Sudan and Russia: What the conflict and the relationship means for the Indo-Pacific Theater

By: Brendan H.J. Donnelly | February 16^th, 2025

Sudan has seen its fair share of conflict, corruption, and disagreements over the last 100 years. Although these instances of contention may not have impacted many nations globally, in the current theater of the Indo-Pacific, what happens to Sudan in eastern Africa should be noticed by the United States and their allies. Since 1899 while Sudan was under the control of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (control by Egypt and the United Kingdom) the most significant resource was land. Land in Sudan allowed for people to maintain their livelihood by using it for agriculture, cattle-herding, access to water, access to subterranean oil, and of course land meant wealth and power in the country as well.[1] The key theme in Sudan is who controls the land, and recent history will prove this to be true through the two Sudanese civil wars and ongoing conflict in 2025. This history leads to what has been in the news throughout 2023 and 2024, and the relationships between Russia and Sudan will illuminate the impact to the Indo-Pacific theater.

To understand why conflict has flared up in Sudan this past year it is critical to start with the First Sudanese Civil War in 1955. This war was between the Sudanese in the South fighting against the Northern Sudanese, where South Sudan wanted representation in government and autonomy over their land. Not only was this civil war a land dispute but also an ethnic and religious conflict as well.[2] The ethnicities were between Arabs and non-Arabs, while religion was between Christianity and Islam. After 17 years at war there was the creation of the regional autonomy for South Sudan. This arrangement lasted just 11 years until 1983, when the Second Sudanese Civil War started. In many ways the second civil war was a continuation of the hostilities from the first civil war, due to the start of the second being the Central Sudanese were expanding land claims and control into South Sudan. Thus, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) formed and fought against the Sudanese Army in the second civil war. The SPLA’s goal was to recreate an autonomous South Sudan so to not be under the control of the Sudanese government anymore.[3] Six years after the end of the civil war in 2005, South Sudan became its own sovereign nation in 2011.

Even with South Sudan now its own nation, in Sudan there was still discord between ethnic groups, competing claims to land, political corruption and access to resources. In 2019, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) Army Chief Abdel-Fattah al-Burham and Rapid Support Forces Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo staged a coup against President Omar al-Bashir. President Bashir had been in power then for thirty years and was ousted due to his political corruption, violence and charges over war crimes in the War of Darfur. The War of Darfur took place between 2003-2010 when the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement attacked the Sudanese government over the oppression of black Sudanese by the majority Arab government. This oppression was called out to be a genocide by the International Criminal Court (ICC) but President Bashir denied these claims.[4] Even after the coup by Chief Burham and Commander Dagalo, President Bashir was not turned over to the ICC. After the coup in 2019 Sudan was under the rule of a Transitional Military Council until conflict arose again in April of 2023.

Tensions burst between Chief al-Burham and Commander Dagalo over disagreements of who had control over the government, key military sites, and land within Darfur and Kordofan regions. Not only between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and SAF but ethnic fighting has started as well. During the conflict since April a few developments added more organizations to the mix of the conflict. In June 2023, the Sudanese People Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) joined the conflict and backed the SAF. As July came the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM-T) also came to support the SAF.[5] Then in August the Tamazuj rebel movement join the RSF to fight against the SAF.[6] These additional actors complicate the ground picture and ensure that the conflict will continue and struggle to come to an agreement. with all these factions, the critical actor in the conflict is the one that does not want to be seen. The relationship between Russia and Sudan has been known for years on the diplomatic level, but has since developed into military support.

Russia seeks to maintain a strong relationship with Sudan to build a naval port on the Red Sea. In early 2023, the Sudanese leadership reviewed Russia’s proposal for a naval base at the Port of Sudan. Sudan agreed to the Russian proposal on two conditions: first that Russia would send weapons and equipment to Sudan, and that the agreement would be executed once the Sudanese government had transitioned from the Transitional Military Council to a legislative body.[8] The breakout of violence in April has halted this deal between Sudan and Russia since Commander Dagalo and Chief al-Burhan cannot come to an agreement on the legislative body. Although, Commander Dagalo was one of the key leaders that supported the Russian base the most, and other reporting identified that the Russian paramilitary organization, the Wagner Group, was supplying weapons and equipment to the RSF for access to gold in Sudan until April 2024.[9] Since April, Wagner and Russia have shifted their support to the SAF for the same purpose of maintaining access to a port in Sudan.[10]

This relationship between the RSF, SAF, Wagner and Russia should be a concern for the United States, and their allies in the Indo-Pacific Region. The agreement states that the Russian naval base on the Red Sea permits the permanent station of 300 Russian troops, while also allowing the station of up to four naval vessels simultaneously to include nuclear power vessels as well.[11] This type of naval base provides the same capability to Russia as the People Republic of China (PRC) have in Djibouti at Doraleh. The PRC maintain their naval base at Doraleh to maintain access to Eastern Africa, the Red Sea, and to the Indian Ocean. For the Russians, a naval base in Sudan provide access to the Red Sea, access to Eastern Africa, and to the Indian Ocean, which previously was more difficult to access for the Russians. Instead, Russia maintained a larger presence in the Pacific Ocean and the East China Sea out of Vladivostok.

The combination of the PRC and Russia both having a naval base in East Africa changes the dynamic of the Indo-Pacific region. The United States maintains a global naval presence, that has been a difficult geostrategic asset for the PRC and Russia to challenge. But, the naval bases in East Africa, help in the ability for the Russian and Chinese navies to challenge the freedom of movement for the U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea. Aside from the military aspects, the relationship with Russia and Sudan also opens an economic issue as well for the United States. To subdue an adversary in war, cutting of supplies, economic support and physical routes, is a necessary movement. With the creation of a Russian naval port in Sudan, Russia can maintain access to gold, and physical trade routes in the Red Sea to support war time efforts beyond their main borders.

Finally, the diplomatic problem that will arise once the Russian naval base is built in Sudan, is that Russian influence in Eastern Africa can grow. The United States still relies on their military, economic and diplomatic relations in Eastern Africa not only for support to the continent, but to also support missions in the Indo-Pacific theater. As Russian influence grows in Eastern Africa, there is a great potential for a decrease in relations with Eastern African nations and the United States. This diplomatic issue, only grows more critical as both Russia and the PRC use naval bases in Eastern Africa for the same reasons, and to interfere with the United States strategic objectives in Africa and the Indo-Pacific.

All in all, although at face value, the conflict in 2024 between the SAF and RSF doesn’t connect to Russia, upon further analysis, it is the relationship between Russia and Sudan, more specifically the RSF that identifies troubling issues. These issues namely will impact U.S. economic missions, military operations, and diplomatic relations in the Indo-Pacific and Eastern Africa. As the conflict in Sudan continues, and the military support to the RSF from the Wagner group also continues, the looming deal for a Russian base in Sudan becomes more threatening each day. Once the conflict in Sudan is over, their government is decided, and the Russian influence and military expansion in East Africa comes to fruition, U.S. objectives and missions in the Indo-Pacific have new threats and complexities to them immediately, and soon. 

Brendan Donnelly is a Fellow with the Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers (CIPR). He has an undergraduate degree in History with a double minor in Political Science and Aerospace Leadership Studies from Bowling Green State University in Ohio. Brendan additionally has a graduate degree in Global Security Studies with a specialization in National Security from Angelo State University in Texas. He has published multiple articles with the Consortium and Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (JIPA). Finally, he is also featured as a moderator and guest on the Vanguard: Indo-Pacific podcast series and has served as an academic mentor to interns with the consortium.