Outcome of India-Russia Summit and Implications for the Indo-Pacific

By: Indu Saxena & Hayat Alvi | December 14th, 2025

Figure 1: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin at India – Russia Business Forum in Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi / Image /PMindia.gov

          Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to New Delhi at the invitation of Indian Prime Minister Narender Modi marked a significant moment in India-Russia relations amid chaotic world politics. Putin’s grand welcome in India demonstrates further expansion of the “time-tested” and “privileged strategic partnership” between the two countries. Modi and Putin signed a joint statement and reaffirmed their commitment to enhance cooperation in trade, defense, energy, transport, space, science and technology, civil nuclear initiative, cultural, tourism, and people-to-people exchange.

          The highlights of Putin’s visit to India included setting the bilateral trade target of USD 100 billion by 2030. Russia’s assistance in helping India achieve a nuclear power capacity of 100 GW by 2014 would be highly significant. Additionally, India will import fertilizers from Russia, while Russia will source Indian pharmaceuticals and agricultural products. In his speech, Putin stated that Russia intends to supply “uninterrupted oil” to India. However, it remains uncertain whether India will increase its oil purchases. Conversely, India has decreased its oil imports following pressure from US President Trump.

          Over the past two decades, the United States’ strategic rebalancing toward Asia—embodied in its “pivot to Asia” and “Indo-Pacific strategy”—has significantly transformed India–US relations. India is recognized as a ‘major defense partner, a natural ally, and participates in a comprehensive global strategic partnership with the United States. Additionally, India is a key member of the U.S.-led Quad grouping, which seeks to counterbalance China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific region. This raises the question of how India can balance its relationship with Russia while remaining a key member of the Indo-Pacific and Quad partnership.

          When the Ukraine war started in early 2022, many strategic thinkers, particularly from the West (US and Europe), observed that the Russia-India partnership is linked with India’s reliance on Russian military equipment, which constitutes of its 70 % of arsenal. And it would gradually diminish as India started diversifying its arms supply from the US, France, and Israel, and India’s domestic production “Make in India” program. That didn’t hold, India still has about 80 billion USD in defense imports from Russia. Additionally, India’s key focus may now be on the procurement of next-generation, Russian air defense systems, the S-500 platform.

          Notably, the Russian S-400 defense system was utilized to protect from drone attacks launched by Pakistan during Operation Sindoor in May 2025. Notwithstanding, expanding on this contract, India may face US sanctions under the provisions of Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).

          Another challenge will be coming up with the BRIC presidency in 2026. President Trump perceives BRICS and its development, such as “BRICS Pay,” moving away from the dollar and promoting industrial development among its members and in the Global South, as a direct threat to America’s national interest. However, both India and the US want to improve trade relations soon and seek to strengthen bilateral relations. India has to carefully manage its relations with Washington at the bilateral level, particularly while holding the torch of BRICS presidency next year.

          Furthermore, the US National Security Strategy (NSS) 2026, rooted in the “America First” principle, recognizes India as a significant partner in the Indo-Pacific region. The NSS states, “We must continue to improve commercial (and other) relations with India to encourage New Delhi to contribute to Indo-Pacific security, including through continued quadrilateral cooperation with Australia, Japan, and the United States (“the Quad”). The United States seeks to expand commercial and other forms of engagement with India to further enhance the US-India relationship.

          However, the United States recently expressed concerns over India’s continued importation of Russian energy supplies, viewing such transactions as counter to American efforts to isolate Russia economically. By introducing punitive tariffs, the administration may have sought to signal its disapproval and encourage India to reconsider its energy alignments.  However, official statements primarily cited trade and security issues as the main justification for these actions, rather than explicitly linking tariffs to India’s energy dealings with Russia.  Still, India has to exact a delicate balance in relations with the United States concerning India’s transactions with Russia.

          Again, the US South and Central Asia Subcommittee Chairman Huizenga states that America’s partnership with India is a “critical” and “defining relationship of the 21st century” to establish a democratic, value-based, free, and open Indo-Pacific. Chairman Huizenga emphasized that the US representatives from both side of aisle have worked to strengthen the relations and noted that Putin’s “warm visit” to India and Modi’s presence in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) this September raised “understandable concerns.” He anticipates that a new trade deal would enhance the US-India partnership.

           India has to walk on a tight rope to sustain cordiality in India-US relations. India’s sovereignty and strategic autonomy provide it with the capacity to pursue a multi-aligned approach. However, as India expands its relations with Russia, it is important to exercise caution and maintain a delicate balance, particularly in managing its broader interests with the United States in the Indo-Pacific region. It is conceivable that Modi and Trump may serve as each other’s guests in 2026, with the United States hosting the G-20 summit and New Delhi presiding over the Quad summit.

Author’s Bio:

Dr. Indu Saxena is Senior Fellow & Chief Operation Officer at the Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers. She writes on U.S. India Relations, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Indo-Pacific Security. She writes “Indo-Pacific Weekly Mail,” a weekly newsletter on the Indo-Pacific region.

Dr. Hayat Alvi is an Associate Professor and the Khaled Chair in Political Science and International Policy, at Auburn University, Montgomery, Alabama. Previously, she served as an Associate Professor at the US Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

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