Navigating
Disputes: South China Sea and The Role of International Arbitration in Territorial Conflict Resolution
PDF Version
By: Stephanie B. Magsumbol | June 7th, 2025

Introduction
With the ongoing
domestic and international developments among nations, it is inevitable that
territorial dispute arises due to rivalry and competition. Conflicting state
interests involve cultural, political, economic, or social factors. In most
cases, disputes among states arise due to the scarcity of resources related to
oil and gas reserves. Additionally, domestic politics and cultural differences
can also trigger boundary disputes whereby neighboring states have different interpretations
of land ownership and occupation[1]. It is
evident that land territory has been considered as the most valuable
asset to a country.
The South China Sea dispute involves competing territorial claims by
Brunei, China, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Tension escalated
since the 1970s as countries began asserting control over various islands,
especially when China strongly and continuously proclaimed expansive claims based
on its so-called “nine-dash line”. For the Philippines, the dispute centers on
the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, and Scarborough Shoal.
The irreconcilable claims over territory pose greater risk of armed
conflict. The intense competition over shared resources is difficult to
resolve. However, failure to address this conflict will result in greater poverty and landless population and might even
lead to war. At this point, territorial dispute resolution becomes particularly
important. International arbitration is one of the prevailing remedies
available in international law for handling territorial disputes. In cases
where the states are unwilling to resolve the conflict within themselves, the
submission of the issue to third parties, like international arbitration and
adjudication, is crucial to peaceful resolution, preventing potential causes of
violent international conflict.
An extensive body of literature has
emerged, delving into various dimensions of South China Sea dispute. This article
aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of key scholarly works that
tackle about the South China Sea issue, particularly between the Philippines
and China. This paper will examine the impact of international arbitration on
both states and analyze its strengths, criticisms, and limitations within the
context of international adjudication. The paper will highlight the
geopolitical context, legal framework, and developments after arbitration will
also be explored.
Geopolitical Context of the Conflict
The South China Sea, or “West Philippine Sea”
in the context of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ), is vital for
global commerce as it is a crucial shipping route, providing access to the Strait
of Malacca and the port of Singapore, thereby controlling the supply chain of
Asian and Middle Eastern economies. It caters to an estimated annual trade of
about $3.36 trillion[2]. Also, the
area is rich in mineral resources, oil, natural gas, and abundant fishing
grounds. Moreover, the location is essential for the military operations of
naval forces.
In 1947, China adopted a map showing the
Paracel and Spratly Island chains as integral part of the Chinese nation[3]. The map
entitled “Map of the South Sea Islands” was released in China in February 1948,
depicting an eleven-dash U-shaped line covering almost the entire South China
Sea. In 1950, China reduced the dashes to nine without any explanation[4]. Based
on such historic rights, China was trying to justify its control over the
disputed areas. The assumed nine-dash line territory encompasses roughly 90
percent of the South China Sea and overlaps with the EEZ of other coastal
states.
The Philippines Vs. China Arbitration Case
International legal
dispute resolution involves states submitting conflicts to independent bodies
that evaluate the merits of competing state claims and deliver a summary
decision regarding the dispute settlement[5]. To
understand the arbitration case between the Philippines and China, it is important
to examine the cause of action and compelling reasons why the Philippines brought
the dispute before an international tribunal.
In
2009, as protest to Vietnam-Malaysia submission
to the United Nations (UN) about their extended continental shelf claims, China
submitted to UN the map of the nine-dashed line territory – claiming to have
indisputable sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the islands and adjacent
waters in the South China Sea. China did not explain the basis of the dashes
nor even give the corresponding coordinates. Such claims by China are of
paramount importance to the sovereign interests of the Philippines to protect
its waters. It appears that China aims to claim 80 percent of the EEZ of the
Philippines in the South China Sea[6].
Considering that
the dispute is between sovereign states with unequal power, the Philippines
opted to resolve the territorial dispute by filing an arbitration case in 2013.
The case against
China was based on the following issues: China’s historical rights claims; the
geological features in the Spratly as not capable of human habitation; maritime
entitlement among coastal states; Filipino fishermen’s traditional fishing rights
in Scarborough Shoal; and harm to the marine environment. In fact, the
Philippines enacted Republic Act No. 9522 which aligned its coastline to
conform with the guidelines delineated by United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS). It bears noting that China was the only coastal state in
the South China Sea that claims a maritime entitlement far in
excess of the 350 nautical miles from its coast, which is contrary to
the UNCLOS.[7]
On the other hand,
China argued that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction since Beijing formally
excluded itself from the compulsory dispute settlement procedures of UNCLOS. It
even characterized the Philippines’ submission as outside the purview of the
tribunal[8].
Furthermore, the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines also stated that the
arbitration was framed and manipulated by external powers like the United
States[9].
In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in favor of the
Philippines, stating that China’s claims of historical rights over the disputed
islands, particularly the Spratly Islands, had no legal basis. The arbitration
court also decided that the unlawful Chinese activities in the South China Sea
violated the Philippines exclusive sovereignty in its EEZ.
Post-Arbitration Situation
Despite the ruling
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, China’s behavior was divergent and
non-compliant to the tribunal, rejecting the arbitral award as “null and void
and has no binding force.” It continued to operate its land reclamation and
build artificial structures on the Spratly Islands, leading to a number of confrontations with other claimant states[10]. For
instance, between 2014 and 2015, China built a 590-hectare artificial island in
Mischief Reef, turning it into a military base with a runway. Additionally,
military operations have intensified, resulting in frequent standoffs and
incidents involving fishing vessels, coast guards, and military forces.
It is evident that a weak state, like
the Philippines, despite having a favorable ruling, can still be considered in
a weak bargaining position with another state that has dominant power such as
China. Political conflicts hinder states utilizing legal mechanisms in
resolving territorial disputes. In the real political arena, not all weak
states can act like David to fight against Goliath states.[11] Indeed,
pursuing arbitration and enforcement of the adjudication is also political in
nature.
The Philippines has evolving strategies in addressing the South China
Sea conflict after the favorable arbitration ruling. Former president Rodrigo Duterte initially
pursued a policy of appeasement toward China. It downplayed the arbitration
ruling and sought closer economic ties with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
However, when China failed to deliver the promised investment and continued its
assertive activities in the South China Sea, Duterte’s administration shifted
to “soft balancing,” where it maintained its US alliance, fostered security
relations with Japan, and pursued a regional code of conduct with ASEAN[12].
On the other hand, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. made a strategic shift and
more assertive stance on the South China Sea issue. His administration actively
exposes Chinese actions in the West Philippine Sea through the “transparent
initiative,” using media to call for domestic and international support[13].
Also, Marcos revitalized the Philippine’s defense and alliances. For instance,
the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) expanded the joint military exercises
with the US in other Philippine bases, including locations near Taiwan. Additionally,
there were increasing military cooperation with other partners like Japan[14]
and Australia.
Furthermore, in
navigating the South China Sea issue, the Philippines faces the difficult task
of balancing its national interest amid tension with China and the US. Despite
the rising territorial dispute over the South China Sea, the Philippines has maintained
economic ties with China recognizing the value of trade and investment. Manila
has adopted a “limited hard balancing” approach – enhancing its own defense
capabilities and strengthening alliances with the US, and other middle powers
while still pursuing peaceful dialogue and economic cooperation with China[15].
Meanwhile, the US continues to play a vital yet evolving role in maintaining regional
security by relying on its network of security alliances and partnerships
throughout Southeast Asia[16].
In this time, the US approach to the South China Sea could take two main paths.
One possibility is continued or increased engagement. If the US views active
engagement in the dispute as an effective strategy to counter China, it may
maintain or strengthen its current posture of support for allies, like the
Philippines. Alternatively, there could be a major pullback. If US leaders
conclude that involvement offers little domestic political advantage, the US
might reduce assistance to the Philippines or shift the security burden
elsewhere[17]. Notably,
the United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty is a critical pillar of
Manila’s security policy. Under this treaty, any armed attack on a Philippine
public vessel in the Pacific area is a ground to invoke mutual defense. The US
has reaffirmed its commitment, stating that attacks on Philippine forces in the
South China Sea would trigger the treaty[18].
However, both parties are cautious as the
US seeks to avoid unnecessary escalation with China, preferring to support the
Philippines through capacity-building, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic
backing rather than direct military confrontation[19].
Nevertheless, it gets more complicated as China views Philippines’ closer
alignment with the US as a threat to its strategic objectives in the South
China Sea. It is evident that the Philippines’ balancing strategy complicates
China’s attempts to strengthen its control over the contested waters.[20]
On the other hand, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has
consistently pursued a diplomatic strategy regarding the South China Sea conflict,
focusing on peaceful resolution and adherence to international law. Since 2013,
ASEAN has been actively negotiating with China to develop a more binding Code
of Conduct (COC), although progress has been slow. The organization has held numerous
discussions at both senior official and working group levels, demonstrating its
ongoing commitment to diplomacy[21].
Despite such diplomatic efforts, ASEAN faced considerable obstacles in managing
the dispute. Its effective intervention was complicated by the different levels
of involvement and national interests among its member states in the dispute.
Challenges in
Arbitration Rulings
While international
arbitration provides a venue for smaller nations to assert their rights against
larger powers, it also raises some challenges for legal battles. Under
international law, an international court or tribunal could render a legally
binding settlement only if the states concerned have expressly or implicitly
consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by such international bodies[22]. The jurisdiction of international arbitral
tribunals and courts is solely consensual. Also, the international arbitral
awards are not self-enforcing. For enforcement, state must raise its
enforcement to international judicial bodies.[23] As
discussed above, although rulings from the Permanent Court of Arbitration carry
weight of legal authority for the benefit of the Philippines, China does not
adhere to or respect the court’s rulings. It is unfortunate that compliance
relies heavily on the willingness of the states involved to cooperate and
implement the judgments.
Moreover, the arbitration tribunal has
no strict enforcement mechanisms. International arbitration and adjudication
lack a binding nature and there is no overarching global authority with the
power to enforce international decision.[24] In
certain cases, the UN Security Council holds the authority to implement rulings
made by international bodies such as the International Court of Justice.
However, the success of such enforcement largely depends on the political
dynamics within the Security Council (considering that China is one of the
members of such a Security Council) and the readiness of its member states to act.
Conclusion
This paper on
territorial dispute resolution through international arbitration and
adjudication is crucial for understanding scholars and policymakers for policy
advice. It provides an opportunity to examine the strengths and weaknesses of
international rulings in addressing the increasing number of territorial
disputes.
It is evident that the Philippines-China arbitration case over the South
China Sea exemplifies that international law could challenge the actions of
rising powers. Such unique arbitrate ruling charts a legal precedent that other
nations can rely on for future territorial disputes. Nevertheless, it
highlights the limitation of international adjudication when major powers
refuse to accept outcomes that challenge their sovereignty.
The South China Sea dispute also underscores the broader geopolitical
implications of territorial conflicts. It highlights the significance of
regional alliances and the strategic balance between diplomacy and deterrence.
Indeed, this regional issue is a test of global order and security.
Author’s Bio:
Stephanie Magsumbol is an intern at the
Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers. She is a graduate student at Korea
University in Seoul. Her research interest lies in International Law, South
China Sea, and U.S.-Philippines relations.
The author thanks Dr. Indu Saxena and Jose
Custodio for their extensive feedback and review.
[1] Scott F. Abramson and David B. Carter, “The historical origins of
territorial disputes,” American Political Science Review 110, no. 4
(2016): 675-698, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055416000381.
[2] Center for Preventive Action, “Territorial Disputes in the South China
Sea,” Global Conflict Tracker, last modified September 17, 2024,
https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea.
[3] “What is the South China Sea Dispute?” News at BBC, July 7, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/July 7sia-pacific-13748349
[4] Antonio T. Carpio, "The South China Sea Dispute: Philippine
Sovereign Rights and Jurisdiction in the West Philippine Sea," Philippine
Law Journal 90 (2016): 459.
[5] Todd L. Allee and Paul K. Huth, “The Pursuit of Legal Settlements to
Territorial Disputes,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 23, no. 4
(2006): 285-307, https://doi-org-ssl.oca.korea.ac.kr/10.1080/07388940600972644.
[6] Antonio T. Carpio, "The South China Sea Dispute: Philippine
Sovereign Rights and Jurisdiction in the West Philippine Sea," Philippine
Law Journal 90 (2016): 459.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese
views on the South China Sea arbitration case between the People’s Republic of
China and the Philippines." China Leadership Monitor 51,
no. 1 (2016): 1-13.
[9] “Remarks of the Spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines
on the Seventh Anniversary of the So-called Award on the South China Sea
Arbitration,” Embassy Update, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic
of the Philippines, July 12, 2023,
http://ph.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgdt/202307/t20230712_11112236.htm.
[10] “What is the South China Sea Dispute?,” News at BBC, July 7, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349.
[11] Stephen E. Gent and Megan Shannon, “Bargaining power and the
arbitration and adjudication of territorial claims,” Conflict Management and
Peace Science 31, no. 3 (2014): 303-322,
https://doi-org-ssl.oca.korea.ac.kr/10.1177/0738894213508710.
[12] Renato Cruz De Castro, “From Appeasement to Soft Balancing: The Duterte
Administration’s Shifting Policy on the South China Sea Imbroglio,” Asian
Affairs: An American Review 49, no. 1 (2020): 35–61, https://doi.org/10.1080/00927678.2020.1818910.
[13] Aaron Jed Rabena, “The Philippines’ Four-Pronged South China Sea Strategy,”
Australian Institute of International Affairs: Australian Outlook, (July
16, 2024), https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-philippines-four-pronged-south-china-sea-strategy/.
[14] Aries A. Arugay, “Traversing Turbulent Waters: The Philippines’
Evolving Indo-Pacific Strategy.” The National Institute of Defense Studies:
NIDS Joint Research Series No. 22 (Chapter 4) (2025): 53-61.
[15] Renato Cruz De Castro,
"Caught between appeasement and limited hard balancing: The Philippines’
changing relations with the eagle and the dragon," Journal of
Current Southeast Asian Affairs 41, no. 2 (2022): 258-278.
[16] The Asia Foundation. 2024. “Critical Issues for the United States in
Southeast Asia in 2025”. Accessed last April 18, 2025 at
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[17] Lee Jaehyon, “Strategies of the Philippines, China, and the US in the
South China Sea in 2025 and Future U.S. Policies on Alliances and the
Indo-Pacific Region.” February 24, 2025. The Asian Institute for Policy
Studies. Accessed last April 19, 2025 at https://en.asaninst.org/contents/strategies-of-the-philippines-china-and-the-us-in-the-south-china-sea-in-2025-and-future-u-s-policies-on-alliances-and-the-indo-pacific-region/.
[18] Chad De Guzman, “Why the U.S. Faces a Delicate Balancing Act on
Countering China in the South China Sea,” World Conflict, Time, last modified March
27, 2024, https://time.com/6960916/us-military-intervention-south-china-sea-philippines-china/.
[19] Sarang Shidore, “Defending Without Provoking: The United States and the
Philippines in the South China Sea,” Quincy Institute for Responsible
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[20] Renato Cruz De Castro, “The Philippines’ Renewed “Hard Balancing” Policy toward China: Has the
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[21] “Remarks by H.E. Le Luong Minh Secretary-General of ASEAN High-Level International
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[22] Richard Bilder, Adjudication: International Arbitral Tribunals and
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(United States Institute of Peace, 2007), 195-226.
[23] Todd L. Allee and Paul K. Huth, “The Pursuit of Legal Settlements to
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