Saudi Arabia and Pakistan entered a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement on 17 September 2025, surprising many across the world. The pact’s key clause declares that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an “aggression against both” without enunciating any further details. This historic pact has come at a time when the Middle East has been shaken by some dramatic events like the Israeli-Iran conflagration of June 2025, US strikes on Iranian nuclear installations, Iranian strikes against US military Base in Qatar (though with no significant damage) and Israeli strikes on Hamas targets in Qatar. The pact has been widely welcomed across the Muslim world, particularly in Saudi Arabia and in the Middle East, given the heightening security anxieties amongst the oil-rich Arab states in the aftermath of unexpected Israeli strikes on Doha, a key security partner and ally of the USA. The agreement is also being ardently celebrated in Pakistan as a tremendous strategic and diplomatic success, especially in the wake of the recent India-Pakistan military confrontation of May 2025 and continued aggressive Indian rhetoric and posturing. Despite the explicit language in the key clause of the pact similar to NATO’s Article 5, and associated celebrations, non-availability of pact’s operational details has led to varying speculations by the experts around the world regarding its strategic play-out and operational parameters when it comes to provisioning of “extended deterrence (nuclear umbrella)”,  by Pakistan to Saudi Arabia against possible threats from Israel, Iran or Yemeni Houthis or the benefits that Pakistan may accrue from it in the event of another round of conflict with India. Ergo, the true potential of the agreement and its practical manifestations can only be verified after the release of further details by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan or after the pact has been tested in a real-time crisis. Nonetheless, based on expert opinions, geo-strategic and geo-economic ground realities, the pact does not come without caveats that both countries, and especially Pakistan, shall have to navigate in a challenging regional environment.  

          Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have a long history of friendship and cooperation dating back to 1951.  The first formal defense cooperation agreement between the two was signed in 1967, which was further strengthened in 1982 under the protocol agreement (allowing deployment of Pakistani troops in Saudi Arabia) as a consequence of events like the siege of the Holy Mosque in Mecca (1979), Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), and the Iran-Iraq War. Since the start of this relationship, Pakistan has trained over 8000-10,000 Saudi military personnel, stationed around 10,000 troops in Saudi Arabia during the first Gulf War (for defensive purposes only), deployed 20,000 troops in Tabuk and sensitive areas for training and operational roles, and both countries have been collaborating in counterterrorism and intelligence sharing besides conducting joint military drills on regular basis. Saudi Arabia has also bailed out the economically struggling country on multiple occasions. In 2023, the Kingdom signaled it would provide an $11-billion lifeline to Pakistan, as it faced default. Riyadh has also indicated its willingness to invest in an oil refinery and in mining and solar projects across Pakistan. KSA also hosts around 2.6 million Pakistani workers, who are a major source of Pakistan’s total remittances. Religion is another major factor binding the two nations together, with a host of religious parties in Pakistan enjoying considerable influence in Saudi Arabia and vice versa. It is also set to become Islamabad’s largest external financier in the 2025-2026 fiscal year (with over $6 billion in loans and deposits). Therefore, both Saudi and Pakistani sources have termed this agreement as a continuation and strengthening of the existing relationship and defense cooperation mechanisms to ensure security and provide deterrence against potential threats. A senior Saudi official commenting on the timings of the agreement told Reuters, “This agreement is a culmination of years of discussions. This is not a response to specific countries or specific events but an institutionalization of longstanding and deep cooperation between our two countries.”

Why Now?

While the agreement may have been under discussion for years, it’s signing at a time when the Middle East’s security landscape is in a state of flux and surprised many, leading to varying conclusions. According to Camille Lons, a Gulf expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations, the pact likely resulted from lengthy negotiations, and "We must be cautious in linking it directly to recent developments in the region, although the broader analysis that sees it as a response to growing Israeli power in the region and Saudi doubts about American security guarantees remains valid.” The unexpected Israeli strikes against Hamas leadership in Doha did shake the Arab countries’ confidence in US security guarantees, despite being host to American Military in the region, and rising security apprehensions in the region must have accelerated the event to culminate just eight days after Israeli strikes.

Additionally, Pakistan’s four-day conflict with India in May 2025 and continuing aggressive posturing by the Indian civilian and military elite, can also be considered as a catalyst in expeditious signing of the agreement, which, for Pakistan, at least projects a symbolic support of a powerful Gulf state that itself enjoys very good relations with India. For Riyadh, this defense agreement augments its security against threats from Israel, Iran, and Houthis, thus ensuring the creation of a conducive security environment for its oil-dependent economy as part of Vision 2030. Thus, changing geo-strategic and geo-economic realities of the Middle East, Saudi efforts to diversify its security, coupled with Pakistan’s own security calculus, seem to have played a vital role in a relatively expeditious finalization of the pact.

What does the agreement mean for Saudi Arabia and Pakistan

Gains for Saudi Arabia

The most important question under discussion amongst strategic experts and academicians is the actual operational parameters and implementation of the agreement by both countries during a crisis. Some experts are worried about the possible extension of Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, especially against Israel. However, history tells us that Saudi Arabia has never entered into a direct military conflict with Israel, and its role during the Arab-Israel wars, though significant, remained largely confined to political, diplomatic, financial, and symbolic domains, except for providing token military contingents, with limited autonomy, on various occasions. Hence, imagining a direct military confrontation between Israel and Saudi Arabia, with its strong relationship with the USA, in the future would be a really far-fetched idea.

Even if such a situation arises, extension of Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella to the Gulf State would be extremely challenging, given Pakistan’s own security concerns, her India-centric nuclear doctrine, her economic vulnerabilities coupled with rising US bonhomie and influence. The absence of any alarming responses from the USA or Israel on this agreement does indicate their implicit pre-knowledge of the pact and its possible strategic implications. Nonetheless, SMDA does send a strong but symbolic deterrent message to Israel if, in the eventuality that Saudi survival is at stake, it was to become a reality. The recent ceasefire and peace deal between Hamas and Israel, brokered by President Trump, if sustained and implemented, would reduce any chances of deteriorating relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states. However, another round of military action by Israel and its allies against Iran cannot be ruled out, which could complicate the situation for Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

Saudi Arabia has always considered Iran as its major opponent and a threat in the Gulf region and has used its influence to curtail any Iranian ambitions of becoming a regional hegemon or acquiring nuclear weapons. In the backdrop of Saudi nuclear ambitions, the pact has also raised nuclear proliferation concerns if Pakistan were to offer extended nuclear deterrence to the Kingdom. While Saudi Arabia’s own nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes as claimed, it has stated that the Kingdom “will have to get a nuclear weapon” if Iran gets one. Also, MBS has been quoted saying that he could simply “buy [a nuclear bomb] from Pakistan,” and the acquisition of nuclear-capable missiles. Such statements have obviously fueled the nuclear proliferation discussions; however, experts consider extension of Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia a complex and unlikely proposition given Pakistan’s own security calculus and nuclear doctrine, which is primarily based on deterring India. 

Despite Saudi apprehensions about Iran, the Iranian president has reportedly hailed the Pakistan-Saudi defense deal as the beginning of a “comprehensive regional security system” with various Iranian officials recommending that Iran join the pact. Since Pakistan has announced that other countries can join the pact, talks of a possible NATO-style Alliance between Muslim countries have also started to make news around the world. However, it would be too early to predict the realization of such an alliance in the near future. Overall, in the backdrop of Iranian ambitions in the region, its nuclear aspirations and support for Yemeni Houthis, and dwindling confidence of Gulf States in the US security guarantees, Saudi Arabia seems to have cut a good deal in ensuring its long-term security against the perceived threats and in enhancing its deterrence in the region.

Benefits and Implications for Pakistan

On the other hand, the agreement might have some challenging implications for Pakistan despite providing her with a strong diplomatic and economic partner in the region and raising Pakistan’s image and influence in the Muslim world. While Iran or Israel do not factor into Pakistan’s primary security calculus, its fundamental security concern remains her eastern neighbor. In view of the key clause of the agreement which states “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both’, what would be Saudi response in case of a conflict between India and Pakistan, given her growing strategic relationship with India? India is Riyadh’s second largest while Saudi Arabia is India’s 5^th largest trading partner with their mutual trade in the tune of 42.98 billion dollars in 2023-24. India imports 18% of its total energy requirement from Riyadh. Similar to China’s BRI, both Saudi Arabia and India are a part of the strategic multi-billion-dollar project IMEC (The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor) signed in the Delhi G-20 Summit in Sep 2023. Also, around 8-9 million Indians working in GCC countries (approx. 2.5 million of them work in Saudi Arabia, remitted $7 billion in 2024) remit around 38% of India’s total remittances (total $118 billion in 2023-24). In view of the deepening strategic economic ties between Saudi Arabia and India in particular and between GCC countries and India at large, it is highly unlikely that KSA would directly engage or send troops/equipment in an Indo-Pak military conflict.

As per the Indian foreign ministry, “India and Saudi Arabia have a wide-ranging strategic partnership which has deepened considerably in the last few years,” and expect Saudi Arabia to mind the mutual interests and sensitivities. The ministry also said that it would study the implications of the agreement. According to Sriparna Pathak, a professor of international relations at O.P. Jindal Global University in India says, Saudi loans and oil subsidies could “bolster Pakistan’s military capabilities which are singularly aimed at India”, adding that “Riyadh has a history of bailing out Islamabad, which causes moderate levels of concern in India”. While India is still assessing the possible security repercussions of the defense agreement, it appears that Saudi Arabia felt confident enough to formalize the defense agreement with Pakistan without putting in jeopardy its ties with Delhi. Ergo, despite the agreements’ NATO style language and ambitious Pakistani expectations, the probable Saudi support to Pakistan during peace and in case of an Indo-Pak conflict would most probably remain limited to financial, political, and diplomatic domains.

Expectedly, Saudi Arabia’s role, remaining short of compromising her ties with India, shall be limited to a generous financial support besides using her diplomatic influence to diffuse future Indo-Pak tensions. The Kingdom will have to tread extremely carefully, though, to balance her support for Pakistan in satisfying the terms and expectations of the agreement vis-à-vis her relations with India during the next Indo-Pak crisis. Likewise, India will also have to seriously evaluate the limits of possible Saudi response and support to Pakistan vis-à-vis her own relations with the Kingdom before embarking upon her next military action against Pakistan. The actual potential of the agreement and its practical manifestations, however, could only be tested during a real crisis, which is yet to be seen.

For Pakistan, in the expected absence of any meaningful Saudi support against India, the agreement could become a liability, complicating her existing security challenges. Firstly, the agreement could drag Pakistan into the Middle East arena providing a potential and much sought after “casus belli” for Israel and her backers making Pakistan (the nukes) a legitimate target; if at any point or for any reason this agreement or its potential is deemed a national security threat for Israel (ISPI has reported that the agreement could revive American and Israeli fears that Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs pose a direct threat to Israel). Israel’s growing boldness and impunity to attack her existing or perceived adversaries/threats could serve as a good reminder for Pakistani strategic pundits to wargame and evaluate possible future scenarios that may unfold. Also, a future normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations in the backdrop of the Abraham Accords could put Pakistan (being a strategic defense partner of Saudi Arabia) in yet another difficult situation by pushing her into the ambit of the accords against her long-stated policy of not recognizing Israel until the solution of the Palestinian problem. Pakistan’s highly charged religious internal dynamics might not allow such a move to go without serious internal instability.   

Secondly, despite China’s successful brokered Iranian-Saudi Arabia détente of 2023, in the case of a future standoff between KSA and Iran or Iranian-backed Houthis, Pakistan would find itself in a very difficult situation to stand by the agreement’s obligations. Pakistan needs Iranian cooperation in quelling the raging insurgency in Baluchistan, and at no cost would prefer another hostile neighbor, while its relations with its eastern and western neighbors are at their worst in history. Also, the majority of around 20% Pakistan’s Shia population maintains a revered attitude towards the Iranian Islamic regime, and any overt actions by Pakistan against Iran could seriously backfire for its already fragile internal security situation. Pakistan’s refusal to join the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen in 2015, despite Riyadh’s requests, could serve as a good example for the future.

Thirdly, the pact could push India towards a closer defense relationship with Israel if the former feels compelled by the probable operational manifestations of the agreement to enhance its national security. Although Saudi officials insist that the agreement is not directed against New Delhi, the symbolism of Riyadh formally binding itself to Islamabad cannot be ignored Although Saudi officials insist that the agreement is not directed against New Delhi, the symbolism of Riyadh formally binding itself to Islamabad cannot be ignored. Indian analysts suggest that this development could accelerate New Delhi’s defense partnership with Israel. Strategically, a formal defense arrangement between Israel (a close US ally) and India would be a serious challenge to Pakistan’s national security calculus aggravating its existing challenges.

Conclusion

To summarize, while the SMDA appears to be an outcome of years of negotiations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to cement their existing friendly ties, its signing has been accelerated by the recent events in the Gulf including Iranian and Israeli attacks on Doha forcing Saudi Arabia to diversify her own security arrangements amidst growing apprehension about US security guarantees against potential threats from Israel, Iran and Houthis. The agreement has definitely improved Pakistan’s image in the Gulf and Middle East as a reliable security provider and strengthened her exiting relationship with a strong economic power of the region to accrue much-needed economic and diplomatic support. The agreement appears to be beneficial for Saudi Arabia in symbolically extending and multiplying its existing deterrence against potential threats. However, it could become a serious challenge for Pakistan to navigate the agreement’s explicit and implicit obligations owing to her exiting security challenges and complex internal factors. Also, non-availability of detailed information about the operational parameters and protocols of the agreement has opened the doors to speculations and discussions based on the existing geo-strategic and geo-economic realities and therefore, the true potential of the agreement could only be tested during a real crisis in the future.

Author’s Bio: Air Cdre (Retd) Nasim Abbas Khan is a senior writer and researcher at Consortium’s South Asia team, Chief Strategy Officer, Privia Security, NATO and Allied forces, Istanbul, Türkiye.

Edited by Dr. Indu Saxena, Senior Fellow and Chief Operation Officer, CIPR.