triumphant return years later.

Maj Arnold also discussed an interesting point about airships being used during World War I, and mentioned “the long-range airships will travel across oceans to make strategic reconnaissance and to launch their protecting airplanes”.[11] The airships that Maj Arnold was discussing include the Zepplin-1 and Z-2, as well as the German “Luftshiff” LZ-1 and LZ-2. These airships were designed to travel long distances, carrying cameras among other things such as bombs, machine guns and airplanes. Maj Arnold was accurate that airships played their role in the oncoming war, but there is a much more recent example of his claims as well. Not so long ago did the United States witness a different type of airship in the form of a Chinese “spy” balloon. At the start of 2023, a Chinese spy balloon, capable of taking imagery and collecting signals intelligence was drifting over the continental United States.[12] Unknowingly, Maj Arnold discussed a real threat and capability that will very likely be seen again in a conflict in the Indo-Pacific theater. As Maj Arnold mentioned, strategic reconnaissance that can travel across the oceans is a key aspect to warfare, therefore the U.S. needs to be capable of countering this capability or potentially using it instead for the same purposes.

One of the final comments by Maj Arnold plays on the idea that aircraft development will forever continue, “[…] man has always been progressive. He accepts all new inventions […]”.[13] This idea is paired with one of his closing ideas that “the one and only effective means to stopping an aircraft is by using more and better aircraft”, the idea Maj Arnold describes as a principle to air warfare.[14] For today, the Air Force must sustain a force of advanced aircraft, that is capable of combatting the Chinese threat. Mr. Brose in his discussion with Senator McCain identified a fear, that 4^th generation aircraft, such as the F-15, F-16, and even F-18 would be unable to take on 5^th generation Chinese aircraft.[15] Learning from the principle of air warfare, Maj Arnold would champion the idea, that the Air Force must develop more advanced aircraft that can compete in future conflict against China.

General Arnold from 1941-1946

          Fast-forward to the start and duration of World War II, General Arnold and another legend to the U.S. Air Force, General Ira C. Eaker discuss the air war in Winged Warfare and This Flying Game. Both generals in their comments identify the significance of intelligence collection, the characteristics of the aircrew and air strategy throughout the war. Regarding intelligence collection, then called “observation aviation” was an absolutely critical piece to warfighting. USAF officers of any discipline in warfighting must integrate this idea into their thinking, General Arnold described a factor prior to the invention of the aircraft, “Introduce one lone airplane into the fifteen decisive battles of the world, and the course of history would have been changed”. [16] This comment discusses that if either side of the conflict, whether it be the Union versus the Confederacy in the American Civil War, Romans versus the Carthaginians or the Persian against the Greeks, the concept of knowing where the adversary is, and where they are moving to, is one of the most critical aspects to warfare. Additionally, intelligence collection using airpower can also provide locations of logistics, enemy movements, and locations of munitions, ultimately, the greater the fidelity one side has, the greater the advantage they have. The idea of maintaining the knowledge of where the adversary is, and where they are moving to, is the concept of maintaining “custody”. In other words, fighting to deny the adversary objectives while sustaining the ability to attain our own must be supported by this idea of custody, which stems directly from the critical warfighting need of using aircraft to provide said intelligence.

Beyond just the idea of aircraft, General Arnold and General Ira’s concept of understanding the battlefield through observation, or in other words collection, expands into the space domain. One of General Arnold’s predictions about the future of warfare was that of “A new air vessel which may be commonplace soon is the stratosphere plane.”[17] The stratosphere, which extends 4-12 miles above the Earth’s surface (21,120-63,360 feet) is a common altitude for not only military aircraft, but commercial flight as well.[18] Extending even beyond the atmosphere of Earth, we can take this historic perspective about maintaining custody and knowledge of the enemy location, to how the Department of Defense must use satellites. The space domain beyond Earth’s atmosphere is a contested domain by multiple actors, as of 2024 there are 80 countries that have satellites in space, totaling over 4,500 in orbit.[19] As the space battlespace become increasingly busy area, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Space Force must be concerned and plan for the future of how they can protect one of the most valuable capabilities. Without satellites the USAF will struggle to operate, communicate and move across the vast theater of operation in the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, extending General Arnolds historic claim for aircraft to spacecraft, the concept is parallel, to alter is quote, no nation will dare to be without a robust space capability to serve as warfighting support in contemporary conflict.