Subsurface Threats: Submarine
Launched Cruise Missiles Threaten Future Allied Conflict in the Pacific
PDF Version
1Lt Grant T. Willis, USAF | May 28th 2023
Naval Strike Versus Land-Based Air Power, Fact &
Fiction
The primary branch of service responsible for the destruction of
the Hawaiian Air Forces on the ground, at their air bases on Oahu, on 7
December 1941 was the Imperial Japanese Navy; although naval aviation, it was
the Navy, nonetheless. Preparing for domains that are not commonly associated
with one’s service counterparts is difficult to foresee in peacetime before a
disaster is analyzed as obvious after the fact.
General “Billy” Mitchell’s prophecy of Pearl Harbor’s fleet and air power
being devastated by a Japanese naval force had been laughed out of the room as
preposterous. His vindication cost the
Pacific Fleet and the Army Air Corps dearly. Another forward thinker within the realm of military
theory was the techno-thriller Cold War author, Tom Clancy, whose work can highlight
methods of attack that are echoed within the naval strike theory presented at
Pearl Harbor against land-based air power.
One of the most
memorable “what if” novels displaying a conventional view of the Third World
War at the height of the 1980s was legendary Cold War author Tom Clancy’s Red
Storm Rising. Depicting modern
conventional combat between Red Army T-80s and US Army M1 Abrams main battle
tanks, the novel also included a “Third Battle of the Atlantic” in which Soviet
submarines, both diesel electric and nuclear classes, attempted to cut off the
vital supply convoys on their way from North America to resupply NATO forces
desperately in need of munitions and other materials to hold back the Red
Army’s attack across West Germany.
Another key vignette played out by the NATO navies and Soviet Naval
Aviation throughout the Cold War was the constant posturing for an intense
long-range air battle. The Soviet intent being to destroy the American carriers
using land-based long range naval bombers while the Americans and their F-14
“Tomcats” armed with AIM-54 “Phoenix” missiles trained to defeat the incoming
cruise missiles (Known as “Vampires”) and their launching bombers.[1] The ability for these land-based bombers to
effectively strike the American naval forces in the North Atlantic and the
Pacific could have decided the outcome of the Third World War.
Other than being a fantastic novel to read as a kid
aspiring to fly planes and drive tanks, when one analyzes Mr. Clancy’s flow of
the theoretical war between the Soviets and NATO one notices a key operation
conducted by three American Los Angeles Class nuclear attack submarines. As an active member of the United States
Naval Institute (USNI), Tom Clancy had compiled the available discussions and
professional military articles being written at the time by prominent naval
officers advocating the technologies and tactics that would be required to win
a potential “Third Battle of the Atlantic.”
The Backfire and Badger bombers of the Soviet Naval Aviation Regiments
had put a job on the American carrier groups operating in the North Atlantic,
sinking several cruisers, carriers, and damaging others with their long-range
cruise missiles. Their air bases on the
Kola Peninsula were out of range of standard NATO land-based air power and
naval aviation, but they were not out of range of a few tomahawks cruise
missile armed Los Angeles Class submarines with proper stealth and timing. As a multi regimental force of Backfires and
Badgers returned to base (RTB) after a strike on the NATO naval forces
operating in the North Atlantic, the three American submarines were lying in
wait off the coast and launched their missiles against the air bases that the
Soviet Naval Bombers required to land after their long flights leaving them low
on fuel and unable to divert to the other air bases. As the tomahawks impacted runways, taxiways,
parked aircraft, and support facilities, those bombers still flying were too
low on fuel to safely divert to an airbase that was not under attack
itself. The result was the destruction
of Soviet land-based naval aviation and the battle for control of the North
Atlantic Sea lanes were back in favor of NATO.
All due to the proper placement of submarine launch cruise missiles
launched at the right time and at the right distance. This was obviously a piece of historical
fiction, but it does raise eyebrows when thinking of possibilities for a modern
Pacific scenario.[2] Clancy gave the ironic name of “Operation
Doolittle” to this crippling strike launched by a few stout-hearted
submariners.
It is vital that our Air Force embraces the possibility that our
greatest threat to our ability to conduct land-based air operations in the
Pacific during a future great power conflict may be from a domain that is not
our counterpart’s air forces. An Air Force caught on the ground is not a force, but
an expensive series of static display models. According to the recently published
report on a series of war games conducted by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), “…ninety percent of aircraft losses occurred on
the ground.”[3]
This highly publicized report may have been conducted in an unclassified
environment, but its findings should be taken with extreme and delicate
attention and analysis. The threat of a crippling first strike may come
in the form of the sneaky underwater menace, launching precision weapons in the
opening blows of a Western Pacific operation to damage our response
capability. To combat this, we must turn
to our history to understand what has been done in the past, by our own
land-based air power during World War II as well as our naval aviation during the
Cold War era. Today,
in the Pacific, the United States and its allies face an integrated and
increasingly capable threat. The
People’s Liberation Army, Navy, Rocket, and Air Forces pose a serious threat to
the stability of the region and threaten to assault the democratic and de facto
independent island of Taiwan (Formosa).
The American Navy and Air Force are the United States’ front line to
deter this possible amphibious assault across the Taiwan Strait and our forces,
in cooperation with our Allies in the Indo-Pacific, must maintain vigilance and
combat readiness to ensure deterrence prevails over war. One key element to this deterrence is the
availability and lethality of our joint anti-submarine warfare (ASW) units. Lessons from our Air Force’s operations against
submarines during World War II and the Navy’s ASW forces in the Cold War era
may prove to be foundational pieces of a playbook upon which our modern
land-based air power professionals can develop joint doctrine necessary for
meeting modern ASW challenges in the Pacific region and across the globe.
The Air Force’s War Against Hitler’s U-Boats
After Germany declared war on the
United States on 11 December 1941, a group of long-range U-Boats were
dispatched to the shores of America to attack shipping up and down the Atlantic
coast. The operation, codenamed Paukenschlag or
“Drumbeat”, resulted in the sinking of over 200 vessels by some 20 U-Boats from
January to March 1942. This period would mark the so-called “second happy
time” noting the lack of heavy resistance from ASW forces upon the attacking
U-Boats. Seeing the convoy system as too passive, the US Navy failed to
properly provide protection for coastal shipping, leaving many vessels to be
sunk within sight of American citizens just off the coastline, witnessing the
silhouetted submarines marauding just beyond the beach. After this initial
disaster, the Americans would implement convoys and increase their air coverage
by utilizing reinforced Naval and Army Air Force land-based and carrier aviation.[4]
The
Eighth Air Force’s strategic bombing campaign against the U-Boat pens
and dock logistic support facilities did not represent the only anti-submarine
contribution that the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) made against
Hitler’s steel wolves. USAAF
anti-submarine squadrons conducted routine patrols and engaged U-Boats,
developing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that refined the battle
against the submarine threat against vital Allied shipping lanes. After 11 December 1941, America was involved
in a two-front war, the American Navy was woefully unprepared to maintain
land-based naval air patrols over the sea lanes and approach routes U-Boats may
use to stalk US shipping. North America was
divided into naval districts of responsibility in which air units would be
allocated to provide naval air patrols and conduct ASW operations, but the lack
of aircraft capable of performing this role immediately forced the Navy’s
leadership to come to a sharp conclusion that help was needed by the assets and
branch most available to fill the gap, the USAAF. Admiral Adolphus Andrews, commander of the
Eastern Sea Frontier (ESF) wrote, “There are no effective planes attached to
the Frontier, First, Third, Fourth, or Fifth Naval Districts capable of
maintaining long-range seaward patrols.”[5] The reply to Adm. Andrews’ concern was less
than satisfactory by the receipt of a few extra destroyers and a notice that
the availability of further ASW capable naval air assets was “dependent on
future production.”[6] The present problem for protecting shipping
from U-Boats and actively destroying them from the air fell on more flexibly
minded air leaders who saw the submarine threat as critical to the joint fight. With the need for anti-submarine squadrons,
the USAAF established the Anti-Submarine Command on 15 October 1942 under the
command of Brig. Gen. Westside T. Larson.
The I Bomber Command had been given the task of organizing the ASW
effort and the daily operations and strategic direction of the command’s
squadrons were placed under the operational control (OPCON) of the US
Navy. This made sense since the Navy new
the most pressing threats and the Air Force had the equipment to be used to
meet the naval challenges which the airmen did not fully understand.[7]
As the U-Boat war moved further from
North America, USAAF ASW squadrons forward deployed to England to work side by
side with the Royal Air Force (RAF) Coastal Command who had been conducting
land-based ASW operations against the U-Boats since the war began. Learning British TTPs and applying the latest
technology to the USAAF bombers would take the inexperienced American crews to
the next level and create a deadly force to assist in the offensive destruction
of the U-Boats. Although the USAAF’s
overall contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic was small in comparison to
other units, their combined operations alongside RAF Coastal Command from
November 1942 to October 1943 in the Bay of Biscay would prove to be the apex
of USAAF ASW combat experience.
The Bay of Biscay was a vast area
stretching approximately 300 miles from the north off Brittany, France to the
south off the northwest tip of Spain, spanning 120 miles east to west. It was an essential transit point for U-Boats
between the Atlantic and bases on the French coast. Luftwaffe air cover had
made it mostly off-limits to Allied aircraft, but by late 1942 the availability
of German planes was notably limited. The RAF bases in Britain could launch
patrol bombers to offensively cover this area and hunt the U-Boats on the
surface while they are in the vulnerable transit route between their coastal
bases in France and the Atlantic.[8] The technological battle between systems of
passive and active detection of submarines on the surface prompted the RAF to
request B-24s be equipped with microwave radar, which the U-Boats could not
detect. The primary weapon the USAAF and
RAF Coastal Command would employ for long-range land-based ASW was the B-24
Liberator and the USAAF 1st Anti-Submarine Squadron, under the
command of Lt.Col. Jack Roberts, was sent to Britain
to assist the U-Boat hunt. On 10
November 1942, the 1st Anti-Submarine Squadron flew it first
mission, assisting in the search for any Vichy French or Axis submarines who
attempted to converge on the amphibious assault groups involved in Operation
Torch. The squadron rapidly utilized
British TTPs and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for flight planning,
communications, and attack methods.
Afterall, the RAF were the experts in this realm after three years of
war and the Americans were still learning.
By January 1943, the 2nd Anti-Submarine Squadron joined the 1st
in Britain forming both units into the 1st Anti-Submarine Group
(Provisional). With the augmentation of two American squadrons, the RAF Coastal
Command’s No. 19 Group under Air Marshal Sir John Slessor planned a nine-day
ASW offensive in the Bay of Biscay for the month of February 1943. This was thought to coincide with the mass
return of U-Boats coming back to port from convoy battles in the North
Atlantic.[9] The Operation would be launched under the
code name, ‘Gondola.’
The
combined operation was launched on 6 February 1943, in which the American
squadrons flew over three hundred sorties, resulting in 15 sightings and 5
attacks. Utilizing the radar equipped
B-24s, the U-Boats were caught on the surface recharging their batteries with
the thought that being so close to home and notional Luftwaffe cover could
provide a needed moment of complacency.
On 10 February 1943, a B-24 named “Tidewater Tillie,” flown by 1Lt W. L.
Sanford of the 2nd Anti-Submarine Squadron, sank U-519 600 miles
west of Lorient. This marked the first
U-Boat kill by a USAAF crew. With the
American’s assistance, the RAF Coastal Command’s offensive combined with the
introduction of Navy hunter-killer groups centered around light escort
carriers, crippled Admiral Dönitz’s U-Boat fleet and
marked the end of the U-Boat as a primary threat to the vital shipping
necessary to build forces
preparing for Operation Overlord and the
liberation of Europe. After the
horrendous losses suffered by the U-Boat crews, Adm. Dönitz
protested the Luftwaffe’s lack of presence over the Bay of Biscay and the lack
of air escort. Twin-engine Ju-88 heavy
fighters were dispatched to provide needed cover from the marauding B-24s and
soon Americans of the 1st Anti-Submarine Group (Provisional) would
encounter some of the strangest dogfights in air power history in which bomber
was pitted against bomber. With the
upgraded heavy flak defenses placed on U-Boats combined with the heavy escort
fighters, the Americans were in for a stiff period of resistance. The USAAF ASW B-24s encountered Luftwaffe
heavy fighters on four occasions damaging two aircraft and losing one to enemy
action. Between November 1942 and
October 1943, sixty-five USAAF ASW crewmen and seven B-24s were lost in action.[10]
After early
failures to properly escort convoys with local air power, light escort carriers
were organized into task groups or ‘Hunter-Killer’ groups with a light escort
aircraft carrier at the center, supported by destroyers. These groups
were highly effective when working independent of convoys, giving their
commanders the latitude to aggressively sweep the area ahead of convoy lanes to
find, fix, and finish U-Boats before they could interdict the convoy trailing
behind. With the assistance of signals and other forms of Allied
intelligence operations, Hunter-Killer Groups could also locate and destroy the
limited in number and vital German supply submarines known as “Milk
Cows”. With larger hulls, these re-supply submarines could carry
everything a U-Boat at sea would need to stay in the fight from food stuffs to
extra torpedoes. Once these submarines were spotted and hunted down,
their loss would further limit the U-Boat’s on station time, forcing them to
home port and away from convoy lanes.[11]
In April
1943, Adm Dönitz upgraded U-Boats by discarding the deck guns on the bow,
replacing this space with more anti-aircraft guns. With this added
protection from allied aircraft, he ordered his crews to stay surfaced and
fight it out against the attacking aircraft. This order would bring
horrific results for the crews who had to carry it out.[12]
By May 1943, U-Boat losses were reaching staggering levels. The
coordination between the newly arrived escort carrier hunter killer groups and
long range ASW patrol aircraft alongside the order to stay on the surface and
fight allied planes led to Dönitz’s order to
withdraw from the North Atlantic.[13]
The joint multi
domain ASW campaign waged by the Allies against Hitler’s U-Boats prompted
similar developments during the Cold War, which would bring the anti-submarine
task back into the spotlight as a key capability to achieve deterrence amongst
the great powers.
After
World War II the Soviets, like their Nazi adversaries, looked to the submarine
as the primary naval strike weapon to cut the allied supply lines in a
potential NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation.
The anti-submarine realm became one of the hottest domains of the Cold
War. A cat and mouse game of sensors and
intelligence collection resulted in great chases between the hunters and the
hunted, continuously edging for a leg up in detection, deterrence, and if all
failed- destruction. Lacking substantial
bomber and land-based missile forces capable of striking the continental United
States, the Soviets placed cruise missiles on diesel electric submarines and
early nuclear classes. The 1950s and 60s
Cold War period saw significant adaptations by both the Soviet and American
Navies to develop capabilities and countermeasures to either launch atomic
attacks from the sea or stop them.
The Cold War and the Soviet Undersea Threat
One
of the primary objectives of the Soviet Navy in the early years of the Cold War
was to make the Continental United States subject to strategic attack by more
than just the medium range missiles and bombers available in the Soviet
Union. Threatening the security of
America’s heartland and her cities was key to Soviet deterrence due to a bomber
and missile gap that plagued Soviet strategic forces. Placing nuclear cruise missile and ballistic
missile submarines on station within launch distance of America was a priority
and equally imperative, the United States Navy’s ability to track these
submarines, hunt them down, and destroy them in the event of war before their
missiles could be launched was a national priority. Modifications to existing diesel electric
attack submarines such as the Whiskey “Long Bin” Class were upgraded with missile
launch tubes attached to the hull to carry SS-3-N “Shaddock” cruise missiles.[14]
Another
function of the Soviet submarine force was global commerce interdiction and
severance. Like German Admiral Karl Dönitz’s U-Boat strategy of WWII, if the masses of Soviet
attack submarines could flood the sea lanes and cut the vital sea lifelines
that connected the free world, the Soviets could limit the amount of supply
that the NATO Alliance could rely on during war time.[15] Classes of submarines such as the conventional
Whiskey, Romeo, and Zulu were designed with this purpose and would have been
the primary diesel electric targets for the Cold War US Navy hunter-killer
groups throughout the 1950s and 60s.
Diesel electric conventional and cruise missile submarines were the mass
of the Soviet submarine force, while in the late 1950s and early 1960s, newer
nuclear types were being introduced to eliminate the weakness of
diesel-electrics, having to surface or snorkel to recharge their batteries.[16]
Cold War Carrier Hunter-Killer Groups
To
counter the Soviets, the US looked to its World War II experience. Like the
light escort carrier centered hunter killer groups, the US Navy used to hunt
U-Boats in the Atlantic, the Navy adopted a new carrier-based hunter-killer
style solution to deal with the Soviets.
Older Essex Class carriers, updated with angled decks to
accommodate jet aircraft and new launch/recovery doctrine, were redesignated
from attack carriers (CVA) to anti-submarine support carriers (CVS) with new
air wings and upgraded destroyer escorts dedicated to detecting and destroying
submarines.[17] The carrier’s air wing consisted of twin
engine S-2 “Tracker” ASW aircraft armed with sonar buoys,
MAD,
depth bombs, ASW rockets, and air droppable homing torpedoes. Single engine A5D “Sky raiders” were also
used in the scouting and attack role to assist in the effort while HSS-1 “Sea
bat” helicopters were used to attack as and detect submarines by dropping buoys
and lowering dipping sonar below the waves while in a steady hover. Many carriers took on a detachment of 4 A-4
“Skyhawk” strike aircraft to provide limited combat air patrol (CAP) for the
carrier group.[18] Destroyers, many upgraded WWII variants such
as the Gearing Class, were fitted with a wide array of detection and attack
capabilities including ASW missiles, torpedoes, and remote control ASW
helicopter drones launched from an aft helicopter landing pad. These hunter killer groups were fast, mobile,
and deadly, but most importantly there were many Essex Class ASW
carriers and air wings to disperse across the globe while retaining many attack
and nuclear-powered carriers capable of projecting conventional and atomic air
power. The number of groups provided an
abundant and lethal force that, combined with a large fleet of land-based ASW
aircraft such as the P-2 Neptune and P-3 Orion, could work in close cooperation
to keep snorkels from recharging batteries and periscopes down if the Cold War
were to suddenly turn hot.
The Same Game with New Players
Today,
in the Pacific, the United States and its allies face a similar threat from the
Communist submarine forces, except this time the potential enemy does not
originate from Moscow, but from Beijing.
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is not heavily combat
experienced and lacks the tradition and continuity of the United States
Navy. This lack should not, however,
influence our interpretation of enemy capabilities on the day of battle. In other words, we should never underestimate
our opponent. The PLAN diesel-electric
submarine force is a large and capable strike force that must be taken
seriously. The American Navy today is
not the Cold War-era US Navy that contained over 600 ships and possessed enough
strength to convert masses of former WWII Essex Class carriers and
destroyers into dedicated ASW hunter-killer groups.
Today,
it will take masses of innovation, new technology, and modifications to adapt
to the growing threat posed by the Chinese.
Chinese nuclear submarines are few and can be expected to operate with
extreme care and tight political control.
Although their nuclear fleet remains limited in number, there are more
than 44 diesel-electric and air-independent powered (AIP) submarines that can
flood the zone in a pre-war crisis scenario that may stretch our globally
deployed ASW and submarine force thin.[19] The diesel-electric and air-independent
powered attack submarines such as the Yuan, Song, and Kilo classes are deadly,
capable of launching cruise missiles that can hit vital supply centers and
bases across the Indo-Pacific Region, crippling response times and logistics
nodes needed to counter an invasion of Taiwan.
US
carrier forces today consist of large deck nuclear-powered leviathans who are
targeted by land-based ballistic missiles, severely limiting their time on
station and potential proximity to the battle space. Their air wings are also designed to fight
for air superiority and conduct strikes against enemy land and sea forces which
will be unavailable if their carriers are far away from the battle area due to
the threat of land-based missiles. The
ASW air capability of the joint force in such a rapid crisis build up, while
maintaining global responsibilities in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and in
the Americas, will likely spread our forces thin. The maintenance standards of these aircraft
are also questionable regarding any global ASW coverage. A recent Department of Defense P-8 Poseidon
readiness report indicated findings that are below the standard 80% asset
readiness requirement finding that, “…October 2018 through March 2020, the
Navy’s mission capability rates for the P-8A Poseidon fleet were between 53 and
70 percent.”[20]
This is highly concerning due to the fact that this readiness report was
conducted to illustrate overall P-8 readiness to cover European
responsibilities which undoubtably indicate an emphasis on the Russian Baltic,
Black Sea, and Northern Fleets , and does not cover preparation and combat
readiness required to cover the Russian Pacific Fleet or the PLAN.
These
facts show that the US military is no longer the Cold War-era force which could
properly cover the majority of ASW threats to convoy escorts posed by Soviet
submarines in both the Atlantic and Pacific with a few squadrons to spare. An enemy who moves rapidly during a crisis
would benefit from our forces taking time to build-up and redirect from global
and domestic commitments.
The
time to plan and think about joint ASW operations is now. Our other
carrier-type ships consist of the amphibious assault ships used by the Marine
Corps for air support and amphibious landing operations. These ships are not intended to be fast
anti-submarine platforms and in the face of missile swarming attacks may not
last very long if it ventures far inside the weapons engagement zones
(WEZs). Our surface warfare ships such
as guided-missile destroyers and cruisers are few and will be needed to help
defend the carriers. Therefore, new
platforms and smaller existing ships like littoral combat ships (LCS) must be
built/modified to accommodate the need for rapid, mobile, and innovative ASW
hunter-killer groups. All of these will need to work with USAF and allied
land-based air to find, fix, and interdict enemy submarines. The lessons of the
past 80 years show the way.
Modern Manned and Unmanned Teams
A
new mixture of equipment and units will be required to enact a WWII-like
Hunter-Killer Group (HKG) concept. The
introduction of strike capable unmanned aerial systems (UAS), both sea and
land-based, working with manned and unmanned ships to find, fix, and in the
case of war finish enemy submarines will allow the Joint Force to dedicate the
larger portions of the Pacific Fleet to concentrate on the primary objective of
defeating the PLAN’s surface fleet.
Light carriers capable of carrying line of sight (LOS) and satellite
controlled fixed wing and rotary remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), utilizing
automated takeoff and landing capabilities (ATLC), which is now being
successfully tested to take-off and land from highways.[21] RPAs should be modified to assist in this
capability from both carrier-based and land-based delivery platforms. As the Air Force attempts to move away from
the Global War on Terror’s (GWOT) legacy platforms like the Reaper, we can look
to the future to modify our current fleet of existing aircraft to help offset
the costs of pivoting to the Pacific and the current great power competition
with Red China. Land-based Air Force
RPAs and several light carriers modified to carry RPAs can provide the HKG with
a persistent and lethal platform to cover large areas capable of enemy
submarine activity. Smaller, faster, and
losable light carriers with minimal personnel aboard can quickly respond and
cover large areas, providing more difficult targets to the PLA than our large
deck national treasures and their precious escorts. Littoral combat ship (LCS) types and unmanned
surface vehicles (USVs) such as the “Sea Hunter” can integrate with the RPAs
supported by manned assets to quickly respond to a contact or sighting and
either track or eliminate the enemy submarine as directed by the ASW group
commander.
The RPA Budget Wars
If
cost is a concern for this force modernization one may take comfort in the fact
that the existing Air Force fleet of MQ-9 “Reaper” RPAs, which have spearheaded
the Global War on Terror and the Air War on ISIS for more than a decade, are
the most cost effective and multi mission air weapons systems the United States
can operate. It costs less per MQ-9
flight hour than any other strike platform in the force.[22] The Reaper also happens to be extremely
adaptable to new methods of attack and reconnaissance.[23]
The anti-submarine mission is not only a fit for RPAs in a decreasing
counter-terrorism security environment, but it’s long on station time and
characteristics make the ASW fight an excellent fill for the Air Force’s
anxieties on what the future of the RPA in great-power competition looks
like. What was proven and remains so
effective in counter-insurgency operations can be adapted to real-time
near-peer deterrence across the globe, as well as protecting the homeland from
submarine-launched cruise and ballistic missile attacks.
Conclusions & Recommendations
A
sea mobile HKG, supported by manned and unmanned land based ASW assets can
create an ideal deterrent to the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) confidence
in its chances for success in a cross-channel Taiwan operation. With the winding down of America’s Post-9/11
emphasis on counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) operations, we
must retain our hard-fought experience in dealing with terrorism while refining
and sharpening our conventional, big-war style, doctrine and innovate
accordingly to meet the challenges of the future’s worst-case scenarios. Nuclear deterrence alone does not impede an
enemy’s willingness to use conventional force in a geographically isolated environment
to achieve political goals. The Russo-Ukraine
War has taught us that words alone do not dissuade a determined adversary.
It is also important to understand that
the fight we face in the Pacific is a joint one. All domains of warfare are required to
achieve victory in a naval campaign such as the Indo-Pacific, but one domain’s
failure can lose the war for all. An integrated systems approach to multi-domain ASW
can produce the necessary doctrine and pre-war training to effectively detect,
classify, localize, and if required kill enemy submarines before they can
attempt to interdict allied supply nodes and bases. A joint mindset and approach to covering all avenues of PLA potential
approaches to an attack will be necessary and this includes thinking outside
the box, utilizing all available platforms from all capable services that can
support this effort regardless of pre-war preconceptions of
responsibility.
Author
Biography: 1st Lt Grant Willis
Lieutenant Willis is a U.S. Air Force officer stationed at Cannon AFB, NM and a Fellow with the Consortium of Indo-Pacific
Researchers (CIPR). He is a distinguished
graduate of the University of Cincinnati’s AFROTC program with a B.A. in
International Affairs, with a minor in Political Science. He has multiple publications with the
Consortium, United States Naval Institute’s (USNI) Proceedings Naval History
Magazine, Air University’s Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (JIPA), and Air
University’s Wild Blue Yonder Journal.
He is also a featured guest on multiple episodes of Vanguard:
Indo-Pacific, the official podcast of the Consortium, USNI’s Proceedings
Podcast, and CIPR conference panel lectures available on the Consortium’s
YouTube channel.
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Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Historical Division, 1953.
“Evaluation of the Readiness of
the U.S. Navy’s p-8a Poseidon Aircraft to Meet the U.S. EUR.” Department of
Defense Office of Inspector General, May 19, 2021.
https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/2626880/evaluation-of-the-readiness-of-the-us-navys-p-8a-poseidon-aircraft-to-meet-the/.
Clancy, Tom, and Larry Bond. Red
Storm Rising. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1986.
Newdick, Thomas. “MQ-9 Reaper Has
Operated from a Highway for the First Time.” The Drive, May 3, 2023. https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/mq-9-reaper-has-operated-from-a-highway-for-the-first-time.
Williamson, Gordon. U-Boats vs. Destroyer Escorts:
The Battle of the Atlantic.
Oxford: Osprey, 2007.
Lardas, Mark, and Edouard A. Groult. Battle of the Atlantic 1942-45:
The Climax of World War II’s Greatest Naval Campaign. Oxford: Osprey Publishing,
2021.
Cancian, Mark F., Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham. “The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a
Chinese Invasion of Taiwan.” CSIS. Accessed May 23, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan.
[1] Tokarev, Maksim Y. (2014) “Kamikazes: The Soviet
Legacy,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 67: No. 1, Article 7.
[2]
Clancy, Tom, and Larry Bond. Red Storm Rising. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1986.
[3] Cancian, Mark F., Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham.
“The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan.”
CSIS. Accessed May 23, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan.
[4] Williamson, Gordon. U-Boats
vs. Destroyer Escorts: The Battle of the Atlantic. Oxford: Osprey, 2007, 7.
[5]
Assistant Chief of Air Staff Intelligence. US Air Force Historical Study No.
107 The Anti-Submarine Command. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Historical Division,
1953, 4.
[6]
Ibid., 4.
[7]
Warnock, A. Timothy. The U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II: Air Power versus
U-Boats: Confronting Hitler’s Submarine Menace in the European Theater.
Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1999, 7.
[8]
Ibid.,11.
[9]
Ibid.,11.
[10]
Ibid.,12.
[11] Lardas, Mark, and Edouard A. Groult. Battle
of the Atlantic 1942-45: The Climax of World War II’s Greatest Naval Campaign. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2021,
18.
[12]
Ibid., 30.
[13]
Ibid., 67.
[14] Breyer, Siegfried. “SOVIET SUBMARINES AS CARRIERS OF
MISSILE SYSTEMS (SSGN).” https://apps.dtic.mil. Naval Intelligence Support
Center, September 1983. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA135554.pdf.
[15] Manke, Robert C. “Overview of U.S. Navy Anti-Submarine
Warfare (ASW) Organization During the Cold War Era.” https://apps.dtic.mil/.
Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division, August 12, 2008.
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA487974.pdf.
[16] “” To Catch a Shadow ” 1969 U.S. Navy
ANTI-SUBMARINE Warfare Film P-3 Orion Aircraft 20854Z.” YouTube. Periscope Film
LLC, January 21, 2021. https://youtu.be/M8p6noWFq20.
[17] Stille, Mark, and Adam Tooby. Essex-Class Aircraft Carriers 1945-91.
Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2022, 11-14.
[18] Ibid., 46.
[19] LaGrone, Sam “Pentagon: Chinese Navy to Expand to 400 Ships by 2025, Growth Focused on Surface Combatants.” USNI News, November 30, 2022.
Pentagon: Chinese Navy to Expand to 400 Ships by 2025, Growth Focused on Surface Combatants
[20]
“Evaluation of the Readiness of the U.S. Navy’s p-8a Poseidon Aircraft to Meet
the U.S. EUR.” Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, May 19, 2021.
https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/2626880/evaluation-of-the-readiness-of-the-us-navys-p-8a-poseidon-aircraft-to-meet-the/.
[21] Newdick, Thomas. “MQ-9 Reaper Has Operated from a Highway
for the First Time.” The Drive, May 3, 2023.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/mq-9-reaper-has-operated-from-a-highway-for-the-first-time.
[22] “Reimagining the MQ-9 Reaper.” Mitchell Institute for
Aerospace Studies, December 7, 2021.
https://mitchellaerospacepower.org/reimagining-the-mq-9-reaper/.
[23] “Reimagining the MQ-9 Reaper.” Mitchell Institute for
Aerospace Studies, December 7, 2021. https://mitchellaerospacepower.org/reimagining-the-mq-9-reaper/.