Memes of War
The
Russo-Ukrainian War and the Effect of social media on Modern Warfare
PDF Version
1st Lt Brendan H.J. Donnelly, USAF
2nd Lt Grant T. Willis, USAF
June 16th 2022
For decades many students of the profession of arms have noticed
that the technology of the information age stands as a critical domain of
modern warfare. A picture says a thousand words and a video says a million. The
United States has been impacted by multiple types of media for decades. Such
examples include the American Civil War which by 1864, the United States was
plagued with draft riots and anti-war sentiment, in favor of a new president
and peace with the Confederacy. Only a
series of Military victories by the Union secured Lincoln’s second term, the
first election of its sort to be held during a nation engulfed by Civil War.
Additionally, during World War II, the Allies and the Axis
both used propaganda films to inform their people of events during the war,
significant victories and called for people to support the war effort however
possible. The importance of propaganda was exacerbated in America’s war in
Southeast Asia when television provided a faster outlet for candid war footage
and for bloody combat scenes to reach the people back home in a way never before
seen or experienced. For the first time, citizens who were far removed from the
rigors of warfare received a TV tray side view of war and they did not like it. The images and nightly news coverage of the
war harmed the war effort with many Americans, sapping the political will of
the people to carry on the struggle from the comfort of their living rooms. Naturally, they did not like what they saw
and the will to fight until victory over Ho Chi Minh’s communists faded as it
does in most democracies during protracted military engagements that lack a
strategy fitting to meet political objectives. Furthermore, uncensored footage and
information was not equally available in places like Hanoi, Vinh, or Haiphong
north of the 17th parallel in Communist North Vietnam during the
Vietnam War. North Vietnamese society
took a different approach and took a 180-degree about face to reporting the
truth. During the 1968 Tet Offensive, as
Americans watched the US embassy in Saigon engulfed in firefights and bodies lying
in the street, the communists were not shown the aftermath of B-52 Arclight
missions blowing apart NVA formations outside Khe Sanh. With this
brief background in mind, the impact of media in past as well as modern conflicts
has grown in importance with every leap in social-technological
development. Our ability to connect continues
to expose our ability to be persuaded in relation to our national will to conduct
successful military operations. The
rapid growth of various social media platforms available throughout the world
today has made the job of finding the truth within the maelstrom of war even
more difficult than before. Apps such as
Tik Tok, Instagram, Facebook, Reddit, Twitter, Snapchat, Tinder, and Spotify
provide avenues for the world to watch the Russo-Ukraine war unfold on their
cellphones, while also watching the footage on television hours after it is
initially posted. This often makes it more difficult for media outlets to
control their information through manipulation and cutting since many see
footage as it is first shared, uncut, and available for interpretation by the
viewer without external enhancement. The
speed of information sharing across the globe adds unforeseen complexities into
the battlespace. War planners must now assume they are unable to totally control
the spread of information during war and that things such as troop movements,
battlefield tactics, damage assessments, and wartime logistics can all be
impacted by social media. Every window,
nook, and hole in a fence could have a smartphone camera hiding, waiting to
send your position to a drone or artillery battery miles away. Throughout the Russo-Ukraine War, social
media has been a prevalent source of information for both the Russians and for
the Ukrainians, the three sections of the war that have been impacted so far
include the build up to war on the border prior to the Russian invasion, the
immediate start of the war, and the continued operations that will shape the long-term
outlook of the conflict for months and years to come. Each of these sections
have presented multiple ways in which social media has affected our conception
of the modern battlespace.
Pre-Invasion
Before Russia’s invasion on 24 February
2022, social media provided a key piece of information for the Ukrainians which
can be recognized as “indications and warnings”.[i]
Indications and warnings provide a country with a series of trip wires which
can point to the likelihood of a potential aggressive action. Being tipped off before an action occurs,
gives the defending side time to counter and mobilize beforehand. A dating app called Tinder provided
information that could have been used as a warning. Along the border with Russia and Ukraine an
increase of profiles that were tied to Russian soldiers could have warned the
Ukrainian public of an initial increase of troops.[ii]
Talking with these soldiers on the direct message function could have also
provided indications of how the Russian soldiers were feeling about the
potential of an invasion and their positions were passed to Ukrainian units
once the war broke out. Other apps such
as Tik Tok, Facebook, Twitter, and Reddit provided images, messages, and videos
of the Russian activities along the border. These apps make it difficult to
maintain Operational Security (OPSEC) meaning that details about the Russian
operations prior to the invasion could have been easily leaked to the public
through social media and relayed to the Ukrainian Armed Forces as well as real
time geolocation for artillery and anti-tank teams for ambush.
Another way that social media affected
the war prior to the invasion was in support of the Russian military and policy
makers such as President Vladimir Putin. Before making the final call to invade
Ukraine, President Putin was able to analyze the potential international
backlash could likely be through social media.[iii]
Millions of people across the world shared their opinions on these various
social media apps either condemning the actions by Russia or accepting them. These
posts, videos, articles, and opinions showed the Russian government what the
international outlook was before the invasion started, providing them a way to
assess what kind of international consequences would come after the launch of
the invasion. Whatever the expectation was by the Kremlin prior to the “Special
Military Operation”, it was a gross miscalculation of the Free world’s
resolve. This type of processing of
Publicly Available Information (PAI) is called Open-Source Intelligence
(OSINT). By using this data on social media, many users and content sharers
have become “wartime reporters”, presenting to millions their interpretations
of the available information before some of the major news networks can release
it officially.
Immediate effects of the Russian
Invasion
After months of military drills,
diplomatic choreography, and a healthy dose of Russian deception or “Maskirovka,”
the Russians launched their attack in the early morning hours of 24 February
with a combination of air, sea, and land-based cruise missile strikes against
air defense and command and control (C2) sites throughout Ukraine. Motor riflemen manned their armored fighting
vehicles (AFV), crews powered up their tanks, and the “Grad” rocket artillery (a.k.a “Stalin’s Organs”) began to rain destruction on Ukrainian
targets. The invasion immediately ignited a massive influx of posts, videos,
and other images. Media has always
played a role in warfare, but in today’s war we find out modern technology and
interconnectivity has triggered the sharing of information at speeds we have
never witnessed before. As the Russian tanks rolled across the border and the
first videos were available of 3M-54 Kalibr cruise missiles impacted their
targets, people across the free world awoke to pro-Ukraine sentiments and anti-Russian
or anti-Putin posts and news footage.[iv] Information
and opinions are traveling at the speed of a finger touching a small
screen. The interconnectivity we have
today can be used to connect and share everything to everyone in an instant,
but this connectivity can be used as a weapon to strike through to emotions of
civilian populations on the home front in ways that we have never experienced in
a high intensity conventional war before.
National will to either carry on the fight or the will to give up is
more vulnerable to exploit than ever before in the history of human
conflict. Information of enemy movements
travel at the speed of a text while in the centuries leading up to the 20th
and 21st centuries the movements of regiments traveled at the speed
of horseback and halftrack.
Since February 24th 2022, social
media has been able to provide real time information on where Russian ground
troops are located, where they are likely going, and status on modern air
defense battles .[v]
These constant updates across social media platforms provide not only the
Ukrainians the knowledge of where the Russians are in the country, but it also
provides the Russians insight on what information is being posted about the
conflict and which ground units may have had their positions compromised.
In addition to situational awareness,
the immediate impact on the war that social media provides is for the
Ukrainians to show the devastation to the civilians, buildings, roads, homes,
and other infrastructure across the country almost immediately. The images of
destroyed buildings, videos of rockets, and the audio of missile sirens and
warning messages provide a valuable platform for the Ukrainians to present the
Russians as the clear aggressors.[vi]
Throughout the conflict these initial images and social media outlets showing
what the Russians are doing presented to the globe a strong need for medical supplies,
weapons, and international support to fight the Russians. Other ways that
Ukrainians used propaganda was to show the heroes in the Ukrainian military
such as the now legendary “Ghost of Kyiv.”
A unique air power legend has taken his
place in the history of combat aviation and in the hearts of many Allied Airmen
in the West. In the early days of the
war, many videos surfaced of Ukrainian MiGs flying at tree top level over Kyiv fighting
for their lives to inflict any damage possible on the attacking Russian Air
Force. Wild rumors began to circulate in
the media based on these videos indicating that the first 21st
century jet ace was a Ukrainian. Affectionately
known as “The Ghost of Kyiv”, this MiG-29 pilot was rumored to have downed six
Russian aircraft in one day of combat, later being shot down and killed in
combat some weeks later.[vii] This
air combat legend is unconfirmed, but the hope that it is in fact a true story
has inspired online merchandise and “toasts to the ghost” in many bars and
heritage rooms across the Allied air services in absolute envy and awe. The well-known air power poster and art
company Squadron Posters revealed a “Ghost of Kyiv” exclusive squadron poster selling
for $99.99 on their website and on their Instagram page with proceeds going to Ukrainian
Refugee and Humanitarian relief.[viii] The legend may only be but an aviation folk
tale for future American and Allied children who grow up hoping to be the next
generation of combat aviators, but this myth is a powerful inspiration and
source of hope for resistance that served its purpose even if it was indeed
only propaganda. The knowledge of only
some air-to-air kills by Ukrainian MiG and Sukhoi pilots are enough to make the
legend of the Ghost a reality in the fact that the feared Russian bear in the
air is not all he has been promoted to be.
Posters supporting the “Ghost of Kyiv,” were purchased by the thousands,
but the posters were not the only instance of “war merch” being available
within the first 48 hours of the war. T-shirts, patches, flags, posters, and
other merchandise was for sale and a hefty sum of the money raised by these
items were sent to the Ukrainian war effort.
They Fought the NLAW & the NLAW Won
As the conflict continues, the
long-term propaganda campaign against the Russian government and military is
two-pronged, with the Ukrainian people commenting on one side and the noticeable
number of Russian people revolting against the war on the other. The days of complete control by the Soviet
state are over and the Russians we know today are far more interconnected to
the world and have far more access to global thoughts than before 1989. On the Ukrainian side, the propaganda
campaign is to show that this war is unjust and that the Russians should be
punished for this action, with the hope that once the conflict is over, the
international community must come to the aid of Ukraine to assist with
rebuilding the nation who fought for the West. The other aspect of the
propaganda campaign is showing how the Russian citizens and military members
have been protesting the war and lacking in their motivation to fight it.
Multiple reports of Russian soldiers refusing to continue fighting or moving to
the front have been pushed in western news and across social media to show that
even the former Red Army does not want the conflict that Mr. Putin began to
restore Russian greatness. [ix]
Aside from the propaganda campaign the
other way that social media has been used to support the war effort is by
showing off new technologies. The lure of the anti-tank missile and its
relevance on the modern battlefield is as potent today as it has been since WWII
or the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The
primary anti-tank weapons delivered by the thousands to the Ukrainians are the American
made Javelin and British NLAW (Next Generation Light Anti-Tank Weapon). Their effect on the battlefield against
Russian armor has been devasting to the crews of T-72, T-80, T-90, and even
T-62 variants.[x] Everything ranging between Russian Zil trucks, BUK SAM systems, and BMD armored fighting
vehicles have met their fate from the dreaded anti-tank guided missile (ATGM). Helmet cameras, videos of blown out T-72
tanks with the 15-ton turrets being thrown 30 meters from the tank chassis, and
intercepted/unencrypted radio transmissions motivates and intensifies
resistance across the lines and in the occupied zones. This motivation to resist and rapid global
pressure to support the Ukrainians sparks momentum to carry on the struggle. The
war is also inescapable for those who follow social media posts. Every day there are citizens across the globe
who wake up to war on their phones. Updates, Tik Toks, Instagram videos, and
Tweets that show the fluid frontlines and its combat caught on tape sometimes
hours or minutes after the fact.
Waking up to War
It is a sad reality that many of us are
so connected to our phones that they have become an extension of ourselves;
therefore, phones have become a constant in most modern political and military
actions. Facebook posts break families
apart before they get to Thanksgiving dinner arguments about elections and if
one were to watch a wave of humans walking down the street, they would not be
surprised to notice that many within the wave are buried deep with their heads
bent over, eyes consumed, almost hypnotized by the little screen in their hands. This is a reality that cannot be forgotten; War
is everywhere now. It is in our pockets,
on our TVs and radios. For years we have
been gradually used to insurgencies, Arab revolutions, political violence that
has impacted our opinions and the way we see our world in ways and speeds that
were never possible before. It is
possible for a 12-year-old to get on Tik Tok and see footage of a Su-25 get
shot out of the sky by a stinger man portable air defense system (MANPAD) or
watch a Reddit video of a TB-2 drone strike on a Russian SA-11 “Gadfly” Buk SAM
system.
Every morning Lieutenant Willis, like
most of us these days, woke up looking to his phone to start the day. Most people scroll through their Instagram,
Facebook, and Twitter feeds to see what is going on in their social lives and
around the world. This is a new thing in
our society that may not be totally analyzed yet, but he never really checked his
social media in the mornings before the war.
Lt Willis at the time barely checked social media prior to the Ukraine
crisis, but since Vladimir Putin’s war began, he checked multiple social media
outlets every day to get the latest on the war. Instagram showed daily videos
of commercial drones dropping mortars right on Russian motorized troops and
killing soldiers while wounding a couple others. The initial video was followed by another of
the same type of drone dropping a round from a couple hundred feet right onto
the top turret of a T-72, setting off secondary explosions as the ammunition
inside the turret exploded. Another source, Reddit, later paired with Tik Tok had
another video of about 10-15 Ukrainian soldiers standing around a knocked-out
BMP-1 while two T-64 tanks rolled up to their position. The T-64 is commonly used by Ukraine, so
these troops waved thinking that the tanks were friendly. Only when the lead tank’s turret turned and
aimed right at the group did they realize their mistake. The following scene
showed the point-blank shot from the main gun round of the T-64 tearing through
the group of men, evaporating them instantly by the sheer force of the round
passing through them.
We can watch the horrors of war and interpret
that individually, but this phenomenon must be recognized as unusual and new
within the historiography of warfare.
The value and importance of Public Relations Officers and the role of
media cannot be discounted as a critical domain of warfare in our time. Solutions to how to exploit it for victory
are still unclear, but the first step to that solution must come from
identifying the reality before us and as we see it now, it becomes increasingly
evident that any future conflict can be won or lost based on a tweet, an
Instagram reel, or a Tik Tok.
Implications for the indopacific
In the indopacific region both the
United States military and the Chinese military will look at this conflict
taking away the multi-dimensional outlook to then place into plans for a
potential conflict in the first island chain, the Western Pacific. The lessons that China may choose to take from
the Russo-Ukraine war include nuclear-armed powers can open the door for the
use of conventional military force to secure national objectives through the
fact that the West will not want to risk an escalation over a situation that
does not directly impact their collective security/sovereignty. In addition, everyone
is a journalist/has an opinion and is easily able to share it with millions in
a matter of seconds. Information interpretation/manipulation matters in modern
war, more now than ever before. China’s neighbors include many of the world’s most
wired and internet-savvy nations such as India, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore,
the Philippines, and Japan. The Chinese may utilize this war as a moment to
audit their force’s operational security (OPSEC) capabilities. Will the commissars
(political officers) in every company confiscate all cell phones and internet
capable devices prior to an assault? Will the PLA target information
apparatuses first rather than an enemy’s integrated air defense system (IADS)
and command and control (C2) nodes? These are a few questions that the Central Military
Commission (CMC) in Beijing will need to ask prior to a decision to launch an
attack in the Western Pacific. These questions will also need to be answered
and accounted for in the pre-war planning at Pacific Air Forces, INDOPACOM, and
the Pentagon.
Every video of a Russian Su-34
“Fullback” fighter-bomber crew taken prisoner on Tik Tok and Instagram post of
an SA-15 “Gauntlet” that runs out of gas and is subsequently dragged away from
a highly motivated Ukrainian farmer in his tractor illustrates the importance
of information on the modern battlefield. The Russian Army’s reputation on the
world stage has been severely damaged by the iPhone and our ability to see with
our own eyes the failure of Russia’s military adventure. China will study this
and for a government and party specifically orchestrated to save face at all
costs will do the utmost to limit the exposure of defeat or the rumor of defeat
in the modern battlespace. In the West, we must take notes on this fact to
exploit the power of information as a domain of combat that might make a
considerable difference in future campaigns against a China that practices
insulation during tests of national will.
A critical lesson that not only the
United States and China can take away from the Russo-Ukraine war, but all
nations is that social media and the ever-growing OSINT realm can impact
warfare in the planning phase, execution phase and an on-going conflict in the
present. In the indopacific region along with the technological power houses
such as South Korea and Japan, other countries, and island nations have the capability
to assist in conflicts solely by using their phones, computers, or cameras.
In summary, the Russo-Ukraine conflict
has provided multiple lessons that can be analyzed and put into planning for
future wars whether they be in the indopacific region or across the globe. Social
media apps and extension of OSINT plays a large part in ways modern war is portrayed
to the public domain. The world has seen impacts with social media prior to a
conflict starting by providing intent of a nation’s government, a general
measure of support and indications, and warnings for the defending nation.
Additionally, the following impacts by social media being immediate battlefield
situational awareness and continuous impacts with technology and funding for a
country are clear. Studying this growing aspect of warfare and how social media
can impact human conflict is an area of study that cannot be forgotten in the
future due to the drastic affects that public opinion, perception, and national
will can bring to any future large-scale conflict.
Author Biographies:
1st
Lt Brendan H.J. Donnelly, USAF
Lieutenant
Donnelly is an intelligence officer stationed at Cannon AFB, NM. He has held
intelligence supervisor roles at Cannon AFB and Special Operations Forces
Africa. He graduated Bowling Green State University, with a Bachelor of Arts of
Sciences, majoring in History.
2nd
Lt Grant T. Willis, USAF
Lieutenant
Willis is an RPA pilot stationed at Cannon AFB, NM. He is a graduate of the
University of Cincinnati with a Bachelor of Arts and Sciences, majoring in
International Affairs, with a minor in Political Science.
[i] Aloisi, Silvia; Daniel, Jack, “Timeline: The Events Leading up to
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine” Reuters (March 1, 2022) https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/events-leading-up-russias-invasion-ukraine-2022-02-28/.
[ii] Bielskyte, Severija “How Tinder became a Weapon in the Russia-Ukraine
War” Huck (March 21, 2022) https://www.huckmag.com/perspectives/how-tinder-became-a-weapon-in-the-russia-ukraine-war/.
[iii] Blake, Aaron, “Putin now among most hated world figures in recent U.S.
history” The Washington Post, (March 11, 2022) https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/11/putin-now-among-most-hated-world-figures-recent-us-history/.
[iv] Baran, Jonathan; Kelly, Meg; Nakhlawi, Razzan; Parker, Claire, “What
to know about the long-range cruise missile Russia says it fired” The
Washington Post (March 24, 2022) https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/24/russia-kalibr-cruise-missile-ukraine-weapons/.
[v] Tondo, Lorenzo, “Russians advance into largest city in Donbas still in
Ukrainians hands” The Guardian (May 30, 2022) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/30/russians-advance-largest-city-donbas-ukrainian-hands-sievierodonetsk.
[vi] Vasovic, Aleksandar; Zinets, Natalia “Missiles Rain down around
Ukraine” Reuters, (February 24, 2022) https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-orders-military-operations-ukraine-demands-kyiv-forces-surrender-2022-02-24/.
[vii] Gaely, Patrick, “Ukraine admits the ‘Ghost of Kyiv’ isn’t real, but
the myth was potent for a reason” NBC News (May 02, 2022) https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/ukraine-admits-ghost-kyiv-isnt-real-wartime-myth-russia-rcna26867.
[viii] The United Nations Refugee Agency, “Ghost of Kyiv” Squadron Posters
https://www.squadronposters.com/product/ghost-of-kyiv-art/.
[ix] Rainsford, Sarah, “Ukraine War: The Defiant Russians speaking out
about the War” British Broadcasting Company (May 23, 2022) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61542365.
[x] Coelho, Carlos, “Why is Russia losing so much military equipment in
Ukraine?” Radio Free Europe Radio Library, (May 13, 2022) https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-war-military-equipment-losses/31847839.html.