Subsurface Threats: Submarine Launched Cruise Missiles Threaten Future Allied Conflict in the Pacific
1Lt Grant T. Willis, USAF | May 28th 2023
Naval Strike Versus Land-Based Air Power, Fact & Fiction
The primary branch of service responsible for the destruction of the Hawaiian Air Forces on the ground, at their air bases on Oahu, on 7 December 1941 was the Imperial Japanese Navy; although naval aviation, it was the Navy, nonetheless. Preparing for domains that are not commonly associated with one’s service counterparts is difficult to foresee in peacetime before a disaster is analyzed as obvious after the fact. General “Billy” Mitchell’s prophecy of Pearl Harbor’s fleet and air power being devastated by a Japanese naval force had been laughed out of the room as preposterous. His vindication cost the Pacific Fleet and the Army Air Corps dearly. Another forward thinker within the realm of military theory was the techno-thriller Cold War author, Tom Clancy, whose work can highlight methods of attack that are echoed within the naval strike theory presented at Pearl Harbor against land-based air power.
One of the most memorable “what if” novels displaying a conventional view of the Third World War at the height of the 1980s was legendary Cold War author Tom Clancy’s Red Storm Rising. Depicting modern conventional combat between Red Army T-80s and US Army M1 Abrams main battle tanks, the novel also included a “Third Battle of the Atlantic” in which Soviet submarines, both diesel electric and nuclear classes, attempted to cut off the vital supply convoys on their way from North America to resupply NATO forces desperately in need of munitions and other materials to hold back the Red Army’s attack across West Germany. Another key vignette played out by the NATO navies and Soviet Naval Aviation throughout the Cold War was the constant posturing for an intense long-range air battle. The Soviet intent being to destroy the American carriers using land-based long range naval bombers while the Americans and their F-14 “Tomcats” armed with AIM-54 “Phoenix” missiles trained to defeat the incoming cruise missiles (Known as “Vampires”) and their launching bombers. The ability for these land-based bombers to effectively strike the American naval forces in the North Atlantic and the Pacific could have decided the outcome of the Third World War.
Other than being a fantastic novel to read as a kid aspiring to fly planes and drive tanks, when one analyzes Mr. Clancy’s flow of the theoretical war between the Soviets and NATO one notices a key operation conducted by three American Los Angeles Class nuclear attack submarines. As an active member of the United States Naval Institute (USNI), Tom Clancy had compiled the available discussions and professional military articles being written at the time by prominent naval officers advocating the technologies and tactics that would be required to win a potential “Third Battle of the Atlantic.” The Backfire and Badger bombers of the Soviet Naval Aviation Regiments had put a job on the American carrier groups operating in the North Atlantic, sinking several cruisers, carriers, and damaging others with their long-range cruise missiles. Their air bases on the Kola Peninsula were out of range of standard NATO land-based air power and naval aviation, but they were not out of range of a few tomahawks cruise missile armed Los Angeles Class submarines with proper stealth and timing. As a multi regimental force of Backfires and Badgers returned to base (RTB) after a strike on the NATO naval forces operating in the North Atlantic, the three American submarines were lying in wait off the coast and launched their missiles against the air bases that the Soviet Naval Bombers required to land after their long flights leaving them low on fuel and unable to divert to the other air bases. As the tomahawks impacted runways, taxiways, parked aircraft, and support facilities, those bombers still flying were too low on fuel to safely divert to an airbase that was not under attack itself. The result was the destruction of Soviet land-based naval aviation and the battle for control of the North Atlantic Sea lanes were back in favor of NATO. All due to the proper placement of submarine launch cruise missiles launched at the right time and at the right distance. This was obviously a piece of historical fiction, but it does raise eyebrows when thinking of possibilities for a modern Pacific scenario. Clancy gave the ironic name of “Operation Doolittle” to this crippling strike launched by a few stout-hearted submariners.
It is vital that our Air Force embraces the possibility that our greatest threat to our ability to conduct land-based air operations in the Pacific during a future great power conflict may be from a domain that is not our counterpart’s air forces. An Air Force caught on the ground is not a force, but an expensive series of static display models. According to the recently published report on a series of war games conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “…ninety percent of aircraft losses occurred on the ground.” This highly publicized report may have been conducted in an unclassified environment, but its findings should be taken with extreme and delicate attention and analysis. The threat of a crippling first strike may come in the form of the sneaky underwater menace, launching precision weapons in the opening blows of a Western Pacific operation to damage our response capability. To combat this, we must turn to our history to understand what has been done in the past, by our own land-based air power during World War II as well as our naval aviation during the Cold War era. Today, in the Pacific, the United States and its allies face an integrated and increasingly capable threat. The People’s Liberation Army, Navy, Rocket, and Air Forces pose a serious threat to the stability of the region and threaten to assault the democratic and de facto independent island of Taiwan (Formosa). The American Navy and Air Force are the United States’ front line to deter this possible amphibious assault across the Taiwan Strait and our forces, in cooperation with our Allies in the Indo-Pacific, must maintain vigilance and combat readiness to ensure deterrence prevails over war. One key element to this deterrence is the availability and lethality of our joint anti-submarine warfare (ASW) units. Lessons from our Air Force’s operations against submarines during World War II and the Navy’s ASW forces in the Cold War era may prove to be foundational pieces of a playbook upon which our modern land-based air power professionals can develop joint doctrine necessary for meeting modern ASW challenges in the Pacific region and across the globe.
The Air Force’s War Against Hitler’s U-Boats
After Germany declared war on the United States on 11 December 1941, a group of long-range U-Boats were dispatched to the shores of America to attack shipping up and down the Atlantic coast. The operation, codenamed Paukenschlag or “Drumbeat”, resulted in the sinking of over 200 vessels by some 20 U-Boats from January to March 1942. This period would mark the so-called “second happy time” noting the lack of heavy resistance from ASW forces upon the attacking U-Boats. Seeing the convoy system as too passive, the US Navy failed to properly provide protection for coastal shipping, leaving many vessels to be sunk within sight of American citizens just off the coastline, witnessing the silhouetted submarines marauding just beyond the beach. After this initial disaster, the Americans would implement convoys and increase their air coverage by utilizing reinforced Naval and Army Air Force land-based and carrier aviation.
The Eighth Air Force’s strategic bombing campaign against the U-Boat pens and dock logistic support facilities did not represent the only anti-submarine contribution that the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) made against Hitler’s steel wolves. USAAF anti-submarine squadrons conducted routine patrols and engaged U-Boats, developing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that refined the battle against the submarine threat against vital Allied shipping lanes. After 11 December 1941, America was involved in a two-front war, the American Navy was woefully unprepared to maintain land-based naval air patrols over the sea lanes and approach routes U-Boats may use to stalk US shipping. North America was divided into naval districts of responsibility in which air units would be allocated to provide naval air patrols and conduct ASW operations, but the lack of aircraft capable of performing this role immediately forced the Navy’s leadership to come to a sharp conclusion that help was needed by the assets and branch most available to fill the gap, the USAAF. Admiral Adolphus Andrews, commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier (ESF) wrote, “There are no effective planes attached to the Frontier, First, Third, Fourth, or Fifth Naval Districts capable of maintaining long-range seaward patrols.” The reply to Adm. Andrews’ concern was less than satisfactory by the receipt of a few extra destroyers and a notice that the availability of further ASW capable naval air assets was “dependent on future production.” The present problem for protecting shipping from U-Boats and actively destroying them from the air fell on more flexibly minded air leaders who saw the submarine threat as critical to the joint fight. With the need for anti-submarine squadrons, the USAAF established the Anti-Submarine Command on 15 October 1942 under the command of Brig. Gen. Westside T. Larson. The I Bomber Command had been given the task of organizing the ASW effort and the daily operations and strategic direction of the command’s squadrons were placed under the operational control (OPCON) of the US Navy. This made sense since the Navy new the most pressing threats and the Air Force had the equipment to be used to meet the naval challenges which the airmen did not fully understand.
As the U-Boat war moved further from North America, USAAF ASW squadrons forward deployed to England to work side by side with the Royal Air Force (RAF) Coastal Command who had been conducting land-based ASW operations against the U-Boats since the war began. Learning British TTPs and applying the latest technology to the USAAF bombers would take the inexperienced American crews to the next level and create a deadly force to assist in the offensive destruction of the U-Boats. Although the USAAF’s overall contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic was small in comparison to other units, their combined operations alongside RAF Coastal Command from November 1942 to October 1943 in the Bay of Biscay would prove to be the apex of USAAF ASW combat experience.
The Bay of Biscay was a vast area stretching approximately 300 miles from the north off Brittany, France to the south off the northwest tip of Spain, spanning 120 miles east to west. It was an essential transit point for U-Boats between the Atlantic and bases on the French coast. Luftwaffe air cover had made it mostly off-limits to Allied aircraft, but by late 1942 the availability of German planes was notably limited. The RAF bases in Britain could launch patrol bombers to offensively cover this area and hunt the U-Boats on the surface while they are in the vulnerable transit route between their coastal bases in France and the Atlantic. The technological battle between systems of passive and active detection of submarines on the surface prompted the RAF to request B-24s be equipped with microwave radar, which the U-Boats could not detect. The primary weapon the USAAF and RAF Coastal Command would employ for long-range land-based ASW was the B-24 Liberator and the USAAF 1st Anti-Submarine Squadron, under the command of Lt.Col. Jack Roberts, was sent to Britain to assist the U-Boat hunt. On 10 November 1942, the 1st Anti-Submarine Squadron flew it first mission, assisting in the search for any Vichy French or Axis submarines who attempted to converge on the amphibious assault groups involved in Operation Torch. The squadron rapidly utilized British TTPs and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for flight planning, communications, and attack methods. Afterall, the RAF were the experts in this realm after three years of war and the Americans were still learning. By January 1943, the 2nd Anti-Submarine Squadron joined the 1st in Britain forming both units into the 1st Anti-Submarine Group (Provisional). With the augmentation of two American squadrons, the RAF Coastal Command’s No. 19 Group under Air Marshal Sir John Slessor planned a nine-day ASW offensive in the Bay of Biscay for the month of February 1943. This was thought to coincide with the mass return of U-Boats coming back to port from convoy battles in the North Atlantic. The Operation would be launched under the code name, ‘Gondola.’
The combined operation was launched on 6 February 1943, in which the American squadrons flew over three hundred sorties, resulting in 15 sightings and 5 attacks. Utilizing the radar equipped B-24s, the U-Boats were caught on the surface recharging their batteries with the thought that being so close to home and notional Luftwaffe cover could provide a needed moment of complacency. On 10 February 1943, a B-24 named “Tidewater Tillie,” flown by 1Lt W. L. Sanford of the 2nd Anti-Submarine Squadron, sank U-519 600 miles west of Lorient. This marked the first U-Boat kill by a USAAF crew. With the American’s assistance, the RAF Coastal Command’s offensive combined with the introduction of Navy hunter-killer groups centered around light escort carriers, crippled Admiral Dönitz’s U-Boat fleet and marked the end of the U-Boat as a primary threat to the vital shipping necessary to build forces
preparing for Operation Overlord and the liberation of Europe. After the horrendous losses suffered by the U-Boat crews, Adm. Dönitz protested the Luftwaffe’s lack of presence over the Bay of Biscay and the lack of air escort. Twin-engine Ju-88 heavy fighters were dispatched to provide needed cover from the marauding B-24s and soon Americans of the 1st Anti-Submarine Group (Provisional) would encounter some of the strangest dogfights in air power history in which bomber was pitted against bomber. With the upgraded heavy flak defenses placed on U-Boats combined with the heavy escort fighters, the Americans were in for a stiff period of resistance. The USAAF ASW B-24s encountered Luftwaffe heavy fighters on four occasions damaging two aircraft and losing one to enemy action. Between November 1942 and October 1943, sixty-five USAAF ASW crewmen and seven B-24s were lost in action.
After early failures to properly escort convoys with local air power, light escort carriers were organized into task groups or ‘Hunter-Killer’ groups with a light escort aircraft carrier at the center, supported by destroyers. These groups were highly effective when working independent of convoys, giving their commanders the latitude to aggressively sweep the area ahead of convoy lanes to find, fix, and finish U-Boats before they could interdict the convoy trailing behind. With the assistance of signals and other forms of Allied intelligence operations, Hunter-Killer Groups could also locate and destroy the limited in number and vital German supply submarines known as “Milk Cows”. With larger hulls, these re-supply submarines could carry everything a U-Boat at sea would need to stay in the fight from food stuffs to extra torpedoes. Once these submarines were spotted and hunted down, their loss would further limit the U-Boat’s on station time, forcing them to home port and away from convoy lanes.
In April 1943, Adm Dönitz upgraded U-Boats by discarding the deck guns on the bow, replacing this space with more anti-aircraft guns. With this added protection from allied aircraft, he ordered his crews to stay surfaced and fight it out against the attacking aircraft. This order would bring horrific results for the crews who had to carry it out. By May 1943, U-Boat losses were reaching staggering levels. The coordination between the newly arrived escort carrier hunter killer groups and long range ASW patrol aircraft alongside the order to stay on the surface and fight allied planes led to Dönitz’s order to withdraw from the North Atlantic. The joint multi domain ASW campaign waged by the Allies against Hitler’s U-Boats prompted similar developments during the Cold War, which would bring the anti-submarine task back into the spotlight as a key capability to achieve deterrence amongst the great powers.
After World War II the Soviets, like their Nazi adversaries, looked to the submarine as the primary naval strike weapon to cut the allied supply lines in a potential NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation. The anti-submarine realm became one of the hottest domains of the Cold War. A cat and mouse game of sensors and intelligence collection resulted in great chases between the hunters and the hunted, continuously edging for a leg up in detection, deterrence, and if all failed- destruction. Lacking substantial bomber and land-based missile forces capable of striking the continental United States, the Soviets placed cruise missiles on diesel electric submarines and early nuclear classes. The 1950s and 60s Cold War period saw significant adaptations by both the Soviet and American Navies to develop capabilities and countermeasures to either launch atomic attacks from the sea or stop them.
The Cold War and the Soviet Undersea Threat
One of the primary objectives of the Soviet Navy in the early years of the Cold War was to make the Continental United States subject to strategic attack by more than just the medium range missiles and bombers available in the Soviet Union. Threatening the security of America’s heartland and her cities was key to Soviet deterrence due to a bomber and missile gap that plagued Soviet strategic forces. Placing nuclear cruise missile and ballistic missile submarines on station within launch distance of America was a priority and equally imperative, the United States Navy’s ability to track these submarines, hunt them down, and destroy them in the event of war before their missiles could be launched was a national priority. Modifications to existing diesel electric attack submarines such as the Whiskey “Long Bin” Class were upgraded with missile launch tubes attached to the hull to carry SS-3-N “Shaddock” cruise missiles.
Another function of the Soviet submarine force was global commerce interdiction and severance. Like German Admiral Karl Dönitz’s U-Boat strategy of WWII, if the masses of Soviet attack submarines could flood the sea lanes and cut the vital sea lifelines that connected the free world, the Soviets could limit the amount of supply that the NATO Alliance could rely on during war time. Classes of submarines such as the conventional Whiskey, Romeo, and Zulu were designed with this purpose and would have been the primary diesel electric targets for the Cold War US Navy hunter-killer groups throughout the 1950s and 60s. Diesel electric conventional and cruise missile submarines were the mass of the Soviet submarine force, while in the late 1950s and early 1960s, newer nuclear types were being introduced to eliminate the weakness of diesel-electrics, having to surface or snorkel to recharge their batteries.
Cold War Carrier Hunter-Killer Groups
To counter the Soviets, the US looked to its World War II experience. Like the light escort carrier centered hunter killer groups, the US Navy used to hunt U-Boats in the Atlantic, the Navy adopted a new carrier-based hunter-killer style solution to deal with the Soviets. Older Essex Class carriers, updated with angled decks to accommodate jet aircraft and new launch/recovery doctrine, were redesignated from attack carriers (CVA) to anti-submarine support carriers (CVS) with new air wings and upgraded destroyer escorts dedicated to detecting and destroying submarines. The carrier’s air wing consisted of twin engine S-2 “Tracker” ASW aircraft armed with sonar buoys,
MAD, depth bombs, ASW rockets, and air droppable homing torpedoes. Single engine A5D “Sky raiders” were also used in the scouting and attack role to assist in the effort while HSS-1 “Sea bat” helicopters were used to attack as and detect submarines by dropping buoys and lowering dipping sonar below the waves while in a steady hover. Many carriers took on a detachment of 4 A-4 “Skyhawk” strike aircraft to provide limited combat air patrol (CAP) for the carrier group. Destroyers, many upgraded WWII variants such as the Gearing Class, were fitted with a wide array of detection and attack capabilities including ASW missiles, torpedoes, and remote control ASW helicopter drones launched from an aft helicopter landing pad. These hunter killer groups were fast, mobile, and deadly, but most importantly there were many Essex Class ASW carriers and air wings to disperse across the globe while retaining many attack and nuclear-powered carriers capable of projecting conventional and atomic air power. The number of groups provided an abundant and lethal force that, combined with a large fleet of land-based ASW aircraft such as the P-2 Neptune and P-3 Orion, could work in close cooperation to keep snorkels from recharging batteries and periscopes down if the Cold War were to suddenly turn hot.
The Same Game with New Players
Today, in the Pacific, the United States and its allies face a similar threat from the Communist submarine forces, except this time the potential enemy does not originate from Moscow, but from Beijing. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is not heavily combat experienced and lacks the tradition and continuity of the United States Navy. This lack should not, however, influence our interpretation of enemy capabilities on the day of battle. In other words, we should never underestimate our opponent. The PLAN diesel-electric submarine force is a large and capable strike force that must be taken seriously. The American Navy today is not the Cold War-era US Navy that contained over 600 ships and possessed enough strength to convert masses of former WWII Essex Class carriers and destroyers into dedicated ASW hunter-killer groups.
Today, it will take masses of innovation, new technology, and modifications to adapt to the growing threat posed by the Chinese. Chinese nuclear submarines are few and can be expected to operate with extreme care and tight political control. Although their nuclear fleet remains limited in number, there are more than 44 diesel-electric and air-independent powered (AIP) submarines that can flood the zone in a pre-war crisis scenario that may stretch our globally deployed ASW and submarine force thin. The diesel-electric and air-independent powered attack submarines such as the Yuan, Song, and Kilo classes are deadly, capable of launching cruise missiles that can hit vital supply centers and bases across the Indo-Pacific Region, crippling response times and logistics nodes needed to counter an invasion of Taiwan.
US carrier forces today consist of large deck nuclear-powered leviathans who are targeted by land-based ballistic missiles, severely limiting their time on station and potential proximity to the battle space. Their air wings are also designed to fight for air superiority and conduct strikes against enemy land and sea forces which will be unavailable if their carriers are far away from the battle area due to the threat of land-based missiles. The ASW air capability of the joint force in such a rapid crisis build up, while maintaining global responsibilities in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and in the Americas, will likely spread our forces thin. The maintenance standards of these aircraft are also questionable regarding any global ASW coverage. A recent Department of Defense P-8 Poseidon readiness report indicated findings that are below the standard 80% asset readiness requirement finding that, “…October 2018 through March 2020, the Navy’s mission capability rates for the P-8A Poseidon fleet were between 53 and 70 percent.” This is highly concerning due to the fact that this readiness report was conducted to illustrate overall P-8 readiness to cover European responsibilities which undoubtably indicate an emphasis on the Russian Baltic, Black Sea, and Northern Fleets , and does not cover preparation and combat readiness required to cover the Russian Pacific Fleet or the PLAN.
These facts show that the US military is no longer the Cold War-era force which could properly cover the majority of ASW threats to convoy escorts posed by Soviet submarines in both the Atlantic and Pacific with a few squadrons to spare. An enemy who moves rapidly during a crisis would benefit from our forces taking time to build-up and redirect from global and domestic commitments.
The time to plan and think about joint ASW operations is now. Our other carrier-type ships consist of the amphibious assault ships used by the Marine Corps for air support and amphibious landing operations. These ships are not intended to be fast anti-submarine platforms and in the face of missile swarming attacks may not last very long if it ventures far inside the weapons engagement zones (WEZs). Our surface warfare ships such as guided-missile destroyers and cruisers are few and will be needed to help defend the carriers. Therefore, new platforms and smaller existing ships like littoral combat ships (LCS) must be built/modified to accommodate the need for rapid, mobile, and innovative ASW hunter-killer groups. All of these will need to work with USAF and allied land-based air to find, fix, and interdict enemy submarines. The lessons of the past 80 years show the way.
Modern Manned and Unmanned Teams
A new mixture of equipment and units will be required to enact a WWII-like Hunter-Killer Group (HKG) concept. The introduction of strike capable unmanned aerial systems (UAS), both sea and land-based, working with manned and unmanned ships to find, fix, and in the case of war finish enemy submarines will allow the Joint Force to dedicate the larger portions of the Pacific Fleet to concentrate on the primary objective of defeating the PLAN’s surface fleet. Light carriers capable of carrying line of sight (LOS) and satellite controlled fixed wing and rotary remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), utilizing automated takeoff and landing capabilities (ATLC), which is now being successfully tested to take-off and land from highways. RPAs should be modified to assist in this capability from both carrier-based and land-based delivery platforms. As the Air Force attempts to move away from the Global War on Terror’s (GWOT) legacy platforms like the Reaper, we can look to the future to modify our current fleet of existing aircraft to help offset the costs of pivoting to the Pacific and the current great power competition with Red China. Land-based Air Force RPAs and several light carriers modified to carry RPAs can provide the HKG with a persistent and lethal platform to cover large areas capable of enemy submarine activity. Smaller, faster, and losable light carriers with minimal personnel aboard can quickly respond and cover large areas, providing more difficult targets to the PLA than our large deck national treasures and their precious escorts. Littoral combat ship (LCS) types and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) such as the “Sea Hunter” can integrate with the RPAs supported by manned assets to quickly respond to a contact or sighting and either track or eliminate the enemy submarine as directed by the ASW group commander.
The RPA Budget Wars
If cost is a concern for this force modernization one may take comfort in the fact that the existing Air Force fleet of MQ-9 “Reaper” RPAs, which have spearheaded the Global War on Terror and the Air War on ISIS for more than a decade, are the most cost effective and multi mission air weapons systems the United States can operate. It costs less per MQ-9 flight hour than any other strike platform in the force. The Reaper also happens to be extremely adaptable to new methods of attack and reconnaissance. The anti-submarine mission is not only a fit for RPAs in a decreasing counter-terrorism security environment, but it’s long on station time and characteristics make the ASW fight an excellent fill for the Air Force’s anxieties on what the future of the RPA in great-power competition looks like. What was proven and remains so effective in counter-insurgency operations can be adapted to real-time near-peer deterrence across the globe, as well as protecting the homeland from submarine-launched cruise and ballistic missile attacks.
Conclusions & Recommendations
A sea mobile HKG, supported by manned and unmanned land based ASW assets can create an ideal deterrent to the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) confidence in its chances for success in a cross-channel Taiwan operation. With the winding down of America’s Post-9/11 emphasis on counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) operations, we must retain our hard-fought experience in dealing with terrorism while refining and sharpening our conventional, big-war style, doctrine and innovate accordingly to meet the challenges of the future’s worst-case scenarios. Nuclear deterrence alone does not impede an enemy’s willingness to use conventional force in a geographically isolated environment to achieve political goals. The Russo-Ukraine War has taught us that words alone do not dissuade a determined adversary.
It is also important to understand that the fight we face in the Pacific is a joint one. All domains of warfare are required to achieve victory in a naval campaign such as the Indo-Pacific, but one domain’s failure can lose the war for all. An integrated systems approach to multi-domain ASW can produce the necessary doctrine and pre-war training to effectively detect, classify, localize, and if required kill enemy submarines before they can attempt to interdict allied supply nodes and bases. A joint mindset and approach to covering all avenues of PLA potential approaches to an attack will be necessary and this includes thinking outside the box, utilizing all available platforms from all capable services that can support this effort regardless of pre-war preconceptions of responsibility.
Author Biography: 1st Lt Grant Willis
Lieutenant Willis is a U.S. Air Force officer stationed at Cannon AFB, NM and a Fellow with the Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers (CIPR). He is a distinguished graduate of the University of Cincinnati’s AFROTC program with a B.A. in International Affairs, with a minor in Political Science. He has multiple publications with the Consortium, United States Naval Institute’s (USNI) Proceedings Naval History Magazine, Air University’s Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (JIPA), and Air University’s Wild Blue Yonder Journal. He is also a featured guest on multiple episodes of Vanguard: Indo-Pacific, the official podcast of the Consortium, USNI’s Proceedings Podcast, and CIPR conference panel lectures available on the Consortium’s YouTube channel.
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Cancian, Mark F., Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham. “The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan.” CSIS. Accessed May 23, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan.
 Tokarev, Maksim Y. (2014) “Kamikazes: The Soviet Legacy,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 67: No. 1, Article 7.
 Clancy, Tom, and Larry Bond. Red Storm Rising. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1986.
 Cancian, Mark F., Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham. “The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan.” CSIS. Accessed May 23, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan.
 Williamson, Gordon. U-Boats vs. Destroyer Escorts: The Battle of the Atlantic. Oxford: Osprey, 2007, 7.
 Assistant Chief of Air Staff Intelligence. US Air Force Historical Study No. 107 The Anti-Submarine Command. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Historical Division, 1953, 4.
 Ibid., 4.
 Warnock, A. Timothy. The U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II: Air Power versus U-Boats: Confronting Hitler’s Submarine Menace in the European Theater. Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1999, 7.
 Lardas, Mark, and Edouard A. Groult. Battle of the Atlantic 1942-45: The Climax of World War II’s Greatest Naval Campaign. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2021, 18.
 Ibid., 30.
 Ibid., 67.
 Breyer, Siegfried. “SOVIET SUBMARINES AS CARRIERS OF MISSILE SYSTEMS (SSGN).” https://apps.dtic.mil. Naval Intelligence Support Center, September 1983. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA135554.pdf.
 Manke, Robert C. “Overview of U.S. Navy Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Organization During the Cold War Era.” https://apps.dtic.mil/. Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division, August 12, 2008. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA487974.pdf.
 Stille, Mark, and Adam Tooby. Essex-Class Aircraft Carriers 1945-91. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2022, 11-14.
 Ibid., 46.
 LaGrone, Sam “Pentagon: Chinese Navy to Expand to 400 Ships by 2025, Growth Focused on Surface Combatants.” USNI News, November 30, 2022.
 “Evaluation of the Readiness of the U.S. Navy’s p-8a Poseidon Aircraft to Meet the U.S. EUR.” Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, May 19, 2021. https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/2626880/evaluation-of-the-readiness-of-the-us-navys-p-8a-poseidon-aircraft-to-meet-the/.
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