Abrams Under the White Sun: New American-Made Tanks for
Taiwan
PDF Version
By:
Grant T. Willis and Brendan H.J. Donnelly | January 18th, 2025
In December 2024, four significant events took place between
Taiwan (aka. The Republic of China) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
First, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te took his first overseas trip in the
Indo-Pacific visiting Palau, the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, Hawaii and Guam.[1]
Likely in response to this trip, the PRC deployed 90 People’s Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN) vessels and Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels, accompanied by 47-53
aircraft in the East and South China Seas to conduct their largest naval
exercise since 1996.[2]
This exercise simulated blocking foreign intervention in the First Island
Chain, and came unannounced days after President Lai’s trip. The PRC likely
intends to keep Taiwan and President Lai on their guard, demonstrating the
PLA’s ability to launch large scale operations around Taiwan anytime. As this
exercise, tensions between CCG vessels in the South China Sea and the previous
Joint Sword 2024A & B taking place in May and October of 2024, increase
pressure on Taiwan, the Taiwanese Presidential office hosted their own exercise
concerned with defending the island against the PRC. Also in December, dozens
of central and local government agencies as well as civil groups participated
in a three-hour long tabletop exercise that simulated high intensity conflict
with China and how to respond when the island is “on the verge of conflict”
with China.[3]
Taiwan must study defensive methods
against the PRC as the PLA and CCG continue to “normalize” their presence in
the South and East China Seas, and cross into Taiwanese controlled territory.[4]
Further, PRC President Xi Jinping re-established the goals for China in his
2024 New Years message, “China will surely be reunified, and all Chinese on
both sides of the Taiwan Strait should be bound by a common sense of purpose
and share in the glory of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”, pointing to
the Chinese goals of rejuvenation which ultimately includes the claimed
“reunification” with Taiwan.[5] Clearly,
the PRC is working to maintain a constant pressure on Taiwan as the current
administration seeks more “separatist” activities, and Taiwan also prepares its
military, government and society for the threat of a PRC emergency.
New Armor Arrives in Taipei
As Taiwan continues to prepare its
military for a PRC emergency, on December 15, 2024, Taipei received its first
delivery of 38 American M1A2T Abrams main battle tanks, with a total of 108 to
be sent to Taiwan by 2026. The new tanks are designated “T” for Taiwan and mark
a new generational leap forward in the ROC armored corps. The majority of
Taiwan’s armored force has always been U.S. made but were upgraded versions of
older M60 or M48 main battle tanks which were mostly used during the Cold War
era.[6]
These Abrams variants are customized M1A2 SEPv2s and will be the first new
tanks Taiwan has acquired in almost 25 years. In a piece for Defense News,
a Taiwan Defense analyst, Chen Kuoming commented that
the new batch of weapons were intended to defend the island’s capital, Taipei,
outfitting two new armored brigades based in Linkou,
Taipei and Hukou, Hsinchu. Chen continued by pointing out that although
powerful pieces of armor, 108 Abrams are insufficient to replace the total
force of armored vehicles in Taiwan’s Army and cannot cover southern and
central Taiwan without further shipments. The Abrams are seen as a final line
of defense for the capital in the event of a Communist Chinese invasion of the democratic
island. Chen offered, “From
the Russia-Ukraine war, we’ve seen drones and loitering munitions attacking
tanks”.[7]
The need to provide protection to these precious new tanks from such an attack
is obvious. Taiwan also received its first installment of U.S. made HIMARS
(High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) units complete with AGM-140 ATACMS
(Army Tactical Missile System) long range missiles assigned to Taichung on the
west central coast’s 58th Artillery Command. These units have a range of 186
miles, placing the Chinese mainland at risk.[8]
This arms package, originally agreed to
by President Donald Trump’s administration in 2019 will see projected
fulfillment by 2026. According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), “The
new tanks will strengthen coastal defense capabilities and help to further
modernize Taiwan’s aging tank fleet. The tanks will also help to expand
interoperability with the United States and several partners. The Abrams tanks’
defense capabilities will be particularly effective against China’s emerging
Type 05 amphibious fighting vehicles […]”.[9]
The PRC responded, “[…] denying that Taiwan had its own Ministry of National
Defense and urging the United States to abide to the one-China principle, which
states that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and the PRC is the sole
legitimate government of that China.[10]
The United States does not recognize the one-China principle but instead
maintains a “one-China policy”, where the PRC is the “sole legal government of
China”, but the United States does not recognize Chinese sovereignty over
Taiwan.[11]
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Lin Jian highlighted the U.S.-PRC
1982 Joint Communique during the normalization of relations, which the PRC
claims preclude the US from selling arms to Taiwan. The U.S. and PRC did not
settle the question of arms sales to Taiwan during negotiations regarding the
normalization of relations, and the United States’ policy dictates that its
arms sales to Taiwan depend on the PRC’s commitment to a peaceful resolution of
its differences with Taiwan. The PRC’s response is consistent with its past
condemnations of U.S. weapon shipments to Taiwan, such as the approval of a $2
billion weapons agreement in late October. Such statements aim to delegitimize
both the ROC government and U.S. support for the ROC.”[12]
Island Armored Warfare in the Pacific: A Historical Context
During World War II, Imperial Japan had
never been known as a mainstay in the development of armored doctrine. Compared
to its Axis Ally in Nazi Germany, Japan did not place emphasis on its armored
corps to ever rival the exploits of expert panzer practitioners like Rommel, Guderian,
or Manstein. The primary motivation for any
improvement to Japanese Tanks and armored doctrine was due to a stunning defeat
for Japanese forces in 1939 at Khalkhin Gol by Soviet
Far East Forces commanded by Georgy Zhukov.[13]
As World War II in the Indo-Pacific
expanded, the American led Allied counter offensives across the south and
central pacific converged upon Japan’s pacific defense perimeter, clashes
between American and Japanese tanks became more frequent and demonstrative of
their value in island warfare. The mismanagement of American armored formations
in the defense of the Philippines from 1941-42 showcased the need for
improvement in the use of mobile firepower in what many observe as a light
infantry contest in the Pacific.
By 1944-45, the Battles in the Marianas
and General Douglas MacArthur’s liberation of the Philippines saw some of the
largest engagements between American and Japanese armor. In Saipan, the larger
size of the island and nature of the terrain allowed significant armored action
by both sides. For the defense of the Marianas, Japan committed the 9th Tank
Regiment as well as attached light armored units under the Imperial Navy’s
Special Naval Landing Forces (SNLF) to provide a mobile armored component to
the garrisons at Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. In Saipan, the U.S. 2nd and 4th
Marine Divisions, along with the Army’s 27th Infantry Division fought a series
of bitter battles to secure the island. The Americans on Saipan committed both
Army and Marine Tank battalions in mass to not only fight off fanatical Banzai
charges and dug in infantry and artillery positions but faced a series of
assaults from elements of the Imperial 9th Tank Regiment and the SNLF
amphibious light tanks. The Japanese armor encompassed both medium and light
tanks such as the type 97 Shinhoto Chi-Ha with an
upgraded 47mm main gun or the type 95 Ha-Go respectively. Although the newer
Type 97 Shinhoto were better equipped, they could
hardly stand up against the American M5A1 Stuart light tank let alone have a
chance of penetrating the frontal armor of an M4 Sherman medium tank. With the
9th Tank Regiment split up into smaller units amongst the Marianas, their
limited firepower could not be concentrated. Only the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Tank
companies were stationed on Saipan alongside 9 SNLF light tanks. The American
Armored historian Steven Zaloga describes Saipan’s tank combat:
“On the night of 15 June, a Japanese
SNLF raiding party, supported by several Type 2 Ka-mi amphibious tanks, landed
near Garapan on the left flank of the northern beaches. The Marines called in
naval star shell illumination, and the Type 2s soon fell victim to Marine
bazookas and tank guns. This was the first wide scale use of bazookas in the Pacific
and marked yet another disadvantage faced by the Japanese tankers. At dawn, the
Japanese SNLF Type 95 Ha-Go company and the 4th Co., 9th Tank Regiment attacked
the beachhead with supporting infantry. They were devastated by tank fire from
the two Marine battalions. On 16 June, the Army’s 27th Division landed,
supported by Co. B (M4A2) and Co. D (M5A1) of the 762nd Tank Battalion, and Co.
D (M5A1) of the 766th Tank Battalion. The steady progress of U.S. forces led
Vice-Admiral Nagumo to order Army garrison commander Lt. Gen. Saito, to launch
an all-out counterattack on the night of 16-17 June. Spearheading the attack
were 44 tanks of Col Hideki Goto’s 9th Tank Regiment. Marines could hear the
Japanese tank engines while they were loaded with troops from the 136th
Infantry Regiment in the town of Garapan. The Marines requested tank support
and received a M4A2 platoon from Co. A, 2nd Marine
Tank Battalion and several M3 75mm SPM halftracks. The largest single Japanese
tank attack of the Pacific war started at 0200 on the morning of 17 June. The
Japanese tank attack came across open ground, and naval star shells quickly
illuminated the tanks. The Marines began firing with bazooka and 37mm anti-tank
guns, knocking out several. In the confusion, several Japanese tanks strayed
into nearby marshes and soon became trapped. Several tanks reached Marine lines
but were quickly knocked out. As the attack was crushed in a hail of gunfire,
the Marine tanks and SPMs began moving into the field, attacking any surviving
tanks. Only 12 Japanese tanks managed to escape the slaughter, half Ha-Go and
half Chi-Has. On 24 June, many of these survivors were lost in an unequal duel
with M4A2 medium tanks of Co. C, 2nd Marine Tank Battalion near Garapan, and
the rest were destroyed in scattered encounters with Army M5A1 light tanks.
Saipan was a complete change from previous Pacific campaigns, since the open
terrain permitted freer use of tanks. But tank losses were quite heavy to
artillery and to hand-emplaced magnetic mines. Japanese mine-teams soon learned
that their weapons were especially effective if carefully placed on vulnerable
points of the M4A2 medium tank, such as the rear fuel tanks. The Marines soon
learned that there had to be close cooperation between the tanks and infantry
to defeat these tactics. By now, the Marines had found that telephones mounted
on the rear of the tanks were absolutely essential to
coordinate their actions with the accompanying infantry. Saipan was declared
secure on 9 July 1944.”[14]
General Douglas MacArthur’s return to
the Philippines reached its zenith when in January 1945 his 6th Army under
General Walter Krueger landed the U.S. I and XIV Corps at Lingayen Gulf on
Luzon. The primary objective would be to secure the massive complex of air
bases centered around what was formerly Clark Field and the city and harbor
facilities of Manila. To bog down the American advance, General Yamashita kept
a substantial ground force on Luzon to draw the Americans into a protracted and
bloody campaign designed to sap the American will to fight and delay the Allied
drive towards the Japanese home islands. To assist this delaying action,
Yamashita had received the Imperial 2nd Armored Division from the China front
in 1944, the only intact division sized armored formation to face the Americans
in the Pacific. Under the command of Lt. Gen. Yoshiharu Iwanaka, the
2nd Armored was a fully equipped division, complete with the latest weapons and
equipment the Empire could provide. Its troops were fanatically motivated and
in high spirits to meet MacArthur’s men when they landed on Luzon. Yamashita
and Iwanaka knew full well that despite the excellent
tank country provided by the Luzon central plain, the 2nd Armored would be no
match in open area massed formations against American air power. The
devastation effect of Allied fighter-bombers like the P-47 Thunderbolt, known
fearfully by Panzergrenediers as “Jabos”, was made
evident to masses of German Panzer formations in tank friendly countries in
Europe and the Japanese were no stranger to this reality. Therefore, without
adequate air support, the 2nd Armored Division was divided into smaller units
to defend key terrain from dug-in positions into which the Americans were
expected to assault. Combined with well entrenched infantry, interlocking
machine gun positions, and direct fire anti-tank guns/artillery pieces, the
tanks could stand as mobile pillboxes. Showing only their turrets with a 360-degree
traversable field of fire, Filipino Barrios became fortresses, waiting for the
Americans to have to assault them from across open ground. One such engagement
took place in February 1945 at Muñoz between elements of the Imperial 6th Tank
Regiment, 2nd Armored Division and 1st U.S. Corps’ 20th Infantry Regiment of
the 6th Infantry Division, “The Sightseers”. The 6th ID engaged in bitter
fighting over several days to take Muñoz, in which 1 Congressional Medal of
Honor was earned. The 2nd Armored Division was a worthy opponent on paper for
MacArthur. Code named “Geki” (Attack force in
Japanese), the armored division possessed nearly 11,200 troopers with 1,500
vehicles of all types. Despite suffering some losses to marauding American
submarines during its dangerous transit from Manchuria to the Philippines, the
2nd was largely in full strength by the time 6th Army landed at Lingayen Gulf
in January 1945.[15]
At Muñoz alone,
elements of the 20th Infantry Regiment, 6th Division alongside armored and
artillery attached units destroyed the Imperial 6th Tank Regiment of the Ida
detachment in bitter fighting for the Barrio against dug- in tanks providing
mutual support to other entrenched infantry and supporting direct fire
artillery. On top of the 6th Tank Regiment, the “Red Star” Division had
destroyed a further anti-tank battalion, 3rd Tank Brigade headquarters, the 2nd
Mobile Artillery Regiment, and an armored infantry battalion. The
American price to pay for dislodging the Japanese positions was high, 97 killed
and 303 wounded.[16]
The 6th Division official history states of Muñoz that, “In addition to
breaking the backbone of Jap armored might in Luzon and destroying the greatest
concentration of enemy armored strength ever encountered in the Pacific, the
wearers of the Red Star had denied to the enemy in southern Luzon his last
route of escape to the north. The Sightseers had won the most decisive
victory of the Luzon Campaign.”[17]
More details were identified in a declassified
intelligence analysis from June 1945 War Department of Japanese Tank and
Anti-Tank Warfare, of the 2nd Armored Division’s performance on Luzon:
“The 2nd
Armored Division on Luzon was the first such unit encountered by United States
forces. It was anticipated that the commitment of this Japanese armored
force would provide valuable material for a study of Japanese methods in the
employment of massed armor and coordinated infantry-armor-artillery
tactics. Actual operations, however, revealed that the Japanese
commanders either did not understand the modern concept of armor employment or
simply were unable to employ the armored division in accordance with
promulgated principles of operation. Instead, the Japanese commanders
fritter away the division in piecemeal counterattacks and immobile
defenses. They never mounted an attack with more than 16 tanks at one
time. The principle of mass was never employed. The inherent
mobility of the tanks was not utilized but was negated by committing the tanks
to fixed defensive emplacements. The greatest concentration of Japanese
tanks was in San Manuel and Muñoz. Here, the armor, committed to a death
stand, was dug in so that only the turrets were exposed. Emplacements had
heavy adobe revetments, were under heavy foliage, and were a nucleus for all
other defensive measures. Tanks were sited to cover the highways and
cross-country approaches with mutually supporting fires. Close-in
security of the armored pillboxes was provided by automatic weapons and
infantry dug in around each tank. Artillery, replaced in covered
positions, supplemented the tanks to complete an integrated fire plan.
Last resort counter attacks were launched at night once the local defense was
doomed.”[18]
Lessons Learned
For Taiwan, unlike Japan in 1944-45,
there are options in the use of armor concentrations against an invasion force.
The M1A2T SEPv2 variant is a far much better match for PLA Armored Fighting Vehicles
(AFVs) compared to the inadequate and underpowered Japanese tanks relative to
their American opponents on Saipan and Luzon. With the current and future
mixture of armored capability, the ROC ground forces will possess a varying
level of armored fighting power that can allow for a two-pronged approach to
providing a hard fighting mobile armored reserve while simultaneously spreading
their less powerful tanks amongst defending infantry formations to provide
local mobilized fire support. The Japanese on Saipan and Luzon were forced to
spread out their armor to make any impact at all against the Americans due to
their lack of firepower and control of the air. For a Taiwanese defense, the
contested air above by Allied air components and influx of air defense could
allow a blanket of maneuverability units like the 2nd Armored Division on Luzon
or 9th Tank Regiment on Saipan never received to support massed combined arms
attacks against American lines.
Taiwan’s Armored Corps would do well to
study the Japanese Tankers at Saipan and Luzon. Taiwan is a large island with
terrain features that can be a friendly tank country by a defender. Its many
rivers and flat lands, combined with its masses of mountainous terrain can make
for a nasty porcupine for any invader, but choosing when and how to employ
armor within these terrain features matters a great deal to the goal of
destroying a PLA beachhead. The use of Taiwan’s older M60s and M48s as mobile
pill boxes, scattered throughout the island’s frontline formations can be of
great use. These units and their main guns are just as powerful as dug in
defensive positions as any direct fire artillery could be to support defending
infantry. Like Japanese armored employment on Luzon, if proper used in pre-registered
zones of interlocking fields of fire, these mobile gun platforms can wreak
havoc on the PLA as they first attempt to establish a beachhead and then break
out to hurdle river and bridge after river and bridge. Combined with dug-in
infantry, rear artillery support, swarms of unmanned systems at and behind the
lines wreaking havoc, and the judicious use of rotary attack aviation, any PLA
formation will find it difficult to execute a combined arms assault. The
maintenance of an intact mobile reserve, ideally the brigades of newer Abrams
and HIMARS, can be held back to conserve their strength long enough to be used
to counterattack PLA formations who stretch themselves out into a vulnerable
salient. In coordination with Allied strikes against the PLA’s amphibious
lifeline to sustain their offensive operations, such an armored counter punch
could be decisive. The armor can also be a very deadly counter force to quickly
overrun airborne or air assault units who attempt to seize vital river
crossings or key terrain in any coup de main operations early in the campaign.
Unlike Japanese formations, who lacked significant armored firepower compared
to their American opponents, the Taiwanese Abrams provide one of the best main
battle tanks on the world stage and if used in mass, can increase the
possibility of inflicting a large defeat on enemy formations.
The M1A2Ts can be seen as a welcomed
entry into Taiwan’s defensive order of battle to replace their older American
models; however, we should note that introducing ultramodern tanks cannot make
for a sound defense alone. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine showcased that once
again, the tank has not faded away to insignificance, but the invasion has also
demonstrated that tanks are also very vulnerable to light weapons at a fraction
of the cost of the main battle tank. Ukraine has exploited the effectiveness of
small unmanned aerial vehicles (sUAV) to find, fix,
and destroy armored vehicles at a grand scale. A few hundred to thousand dollars’
worth of material in the form of a hand-launched quad copter drone with a Rocket
Propelled Grenade (RPG) attached to its bottom can knock out a T-90 and its
crew just as fast and easy as an Abrams. The war in Ukraine displays a new
series of lessons for professional practitioners of combined arms warfare.
Quality counts, but mass remains a critical principle of war that nations like
Taiwan must wrestle with when determining defense acquisition. The two new
Armored Brigades can be used and used well in an island defense if they are
properly deployed within this dangerous environment of loitering sUAVs, always watching and attempting to find a venerable
target with hatch open or an exposed piece of armor to penetrate. Just as the
tank has always developed ways to maintain its status as a powerful instrument
of ground combat so have the methods to destroy them. From the Egyptian AT-3 Sagger anti-tank guided missile operator along the Suez
Canal in 1973 to the Ukrainian small drone operator in the Kursk salient in
2025, tanks will always be forced to mitigate cheaper solutions that challenge
their status on the modern battlefield.
Author’s Bios:
Grant Willis is a Fellow with the Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers (CIPR).
He is a distinguished graduate of the University of Cincinnati’s AFROTC
program with a B.A. in International Affairs, with a minor in Political
Science. Grant has multiple publications
with the Consortium, United States Naval Institute’s (USNI) Naval History Magazine, Air University’s Journal of
Indo-Pacific Affairs (JIPA), Air University’s Wild Blue Yonder Journal, Nova
Science Publishing and Air Commando Journal. Furthermore, he is often a
featured guest on multiple episodes of Vanguard: Indo-Pacific, the official podcast of the Consortium, USNI’s Proceedings Podcast, and CIPR conference panel lectures available on
the Consortium’s YouTube channel.
Brendan Donnelly
is a Fellow with the Consortium of
Indo-Pacific Researchers (CIPR). He has an undergraduate degree in History
with a double minor in Political Science and Aerospace Leadership Studies from
Bowling Green State University in Ohio. Brendan additionally has a graduate
degree in Global Security Studies with a specialization in National Security
from Angelo State University in Texas. He has published multiple articles with
the Consortium and Journal of
Indo-Pacific Affairs (JIPA). Finally, he is also featured as a moderator
and guest on the Vanguard: Indo-Pacific podcast
series and has served as an academic mentor to interns with the consortium.
[1] Brian Hioe, “China Launches New Military Drills Around
Taiwan Following Lai’s First Overseas Trip”, The Diplomat, (December 13,
2024), https://thediplomat.com/2024/12/china-launches-new-military-drills-around-taiwan-following-lais-first-overseas-trip/.
[2] Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, et al.,
“China Taiwan Weekly Update, December 12, 2024”, Institute for the Study of
War, (December 12, 2024), https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-december-12-2024.
[3] Yimou Lee, “In a first, Taiwan’s Presidential Office
Runs tabletop simulation on a China Emergency”, Reuters, (December
26,2024), https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/first-taiwans-presidential-office-runs-war-games-simulate-china-emergency-2024-12-26/.
[4] Reuters, “Xi Says no one can stop China’s
‘reunification’ with Taiwan”, Reuters, (December 31, 2024), https://www.reuters.com/world/china/xi-says-no-one-can-stop-chinas-reunification-with-taiwan-2024-12-31/.
[5] Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the
United States of America, ”Full Text of President Xi Jinping’s 2024 New Year
Message” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of
America, (December 31, 2024), http://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202312/t20231231_11215608.htm.
[6] Wu Che-yu,
and William Hetherington, “First Batch of M1A2 Tanks Arrive in Taipei – Taipei
Times.” Taipei Times, (December 16, 2024), https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2024/12/16/2003828564.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Arthur, Gordon, “Taiwan Gets US Abrams Tanks, Hardening Final
Defenses in an Invasion.” Defense News, (December 20, 2024), https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2024/12/20/taiwan-gets-us-abrams-tanks-hardening-final-defenses-in-an-invasion/.
[9] Matthew
Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, et al., “China-Taiwan Weekly Update, December 20, 2024.” Institute
for the Study of War, (December 20, 2024), https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-december-20-2024.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Michael J. Green and Bonnie S. Glaser, “What is the
U.S. “One China’ Policy and Why does it Matter?”, Center for Strategic
International Studies, (January 13, 2017), https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-one-china-policy-and-why-does-it-matter.
[12] Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, et al.,
“China-Taiwan Weekly Update, December 20, 2024.” Institute for the Study of
War, (December 20, 2024), https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-december-20-2024.
[13] Steven J. Zaloga, and Felipe Rodríguez. Tanks in the Philippines 1944-45 the biggest armored clashes of the
Pacific War. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2024. Pg 4.
[14] Zaloga,
Steve. Tank Battles of the Pacific War: 1941-1945. Hong Kong: Concord
Publications, 1995. Pg 6-7.
[15] Patrick J. Chaisson,
“‘The Enemy Must Be Annihilated.’” Warfare History Network, (October 21,
2024) https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/the-enemy-must-be-annihilated/.
[16] 6th Infantry Division in World War II. Washington,
D.C: Infantry Journal Press, 1947. Pg 100.
[17] Ibid., Pg
100.
[18] Japanese Tank and Anti-Tank Warfare Declassified.
Washington D.C.: U.S. War Department Military Intelligence Division, 1945. Pg
36-37.