The Indo-Pacific region has continuously thrust problems onto militaries throughout history that have operated within it. Encompassing the Indian Ocean, Pacific Ocean, thousands of islands and geographic features, the region itself complicates any military logistic supply chain. This is why, whichever nation controls the area, or the key areas maintain such strategic dominance over any other state that wishes to use it. These choke points include the South China Sea (SCS), Strait of Malacca, and East China Sea (ECS). Today, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) lays claim to both the ECS and SCS, directly interfering with multiple Southeast Asian nations maritime sovereignty and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) identified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This situation represents one of the most hostile geographic areas in the world. The PRC recognizes this and has determined that their military, the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) must be prepared to enforce the PRC’s claimed sovereign territory by 2027 and continue to pursue the PRC’s rejuvenation goals by 2049. What this will look like can be derived from Chinese Admiral Lie Huaqing’s teachings about what a modern Chinese Navy should look like. The PLA will maintain a consistent strategic defense posture, operate and enforce Chinese control over the first and second island chains, uphold national unity and maintain the capability to win regional disputes.[2] Each of these goals for the PLA inherently seeks to counter the opposing view of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP).

A Free and Open Indo-Pacific as a term originated from Japan, but has evolved into the national policy for many nations to include the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and others within the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations (ASEAN).[3] Further, other states that also rely on the ECS and SCS also diplomatically prefer and work towards a FOIP, such as the European Union, so that conflict does not arise in the area and inflict economic damage at a global scale.[4] Yet, even with the threat of economic impacts, the PRC and the United States have both identified outwardly that they each will be prepared to face off through military means if necessary. For the PRC, their military action would include invading and taking over Taiwan and enforcing sovereignty over the 9-Dashed Line in the SCS. While the United States would protect Taiwan from a Chinese invasion and defend a FOIP in the SCS from any Chinese aggression. Thus, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) must be prepared if called upon to operate in the Indo-Pacific region. This includes not only trained service members and the right technology to support a large-scale conflict in the Indo-Pacific region but also maintaining the support necessary for large scale combat operations. This support will ultimately fall on the logistics supply chain, and the U.S. military industrial complex to equip the U.S. service members for any conflict that could occur.

Logistics is the name of the game for the U.S. military in the Indo-Pacific as, unlike their Chinese adversary, the Indo-Pacific demands that the United States traverse thousands of miles to deliver food, supplies, and medical equipment to its forces by means traveling in air, land or sea. Within the DoD, there are two Combatant Commands (CCMD) that will have to take on the brunt of this issue. First will be the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), as a functional CCMD they are assigned the responsibility to work with the separate uniformed services to supply the global U.S. force with the required equipment. Second, will be the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as this command will be required to supply their teams that are dispersed in unconventional locations with supplies that may be in significantly difficult to reach areas, also known as Denied, Degraded, Intermittent or Low-Bandwidth (DDIL) areas. This paper aims to identify a critical historic example, the Bamboo Fleet, that sheds light on potential ways that USTRANSCOM, USSOCOM and the supporting U.S. service members can think about to assist with the grander logistics issue in the Indo-Pacific.

The Bamboo Fleet 1941-1942

December 8th, 1941, the U.S. military forces and Filipino forces based on Luzon in the Philippines archipelago, learned that their fears had come true, that the United States was at war. Having heard about the Japanese air attack at Pearl Harbor, U.S. Army Air Force pilots were ready for their orders to launch and bomb Formosa (today known as Taiwan), counter attacking Japanese forces that were staged there. Their anticipation was not met by any such order, instead pilots were given the order to launch and defend from oncoming Japanese aircraft that were headed to bomb Luzon. As many aircraft had either launched early, or as they were at Clark Field, lined up on the airfield prepared to launch, many pilots and aircraft were unable to make it off the ground as Japanese bombers had surprised the U.S. forces. “The Japanese managed to demolish a majority of the planes at Clark Field, Nichols Field and Iba Field,” this destruction left the defending U.S. and Filipino forces with a minuscule air force compared to the hundreds that had been stationed their previously.[5] Across the airfields, the American’s realized that they had lost munitions, aircraft hangers, fuel and the aircraft themselves set ablaze after this attack, decimating any land based airpower that they could use to repulse the next phase of the Imperial Japanese plan.

A few days after the attack, on December 10-12, 1941, the Japanese landed 10,000 soldiers on Luzon, that were met with little land or air resistance.[6] Immediately pressuring U.S. forces on Luzon, General Douglas MacArthur was faced with a daunting decision whether to execute War Plan Orange – 3 (WPO-3) or not. This plan was created as the final defense of Luzon and U.S. forces on the Philippines where they would retreat to the Bataan Peninsula and the Island of Corregidor to hold out and defend against the Japanese forces. For almost two weeks, the Japanese faced resistance from the American’s and Filipinos on Luzon, until December 23, 1941 when General MacArthur decided to execute WPO-3.[7] Retreating to the Bataan Peninsula, the U.S. and Filipino soldiers defended a total of 100,000 people, 78,000 military members and about 22,000 Filipino civilians.[8] Each person requiring food, medical supplies and military equipment.

Many air crew members, maintainers, pilots and administrative airmen that served as part of the Army Air Force, were pulled to become infantry to support the defensive lines around Bataan, these airmen were called the Provisional Air Corps Regiment (PACR).[9] The other pilots from 34th, 21st, 3rd, 17th, 20th and 24th Pursuit Squadrons that were not part of the PACR, operated the Bamboo Fleet. “Cut off from any land supply, blockaded by sea and with no conventional military airlift assets available, brave Airmen under extremely austere and grueling conditions displayed the hardiness of spirit to procure, maintain and fly an eclectic group of military and civilian aircraft dubbed the Bamboo Fleet to ferry supplies and personnel to and from Bataan and Corregidor”, these pilots numbered between 12 and 15 that braved hazardous conditions to support the last stand at Bataan.[10]

Captains Harold Slingsby, Dick Fellows, Joseph Moore, Gus Williams, Ed Dyess, Ray Gehrig, Bill Bradford, Harvey Whitfield, Samuel C. Grashio, Ben Irvin, John Posten and William Cummings made up the daring team of pilots that provided essential air support to the U.S. and Filipino forces on Luzon.[11] These pilots operated a small fleet of military and civilian aircraft, including five operational P-40 Warhawks, one Grumman F2J4 “Duck”, two Bellanca CH-400 Skyrocket’s, one 1934 Waco UMF-3 Bi-Plane, two P-35s, four Beechcraft Model 17 Staggerwings, four O-49 Stinson Model 49 and one PT-130 “Kaydet”.[12] Many of these aircraft were patched up with native Philippine wood, or like the “Duck” was literally pulled out from being semi-submersed after being destroyed in the initial Japanese bombardment.[13] Nonetheless, the pilots and aircraft pulled through to conduct a few different types of operations.

As recalled by Dyess, “[…] the rest of February, through March and up to the fall of Bataan in early April we flew reconnaissance, brought in medical supplies from the southern islands with the Bamboo Fleet, and dropped supplies to our guerillas who were fighting in the mountains of Luzon.”[14] Outside of reconnaissance and supply runs, the Bamboo Fleet with their P-40s and P-35s went on a few bombing missions, attempting to degrade any additional Japanese landings on Luzon. During these bombing missions, the Bamboo Fleet used homemade delivery mechanisms that carried 30-, 100-, 300- and 500-pound bombs.[15] Every day the Bamboo Fleet found themselves flying nighttime missions. “The dangerously overloaded planes took off at dusk on hair-raising flights timed to reach their objective just as dawn was breaking. Sometimes missions were so urgent that the pilots had to fly during the day. When that happened, they would island-hop, flying at an altitude of no more than 500 feet, often just 100 feet above the water’s surface”.[16] These missions were meant to provide air support to soldiers on the ground, or run logistics operations, but the critical mission was bring the aircraft back to the airfields so that it could continue flying.

The resourcefulness of these pilots and their maintenance crew members, enabled the evacuation of between 100-120 personnel to Australia who would either be sent to the European theater to support air operations, or were kept in the Pacific to assist the U.S. operations in the Southern Pacific.[17] Additionally, the Bamboo Fleet was able to provide medicine, food and supplies that not only assisted with the defense of Bataan but also saved lives overall.[18] Uniquely, the Bamboo Fleet also assisted with boosting morale, as American’s that heard the engines of the Bamboo Fleet latched onto the hope of survival that these pilots brought, as well as the candy that they could bring. Capt Moore in the “Duck” was able to bring candy along with him that boosted the spirits of nurses on Bataan and those that the candy made its way to, giving the ”Duck” the name “The Candy Clipper”.[19] Although the Bamboo Fleet flew every day and continued to bring supplies for the defense at Bataan, unfortunately the U.S. and Filipino forces at Bataan were forced to surrender to the Japanese on April 9th, 1942. Even so, this historic example identifies a few key aspects that can inform USTRANSCOM and USSOCOM of the opportunities that Non-Standard Aviation (NSAV) can bring to combat operations in the Indo-Pacific region today.

Non-Standard Aviation Today

Today there are a few aircraft that support that vast majority of logistics missions for USTRANSCOM and USSOCOM. Within USTRANSCOM the heavy hitters regarding aircraft include the C-5 Galaxy, C-17 Globemaster III and the C-130 Hercules. While within USSOCOM their NSAV mission includes the M-28 Skytruck, Q-200, and C-146A Wolfhound.[20] The USSOCOM aircraft are typically painted in civilian schemes to provide a more clandestine profile and make them look less like military aircraft.[21] These are the bulk of airborne logistics operations that could be seen in the Indo-Pacific region. Yet each of them has a significant disadvantage when operating against the PRC in the DDIL environment during wartime operations. This disadvantage is that aircraft like the C-5 and C-17 are large targets the PLA would see as High Valued Air Assets (HVAA) since they both can carry a significant amount of people or logistics. As for the USSOCOM NSAV aircraft, they are each associated with special operations and therefore could be seen as high valued assets for the PLA to engage. Herein lies where the Bamboo Fleet can identify a supporting capability in the 21^st Century.